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Abstract
This thesis empirically examines why an agent, a seller or a buyer, will
choose to hold or attend one particular sales mechanism over another. I examine
this question using housing sales data and government bond auction data from
the Australian State of NSW.
In Chapter one I test whether auction or private treaty achieves higher
revenue for a seller of a house in NSW, using an hedonic framework of house
valuations. I hypothesise that auctions perform better when the value of the
object is more dispersed. My results show that auctions do achieve higher
revenue, and that more unique properties benefit even more from auctions over
private treaty.
In Chapter two I test whether a certain type of buyer or seller can achieve
a better bargaining outcome through auction and private treaty sale. I use
a regression model that explains the bargaining outcome with reference to a
combination of property-related characteristics. I find that certain seller types
do achieve better bargaining outcomes for private treaty sales, but there is no
significant advantage for auction sales.
Chapters three through five test whether discriminatory price government
bond auctions achieve higher revenue than uniform-price auctions in NSW. I
use a resampling method to estimate bidder valuations. I find that on average,
discriminatory-price auctions achieve lower revenue than a counterfactual auc-
tion. But I then extend the analysis to include secondary market prices in the
estimation of bidder valuations. When I account for the presence of secondary
markets, I find that the original result is reversed and revenue raised using
discriminatory-price auctions is higher than could be achieved in a counterfac-
tual auction.
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Introduction
Background and Motivation
Auctions are an extremely widely used institution that have existed for
thousands of years. Auctions as a sales mechanism have proliferated with the in-
troduction and adoption of online auction houses. Auctions are often used to sell
relatively small value goods to unsophisticated retail buyers.
But auctions are also used to sell very high value goods to sophisticated
buyers. Government bonds are a good example. The New South Wales (NSW)
State Government regularly auctions bonds with a face value greater than $100m.
Housing in Australia is another example. In Australia, housing is an asset
class that is worth almost $4 trillion and constitutes close to 60 per cent of Australian
households’ assets. But these auctions have received very little attention in the
academic literature, despite the magnitude and importance to the Australian and
NSW economies.
In this Thesis, I extend the empirical literature to consider the optimality
of competing sales mechanisms available to sell high value assets to potential buyers
in the state of NSW. I use data sets including housing sales in NSW in 2011 and
NSW Treasury bond auctions over the period 2009 to 2011. The sheer magnitude
of the values involved means the choice of sales mechanism is very important for the
sellers of these goods.
My analysis is motivated and tied together by some important economic
questions. There is the question of which mechanism performs better for these two
markets. But overarching this are some important economic issues in the fields of
real-estate and treasury auctions for the State of NSW.
The potential for relative revenue loss is important from a policy and eco-
nomic point of view. A seller of a house could potentially be selling her largest
viii
store of wealth. And the NSW Government is clearly motivated to fund itself at
the lowest possible cost. An optimal sales mechanism ensures these objectives are
achieved.
The analysis in this Thesis is split across the two separate NSW asset mar-
kets. Chapters one and two examine the housing market in NSW. Chapters three
through five examines auctions of NSW Treasury bonds. To the best of my knowl-
edge, the tests in Thesis have not been conducted using Australian data.
Literature
The theoretic literature focussing on sales mechanisms is well developed.
Vickrey (1961), in his seminal paper, began a stream of literature that has left the
characteristics of simple sales mechanisms very well understood. But the relative
performance of competing sales mechanisms is less well understood from a theoretic
perspective.
In auction theory, the Revenue Equivalence Principle tells us that expected
revenue should be the same under any standard auction format. But in practice,
auctions may be favoured when the item being sold is unique, or when the item is
infrequently traded. Milgrom (1989) and Cassady (1967) support this view.
The Revenue Equivalence Principle does not easily extend to deciding be-
tween alternate sales mechanisms. Myerson (1981) showed that if a seller faces
buyers with independent private values, then a standard auction with a specifically
selected reserve price is the optimal selling mechanism. But Myerson (1981) and
Riley and Samuelson (1981) is not the final answer to the seller’s problem of how
to best sell her good. This early literature used static settings and did not account
for differing cost structures.
This thesis uses two branches of competing mechanism literature. The first
focuses on mechanisms available to sell individual, indivisible goods to potential
buyers. Housing sales are a good example of these types of mechanisms. Wang
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(1993) further developed the literature for these competing mechanisms. Wang
compared auction mechanisms against fixed-price sales. Wang found that auctions
should be preferred when the item being sold is high value, or when the dispersion
of the valuation of the item is high.
The second branch considers auction mechanisms used to sell divisible goods
to potential buyers. Treasury auctions are a good example of these types of com-
peting auctions. Wilson (1979) introduced the ‘share model’ that has since been
extended by Back and Zender (1993), Hortacsu (2002) and Kang and Puller (2008)
to compare discriminatory-price and uniform-price Treasury auctions.
Empirical research testing for optimality across the alternative mechanisms
has been inconclusive for both individual, indivisible goods sales and for divisi-
ble goods sales. The majority of the empirical tests have been conducted in non-
Australian settings.
The lack of research in Australia is particularly surprising given the impact
of the housing market on the Australian macroeconomy, and the the importance
of debt markets for the Australian and State Governments. To my knowledge,
only two empirical studies exist that consider optimal sales mechanisms for housing
in Australia. And there is no existing research that considers the optimal sales
mechanism for Australian Treasury bonds.
In the housing sales mechanism literature, Lusht (1996) and Frino, Lepone,
Mollica, and Vassallo (2010) examined which sales mechanism delivered higher prices
in Australia. Both Lusht and Frino, Lepone, Mollica, and Vassallo found that the
auction mechanism delivered a premium to the seller over setting a fixed-price sale.
Housing Sales Mechanisms
The housing sector is an incredibly important part of the Australian eco-
nomic landscape. Housing, as an asset class, constitutes close to 60 per cent of
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Australian household assets, according to Ellis (2010). House prices are an impor-
tant element in the Reserve Bank of Australia’s monetary policy decision making
framework. But housing decisions are also important on a micro level. For most
Australians, buying or selling a house could be one of the largest transactions in
their life.
Existing homeowners, and potential buyers, are naturally then likely to
spend some time thinking about how to buy or sell a property. Two questions in
particulary seem likely to receive some focus. A seller of a property is likely to ask,
how can I achieve the highest revenue from selling my property? And a potential
buyer, on the other hand, might ask what chance do I have of getting a bargain?
These are questions of mechanism design. In particular, these questions are
focussed on optimality across competing mechanisms. Wang (1993) extended the
theoretic research from Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and McAfee
and McMillan (1988) to show that auctions should be preferred when the item being
sold is high value, or when the dispersion of the valuation of the item is high. But
empirical testing of competing mechanism frameworks has been inconclusive. And
despite the rich institutional frameworks and data in Australia, there have been no
tests conducted in this country. Chapters one and two go some way to addressing
this shortfall.
In Chapter one I ask whether auction or private treaty achieves higher
revenue for a seller of a house in NSW. I hypothesise that auctions perform better
when the value of the object is more dispersed, in line with Wang (1993).
This has not been tested before in Australia, despite the importance of the
housing sector to the Australian macroeconomy. The data I use are much richer
than prior international studies. I am able to extend the literature to test whether
seller-types impact auction revenues.
I first use an hedonic framework of house valuations to ask whether the
same property would sell for a higher price at an auction or a private treaty sale.
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I then ask whether sellers achieve a higher price in auctions or private treaty sales,
depending on the characteristics of the property. The aim is to empirically test the
theoretic findings in Wang (1993) that auctions perform better when the value of
the item is more dispersed or when the value of the item is higher.
My results show that auctions do achieve higher revenue. And the benefit to
the seller from setting an auction increased as the property type was more valuable,
or more unique. Investor-type sellers on average achieve higher auction sales prices
relative to private treaty sales than do owner-occupier-type sellers. My empirical
evidence supports Wang’s theory.
In Chapter two I ask whether a buyer or seller can achieve a better bar-
gaining outcome by announcing or attending a property auction compared with a
private treaty sale. Bargaining outcomes are measured by the discount ratio, that
is defined as the ratio of the difference between the asking price of the property and
the sale price, and the asking price. If certain types of participants can achieve a
systematic bargaining advantage depending on the sales mechanism, then it raises
questions about why participants attend alternative sales mechanisms.
I consider whether the ‘type’ of property seller and potential property buyer
impacts the bargaining outcome. Sellers and buyers of properties in NSW can be
segmented into one of two types, ‘owner-occupiers’ and ‘investors’. To my knowl-
edge, the existing literature has not tested for bargaining power according to seller
types. Nor has bargaining power been empirically tested in Australia at all.
I use a regression model that explains the bargaining outcome with reference
to a combination of real estate, household and buying process characteristics to
test for bargaining power in NSW auctions. The methodology is similar to the
econometric methods of Song (1995) and Wilhelmsson (2008). My results show that
owner-occupier-type sellers do achieve better bargaining outcomes than investor-
type sellers for private treaty sales. But there is no significant advantage to either
type for auction sales.
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The regression results indicated that opting for a private treaty mechanism
increased the discount ratio and worsened the bargaining outcome for sellers. Con-
versely, choosing an auction improved the bargaining outcomes. It appears that
sellers overvalue the property when choosing a private treaty sale, and set an asking
price that is too low when an auction is chosen.
NSW Treasury Auctions
Chapters three through five focus on Treasury bond auctions. Governments
around the world use auctions to sell Government securities. The size and value of
Treasury auctions in Australia means that Governments should spend time consid-
ering what is the optimal mechanism for selling these securities.
Treasury auctions are generally conducted using discriminatory auctions
or uniform-price auctions. Discriminatory and uniform-price auctions differ in the
payment rule. In a discriminatory auction, winning bidders pay the amount that
they actually bid for each quantity that they won. In a uniform-price auction, each
winning bidder pays the market clearing price of the auction.
In Chapter four, I test whether discriminatory-price auctions achieve higher
revenue than uniform-price auctions in NSW. I replicate the resampling method from
Hortacsu (2002) to estimate bidder valuations in NSW Treasury Corporation bond
auctions in 17 Treasury auctions held between 2009 and 2011. This test has not
been considered using Australian data.
The NSW Treasury Corpration (TCorp) is the second largest of the Aus-
tralian State Government issuers, accounting for around 25% of the total Australian
State-Government bond market. By mid-2011, NSW had a total of $54.5bn of debt
issuance. Just under $5bn of that was inflation-linked bond yields.
In Treasury auctions, bidders aim to achieve the best rate of return on their
purchases of Treasury bonds. They will try to under-bid for Treasury bonds relative
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to their true value. Treasury auctioneers, on the other hand, will seek to fund their
Government at the cheapest possible rate.
Using Hortacsu’s method, I find that the bidders in discriminatory and
uniform-price auctions in NSW do under-bid relative to their valuations.
NSW TCorp typically uses discriminatory auctions issue bonds. I test
whether the actual revenue achieved by TCorp exceeds the revenue that could have
been achieved in a counterfactual multi-unit Vickrey auction. My results show that
on average, the discriminatory auction used by Tcorp achieves lower revenue than
the counterfactual auction.
The existing empirical literature that estimates revenues using bidder-level
data from Treasury auctions ignores the presence of a secondary market for Treasury
bonds. But after a Treasury bond line has been established, auctions held by the
issuer are no longer the only place bidders can buy the bond. Bidders can instead
purchase the bond on the secondary market.
A secondary market can act as a fixed price alternative to Treasury bonds.
I hypothesise that bidders incorporate the presence of secondary markets in their
bidder strategies. If that is the case, ignoring secondary markets could result in over-
estimation of bidder valuations. And that greater level of bid-shading will result in
lower revenue estimates for the counterfactual auction held in Chapter four.
I extend the empirical literature by including secondary prices into the
estimation. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical research that
estimates bidder level valuations that does not treat the auctioneer as a monopolist
seller.
When I account for the presence of a secondary Treasury bond market, my
results do show the actual revenue raised by NSW Treasury Corporation discriminatory-
price auctions is higher than what could have been achieve in the counterfactual
auction. That is, including secondary markets reverses my findings from Chapter
four. My analysis indicates that auctioneers and researchers need to consider the im-
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pact of secondary markets when considering the relative performance of competing
auction mechanisms.
Concluding Remarks
My Thesis uses NSW auction data from two separate asset classes to em-
pirically test optimality across competing sales mechanisms. The empirical research
extends international studies and uses Australian data for the first time, to the best
of my knowledge. I find that the theoretic results in Wang (1993) are born out by
empirical testing using NSW housing data. Auctions do perform better when the
value of the item is high or the item is unusual. My empirical results from Chapter
five indicate that secondary markets do matter to auctioneers of Government bonds.
Discriminatory-price auctions achieve higher revenue in the presence of secondary
markets in NSW than could have been achieved using a counterfactual multi-unit
Vickrey auction.
xv
Chapter 1
1 New South Wales Housing Sales - Why Do Sellers
Choose Auctions?
Housing in Australia is a big deal. Housing is an asset class that is worth
almost $4 trillion and constitutes close to 60 per cent of Australian households’
assets1. For most Australians, buying a house will prove to be the largest purchase
within their life.
Given the size of the market, housing plays an extremely important role
in Australia’s macroeconomy. House prices are regularly a topic for discussion at
the Reserve Bank of Australia’s monetary policy meetings. Economists worry about
house prices because of the potential for wealth effects on household spending. Move-
ments in house prices may influence the equity available to home owners to withdraw
to support spending. Conditions in the housing market might also have implications
for financial stability2.
But existing householders, and potential buyers, might tend to worry about
house prices from a different perspective. Two natural questions arise for these
individuals. Potential house sellers might naturally be wondering, how can I best
sell the property? And potential buyers, on the other hand, might ask what chance
do I have of getting a bargain?
The former question is essentially a mechanism design question. The impact
of mechanism design on housing prices in Australian and internationally has been
considered previously in the literature. In this paper, I consider the impact of
mechanism design to test existing theory. I ask why is it that sellers choose one
selling mechanism over the other? I test existing theory that suggests that sellers
1See Ellis (2010).
2See Ellis (2010) and Bank of England (2010).
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prefer to auction an item if the item has characteristics that make it unique. The
latter question, concerning the possibility of achieving a bargain, is considered in
the subsequent Chapter 2.
In auction theory, the Revenue Equivalence Principle tells us that expected
revenue should be the same under any standard auction format3. But in practice,
auctions may be favoured when the item being sold is unique, or when the item is
not traded often. Milgrom (1989) and Cassady (1967) support this view.
The Revenue Equivalence Principle does not easily extend to deciding be-
tween alternate sales mechanisms. Myerson (1981) showed that if a seller faces
buyers with independent private values, then a standard auction with a specifically
selected reserve price is the optimal selling mechanism. In Myerson’s seminal paper,
the optimal mechanism maximised the seller’s expected profits among all conceivable
selling mechanisms.
But the literature on optimal auctions (e.g Myerson (1981) and Riley and
Samuelson (1981)) is not the final answer to the problem for a seller choosing how
to sell her good. The early literature on optimal mechanism design considered the
problem using static settings where the the set of bidders was not influenced by the
selling mechanism. And the early literature did not recognise that cost structures
could be different under alternate selling mechanisms.
Wang (1993) further developed the literature on competing sales mecha-
nisms. Wang (1993) compared posted-price selling, auctions and bargaining and
concluded that auctions and bargaining outperformed posted-price selling when the
value of the object is more dispersed. Items with higher values are more likely to
achieve a higher selling price using auctions rather than posted-price sales. And
bargaining will give a lower reserve price, so the item is more likely to sell under
bargaining than posted-price. In this research, I am interested in whether it is ra-
tional for the seller to favour auctions over private treaty if she is less sure of the
3See, for example, Krishna (2010).
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value of the characteristics of her particular property.
Given the importance of the housing market in Australia, it is odd that
there has been so little research dedicated to examining these results. In my re-
search, I find that the uniqueness of the property does increase the auction price
differential over private treaty sales. That finding supports the findings in Wang
(1993). And auctions in general achieve higher sales prices than private treaty sales.
It is incongruous, then, that private treaty and bargaining remains the dominant
sales mechanism in Australia.
In the next section, I will discuss the existing literature on mechanism choice
for property sales. The Section 1.2 discusses the empirical methodology used, while
the Section 1.3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 contains the
results of analysis, and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1 Auctions versus private treaty
In most real estate markets around the world, a seller of a house typically
has two sales mechanisms available. The house can be sold using a private treaty
mechanism, or it can be sold using an auction mechanism. In US housing markets,
for example, houses are typically sold using private treaty or negotiation. Auctions
are generally only used to sell property as a last resort. Vanderporten (1992) reports
this is particularly so when the owners face financial stress or are forced sellers. The
Australian experience is different, where auctions are a more accepted method of
sale. Lusht (1996) points out in an empirical paper that auctions are more favoured
during periods of strong demand. This is probably because stronger demand attracts
more bidders, making auctions appear even more favourable to sellers.
The alternate mechanisms have different characteristics that make them
appealing. The most fundamental difference between the two mechanisms is the
timing and ability to compare offers to purchase the property.
Private treaty allows a theoretically infinite time horizon to attract buyers.
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Buyers essentially face a search process that allows them to look for the ‘correct’
property, according to their wants and needs. Sellers also face a search process,
that lets them find the buyer that is willing to pay at least as much as the seller’s
reservation price. Offers to buy arrive with the seller sequentially. The seller can
reject offers that are too low, and can then wait for additional offers. But private
treaty sale does not allow the seller to compare all offers at any one time. Because
offers arrive sequentially and not simultaneously, and are withdrawn if not accepted,
the seller must trade off the timing of sale against waiting for an offer that meets or
exceeds the reservation price.
The auction mechanism, on the other hand, allows sellers to compare all
buyer offers for the property at a single time, because the mechanism acts as a
centralised marketplace. The time of sale trade-off need not occur. If there are
serious bidders that offer more than the reservation price, then the sale occurs
immediately.
Much of the literature ascribes systematic differences in the price achieved
between the two mechanisms to the trade off between time-to-sale and price, assum-
ing transaction costs are similar for both mechanisms. The comparisons are usually
conducted using hedonic pricing techniques, with a sales mechanism dummy in-
cluded in the regression to capture the impact of the seller’s choice for sale.
For example, Quan (2002) proposes a model of mechanism choice that as-
sumes that transaction, search and holding costs are high in real estate transactions.
High search costs will weigh on buyers’ reservation prices and expected benefit from
continued searching. So, buyers with high search costs attend auctions, but lower
search costs incentivise buyers to continue in the search market. Quan concluded
that because high-cost buyers attend auctions, prices should be expected to be
higher at auctions.
The impact of the stage in the cycle of the housing market could also impact
auction prices relative to private negotiation. Mayer (1995) used a theoretical model
4
to explain larger discounts in auction markets in the US during housing downturns.
The model incorporates the housing cycle via shocks to the number of house buyers
and available houses. In Mayer (1995), buyers face higher costs in search markets,
if the house is not a perfect match. And in auction markets, the buyer values
the house based on expected alternatives in the search market. A greater number
of alternatives makes the search market a better choice, and the auction discount
increases. But more buyers makes auctions more effective, and decreases the auction
discount.
The existing literature has not reached a consistent conclusion about the
best mechanism for selling a house. For example, Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992)
found that prices at auction were up to 13% higher than private negotiations. But
Mayer (1998), among others, found the opposite result.
There are few studies conducted using Australian data, despite the exagger-
ated interest in the macroeconomic impact of housing in Australia. And as Frino,
Lepone, Mollica, and Vassallo (2010) points out in an empirical study, the struc-
ture of the Australian housing market appears more conducive to research examining
mechanism design. In the US, as mentioned, auctions are a last resort and commonly
used during periods of financial duress. In contrast, auctions are a more common
alternative to private negotiation for selling residential property in Australia.
Lusht (1996) and Frino, Lepone, Mollica, and Vassallo (2010) empirically
examined which sales mechanism delivered higher prices in Australia. Lusht studied
selling prices for 221 properties sold in Melbourne over the period January 1988 to
March 1989. 163 of the properties were sold using auction. 58 were sold through
private treaty. Lusht controlled for several characteristics of the properties and
found that auction sales delivered a premium to the seller of $19326, or around
8%. Frino, Lepone, Mollica, and Vassallo find that houses sold via auction generally
deliver a higher price. But that auction premium was not evident for auctions for
sales of units.
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Frino, Lepone, Mollica, and Vassallo (2010) raise the interesting possibility
that auctions perform better when the item being auctioned is less homogenous.
Wang (1993) raised a similar point. Auctions might promote competitive bidding
that could be particularly useful when the property has unusual characteristics that
could be difficult to value. Wang (1993) compared posted-price sales with auction
sales. Wang concluded that auctions perform better when the value of the item is
more dispersed or when the value of the item is higher.
Wang (1995) also compared the competing sales mechanisms. In this paper,
Wang concluded that sellers prefer bargaining over posted-price sales whenever the
item being sold is difficult to value.
The findings in Wang have not been universally supported by empirical
research. Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2003) showed empirically that auctions
performed poorly in cases where the item being auctioned was complex. And Hel-
stad, Vassdal, and Trondsen (2005) showed empirically that auctions perform worse
than negotiated sales when the item - in this case, lots of fish - were heterogenous.
To the best of my knowledge, Wang (1993) has not been tested empirically in Aus-
tralia. This paper addresses that with a focus on NSW residential property sales.
Clearly, Wang is important to this Thesis. In the next subsection, I discuss Wang’s
theoretical findings in more depth, as they are particularly relevant for this Chapter.
1.1.1 Wang and Competing Mechanisms
Wang extended the competing mechanism theoretical literature to consider
why a monopolist seller might prefer alternative selling mechanisms over fixed-price
sales. Wang could not use the Revelation Principle to find the optimal mechanism,
because the cost structure was assumed to be different under the alternative selling
mechanisms. Wang therefore extended the previous theoretic research from Myerson
(1981) and McAfee and McMillan (1988).
Wang (1993) compares posted-price selling mechanisms with an auction
6
mechanism. In posted-price selling, sellers post a price and bidders arrive sequen-
tially and randomly. Each buyer decides whether to buy at the posted price. The
selling game ends as soon as the object is sold. For the auction mechanism, the seller
invites potential buyers to an auction on a given date. The seller can announce a
reservation price for that auction. A subsequent auction is announced if the object
does not sell at the initial auction - and that process continues until the object is
sold.
The cost structures for the two mechanisms differ. There is a cost of display-
ing the object whenever the seller chooses a posted-price mechanism. The auction
mechanism, on the other hand, incurs a cost of storage and a cost of auctioning the
object. Wang shows that a seller will always choose an auction if there is no auc-
tioning cost. This mechanism is equivalent to a posted-price mechanism where the
posted price equals the reservation price and the seller facing a continuous storage
cost.
Wang also found that if there is a positive cost of auction, then the optimal
choice of mechanism does depend on the relative size of the costs. Auctions can be
optimal if the auctioning cost is low enough, or if the cost of storage is low enough.
Wang’s consideration of costs extended the theoretic literature. But it was
the focus on how the dispersion of the distribution of a bidder’s valuation affects
the optimal choice for selling mechanism that was the primary focus for the paper,
and of primary relevance for this empirical paper.
Wang (1993) considered theoretically why a seller would choose to set an
auction rather than sell the item at a fixed price. I test this empirically in this
paper. Wang found that there is an incentive for sellers to wait longer for a sale
when the distribution of buyers’ valuations for the item are widely dispersed. As
time progresses, the seller becomes more likely to get a higher price because the dis-
tribution of the second highest bid - that becomes the sales price - shifts higher.The
key result from Wang’s paper is that auctions become more attractive as a selling
7
mechanism as the dispersion of buyers’ valuations widens.
Wang points out that the dispersion of a distribution is different from the
variance. But an increase in dispersion implies an increase in variance, and an in-
crease in variance is also an increase in dispersion if a distribution is characterised by
mean and variance. The following exposition follows Wang and considers dispersion
by looking at the cumulated distribution function of a random variable.
Assume that f(v) > 0∀v ∈ [vv¯]. Thus F (·) is strictly increasing on its
support. Define g ≡ F−1. g has domain of [0,1], and a range of [vv¯].
Because g′ = 1f , then
J ◦ g = g − 1−F (g)f = g − (1− F (g))g′
Assume Φ ∈ [0, 1]. Wang then translates the optimal auction problem into
Φ language, after defining v = g(Φ) and F = F (p) and denoting J ◦ g ≡ . Wang
measures the dispersion of a given distribution by . Then, a distribution F1 is more
dispersed than distribution F2 if and only if 
′
1(Φ) > 
′
2(Φ)∀Φ ∈ [0, 1].
Wang shows that auctions are a more attractive selling mechanism when
the dispersion of buyers’ valuations is greater. But that is not all. Wang also shows
in the same theorem that objects with larger values are more likely to be auctioned,
since they have more dispersed distributions. And sellers are incentivised to wait
longer to sell when valuations have a more dispersed distribution. The distribution
of the winning bid is pushed higher as the seller waits longer, for more dispersed
distributions.
So a seller would prefer to wait for a longer period and attract more bidders
in the auction, and the profits from that auction will increase, with the more dis-
persed valuations. The implication is that the optimal sequence of auctions becomes
more attractive to a seller relative to the posted-price mechanism that acts as an
immediate take it or leave it offer.
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Wang’s finding, that auctions should be preferred when the dispersion of
valuations is greater and when prices are higher, is the theoretical aspect that I test
in this Chapter. But I do not have the distribution functions of bidder valuations
available in the data set,that is, I cannot directly calculate whether F1 is more
dispersed than distribution F2. So I use a property’s ‘uniqueness’ to gauge how
dispersed the valuations are and test whether auctions have performed better from a
sale price perspective relative to a fixed-price alternative in NSW property auctions.
In the next section, I describe the tests I perform to conclude whether auc-
tions perform better or worse when a property is more unique relative to alternative
properties. I also describe how I test whether the same property sells for more or
less under the alternative sales mechanisms.
1.2 Methodology
The empirical section of this paper contains two distinct parts. The first
asks whether an auction or a private treaty sale achieves a higher selling price using
an hedonic framework of house valuations. Hedonic frameworks estimate the value
of the house as the sum of the values of each of the characteristics of the house.
This hedonic-style modeling has been conducted before, both internation-
ally and in Australia4. But the test has been limited to comparing whether on
average, the auctions or private treaty obtain higher prices.
In this paper, I consider whether the same property achieves a higher price
at the auction or at private treaty. The second part of the paper asks whether
sellers achieve a higher price in auctions or private treaty sales, depending on the
characteristics of the property.
The aim is to empirically test the notion from Wang (1993) that auctions
perform better when the value of the item is more dispersed or when the value of
the item is higher. Wang’s definition of dispersion is discussed in Section 1.1.1.
4See Lusht (1996), Song (1995) and Harding, Knight, and Sirmans (2003).
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Houses are typically higher value properties than are flats or units. And I
can measure the similarity or otherwise of properties to an average property because
I have data that describe the characteristics of the residential properties. I use the
Mahalanobis distance to measure the variance of the characteristic set for each
property from the average property characteristics. This measure allows me to
empirically test Wang’s findings.
The second part of the paper follows a similar methodology to Chow,
Hafalir, and Yavas (2011), who considered the questions with a less rich data set for
Singaporean property sales. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time this
question and the implications have been considered using Australian data.
The hedonic model of house prices assumes that a residential property is
composed of a number of individual characteristics. Griliches (1971), Rosen (1974)
and Epple (1987) developed the empirical hedonic framework for modeling prices.
They showed that each of those characteristics has an implicit price, or shadow price.
The market value for the residential property is estimated as the sum of the shadow
prices for the individual components. The shadow prices themselves are estimated
using actual realised prices from trading of items that differ across the individual
attributes.
The empirical estimation of the hedonic pricing model needs to account for
sample selectivity bias. Hedonic price modeling needs to account for buyers and
sellers being able to decide which sales mechanism they compete in. The decision
may not be random. Sellers can trade-off between an auction that has a better
chance of an immediate sale on one hand, and a private treaty sale that could take
longer to find a buyer that will at least meet the seller’s reservation price on the other
hand. Clearly, a rational seller should choose the alternative that will maximise her
expected returns.
But that decision means that the properties sold using one mechanism in-
stead of the alternative may not be a random decision. The decision would become
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endogenous and based on some variable that has been omitted from the hedonic
equation but still affects the price of the property. In contrast, a hedonic model
that does not account for sample selectivity bias implies the decision between auc-
tion and private treaty is exogenous.
If the endogeneity is not accounted for, then price differences that should
have been attributed to the omitted variable would be reflected in the mechanism
decision. Then the conditional expectation of the error terms in the hedonic es-
timation would no longer be equal to zero and the coefficients will be subject to
selectivity bias. Heckman (1979) proposed the correction term that is called the
inverse Mill’s ratio to correct for bias. The inverse Mill’s ratio becomes an explana-
tory variable in the hedonic price OLS regression. If the coefficient for the inverse
Mill’s ratio is significantly different from zero then there is selectivity bias present5.
Quan (2002) showed the potential ramifications of selectivity bias. Quan
showed empirically that property prices fall under auction if the sales mechanism
decision was treated as exogenous. But property prices increased significantly under
auction if the mechanism decision was treated as endogenous.
I use the two-step estimation procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) and
follow the structure of the empirical model of Lee (1982) to account for potential
sample selectivity bias. The first step of the procedure estimates a selection equation
using a probit model described in Equation 1.
MCi = Mη +Xβ + Z
′γ +  (1)
The second step of the Heckman procedure estimates the hedonic price equations.
I estimate two equations, one for each sales mechanism. In the two price Equations
2 and 3, the dependent variable is the natural log of the sales price. The subscripts
a and pt refer to auctions and private treaty sales respectively.
5See Appendix C for a brief description of Heckman’s procedure.
11
logPa = Mηa +Xβa + LMIγa + a (2)
logPpt = Mηpt +Xβpt + LMIγpt + pt (3)
In the probit equation, Equation 1, MC is a binary dummy variable that takes the
value MC = 1 if the property was sold under private treaty and MC = 0 if the
property was sold under auction. M is a matrix of market conditions prevailing at
the time of the transaction. And X is a matrix of the properties’ characteristics.
Z’ is a matrix of seller characteristics.  is the random error term.
Clearly, the property characteristics could impact the seller’s sale mecha-
nism decision. Property market characteristics could also influence the seller’s sale
mechanism decision. I include an index for auction clearance rates in NSW and cash
rate expectations in M. The month of the sale is also included in M. Z’ is included
in the probit model equation to capture seller characteristics that could impact the
sellers’ mechanism decision. Z’ includes the seller type ST that is a binary dummy
variable that takes the value ST = 1 if the seller is an owner-occupier and ST = 0
if the owner is an investor. Z’ also includes a variable for the log mean income of
residents within the postcode that the property is being sold.
I expect the variables in Z’ will impact the choice of mechanism. But the
seller-type variable ST should not directly drive the value of the property. I drop
that variable in the price Equations 2 and 3. In those equations, the matrix Z
becomes the log mean income variable LMI.
I derive the inverse Mills’ ratios from Equation 1. They are calculated as:
E (pt|I = 1) = −σpt f(Mη+Xβ+Z
′γ)
F (Mη+Xβ+Z′γ) = −σpt
(
f(Θ
F (Θ)
)
E (a|I = 1) = σa f(Mη+Xβ+Z
′γ)
1−F (Mη+Xβ+Z′γ) = σa
(
f(Θ
1− F (Θ)
)
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f is the standard normal density function, F is the cumulative distribution, and σ
is the covariance between the estimated hedonic price equations and the random
errors for that hedonic price equation.
After deriving the inverse Mill’s ratio, denoted IMR in Equations 4 and 5,
I can estimate the new hedonic pricing equations for each sales mechanism.
logPa = Mηa +Xβa + LMIγa + IMRa + εa (4)
logPpt = Mηpt +Xβpt + LMIγpt + IMRpt + εpt (5)
In the new pricing equations, E (εa|MC = 0) = 0 and E (εpt|MC = 1) = 0.
The primary research question in this paper is whether properties with more
unique characteristics or higher values achieve a higher price when sold through
auction instead of private treaty. Is the assertion in Wang (1993), that unusual
or harder-to-value items sell for more in auctions, supported by NSW residential
auction data? To answer this question, I need to have an estimate of what price
a given residential property could hypothetically have achieved if sold under the
alternative mechanism. Those estimates are given by Equations 6 and 7.
νa = Mηˆa +Xβˆa + ˆZγa (6)
νpt = Mηˆpt +Xβˆpt + Zγˆpt (7)
I can estimate the percentage price difference for a property i sold under auction
instead of private treaty using the formula from Lee (1978) and Chow, Hafalir, and
Yavas (2011).
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P% =
exp (νa)× exp
(
0.5× (σˆa2 − σˆpt2)
)− exp (νpt)
exp (νpt)
(8)
σˆa
2 and σˆpt
2
are the standard errors from the estimated auction price equation and
the estimated private treaty equation, respectively.
I calculate the price differentials across three price quantiles, three mean
income quantiles and by property and seller type.
I first subdivide the data into two categories. The first category only in-
cludes data for sales of houses. The second category only includes data for sales of
apartments. I assume as a prior that houses are more likely to have hard-to-value
characteristics. Flats, on the other hand, are more likely to be homogenous. The
risk to this assumption is the property’s views. Apartments, particularly around the
harbour of Sydney, could have water views that are difficult for sellers and buyers
to pin a value to. And some of the apartments are as large as houses with the
same number of bedrooms. I calculate percentage price differences for each of the
subcategories.
I also subdivide the data into two seller type categories. The data are
divided into owner-occupier-type seller data and investor-type seller data. I calculate
the percentage price differences for both subsets for all properties, and across the
two property subcategories, to test whether the seller characteristics impact the
price difference. The results could indicate bargaining power for one seller type over
the other if there is a significant difference between the two seller types. I follow this
test up in Chapter 2 where I consider bargaining power in NSW residential property
sales.
As previously mentioned, I also separate the data into three quantiles by
price and by mean income. I expect higher price properties and properties situated
in higher mean income postcodes should have higher values or have characteristics
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that are harder to value. If that is the case, Wang (1993) suggests the property
should achieve a higher sales price under auction than private treaty. The quantiles
separate properties into the lowest 30th percentile, the middle 40th percentile and
the highest 30th percentile for price and mean incomes.
In Equation 9 I regress the percentage price difference P% for each property
against PD, a measure of the variance of the characteristic set for each property from
the average property characteristics and PT, a binary dummy variable that indicates
whether the property is a house or an apartment. I follow Chow, Hafalir, and Yavas
(2011) and run the regression across the three price quantiles that separate the
residential property in the lowest 30th percentile of house prices, the middle 40th
percentile of house prices and the highest 30th percentile of house prices.
I also then separate the data into the same three quantiles for the mean
income of the area the property is situated, and run the same regression. In com-
parison with Chow, Hafalir, and Yavas (2011), I use a measure of the variance of
the total characteristics of the property instead of just the property size and tenure.
I am able to do so because of the richness of the data on property characteristics.
P% = θPD + φPT +  (9)
1.3 Data
The data used in the regressions come from four separate sources. The
major data source is the property sales data from Australian Property Monitors.
The data set includes information on all residential property transactions conducted
in NSW over the 2011 calendar year. These data include the property characteristics,
that are listed in Table 1. The data also include information on the actual property
transaction including the sale price, property type, time on market, and seller types.
The variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 1: Housing Data Variable Definitions
Variable Abbrev Unit Description
Sale Price P AUD Final sale price
Mechanism MC Binary 1 if sold through private treaty,
0 if auction
Property Attributes
Time on Market T Days Days spent on the market
Property Type PT Binary 1 if house,0 if apartment
House Size HS meters2 Total size of the property
Bedrooms B Number Number of bedrooms
Bathrooms BR Number Number of bathrooms
Carparks CP Number Number of carparks
Study S Binary 1 if study, 0 if not
Dining Room DR Binary 1 if dining room, 0 if not
Family Room FR Binary 1 if family room, 0 if not
Sunroom SR Binary 1 if sunroom, 0 if not
Rumpus Room RR Binary 1 if rumpus room, 0 if not
Fireplace F Binary 1 if fireplace, 0 if not
Walk in Wardrobe WR Binary 1 if WIR, 0 if not
Courtyard CY Binary 1 if courtyard, 0 if not
Heating H Binary 1 if central heating, 0 if not
Aircon AC Binary 1 if air-conditioning, 0 if not
Balcony BC Binary 1 if balcony, 0 if not
Barbecue BB Binary 1 if bbq, 0 if not
Timber Floor TF Binary 1 if timber floor, 0 if not
Ensuite E Binary 1 if ensuite,0 if not
Garage G Binary 1 if garage, 0 if not
Pool/Tennis Court/Spa PO Binary 1 if P/T/S, 0 if not
Alarm AL Binary 1 if alarm, 0 if not
Seller Attributes
Seller Type ST Binary 1 if owner-occupier seller,
0 if investor seller
Mean Income MI AUD Mean income of the
property postcode
Market Conditions
Sale Month MT Index out of 12 Month of sale
Auction Clearances AR Percent Average percent of auctions cleared
in the four week period prior to sale
Expected cash rate CR Percent Expected cash rate
change over 12 months
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The second source of data is Personal Tax Table 3A, published by the
Australian Tax Office (ATO)6. The ATO publishes mean income levels for all the
residential postcodes in NSW. These can be linked to the property transaction post-
codes contained in the major data set. There are 601 postcode regions in NSW, with
a mean income across the state of $55,852. The mean income data are used to proxy
for socioeconomic characteristics for different suburbs, that are a subset of the hous-
ing characteristics.
The third source of data is the auction clearance rates in NSW. Auction
clearance rates are published weekly by RP Data. The data include the number of
auctions and the percentage of cleared auctions each week in 2011 for the state of
NSW. The average clearance rate over the year was 47%. I have used the auction
clearance rate as a gauge of buyer and seller certainty about the state of the housing
market.
Furthermore, I have included market characteristics that are likely to influ-
ence the bargaining power of buyers and sellers. In Australia, housing credit and
home sales are sensitive to changes in the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) official
cash rate, that impacts mortgage lending rates7. In Australia, domestic residents
are acutely aware of the prevailing economic conditions according to Macfarlane
(2006), and likely make decisions based on those conditions. So buyers and sellers
are likely to form opinions about the state of the market based on current cash rates,
relative to expectations for future cash rates.
The variable Cash Rate Expectations (CR) is calculated using the official
cash rate prevailing at the time of the property transaction, minus the expected
cash rate 12 months forward. When that number is negative, then the cash rate is
expected to increase over the following 12 months. Mortgages will cost buyers more.
When the number is positive, then cash rates are expected to decline. Over 2011,
the cash rate was expected to increase for the first half of the year. Expectations
6See Australian Tax Office, www.ato.gov.au
7See Brischetto and Rosewall (2007).
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changed to rate cuts over the second half of 2011.
I use the full dataset of 89,442 sales in the probit model selection equation.
I split the dataset into two sales mechanism subcategories. There are 3,571 auction
sales and 85,871 private treaty sales. Table 2 shows the descriptive statisitcs for the
variables in the full data set, and for the sub-categories of auction sales and private
treaty sales.
Table 2 shows that properties sold under auction on average achieve higher
sales pricesf. The magnitude of the variance in average sales price is stark. Auctions
average $823,709 per sale, almost $300,000 more than private treaty sales.
The difference between the average sales price could indicate two possibili-
ties. The first is that auctions deliver higher sales prices relative to private treaties.
I test this hypothesis in this paper using Equation 8 and discuss the results in the
next section. The second possibility is that higher value properties, or properties
with unusual characteristics, are sold under auction. I test this hypothesis using
Equation 9 and discuss the results in the next section.
The latter of the two possibilities discussed above does gain some support
from the descriptive statistics in Table 2. On average, the properties sold under
auction are larger, with an average of 3.07 bedrooms compared with 2.98 bedrooms
for properties sold under private treaty. And there is on average more bathroooms
in properties sold under auction than for those sold under private treaty.
Properties sold under auction have a higher mean for 12 of the 21 property
attributes, excluding time on the market and property type. The Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum test also suggests that in general, properties sold under auction are significantly
different from properties sold under private treaty in terms of the characteristics.
The higher average price for properties sold under auction could indicate
that these properties are more likely to have unusual or difficult to value character-
istics. That would support the finding in Wang (1993). Since this is a key focus
for this research, I consider the question in more detail in the following section.
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Table 2: Housing Summary Statistics
Full data set Auctions Private Treaty
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Wilcoxon Test
P 536,550 485,105 823,709 578,511 524,611 477,106 47.44**
MC 0.96 0.20 — — — — —
Property Attributes (X)
T 110 142.41 73.84 129.67 111.13 142.73 -31.75**
PT 0.74 0.44 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.44 -0.75
HS 1751 24634 1710 20638 1789 30687 -0.865
B 2.98 1.10 3.07 1.12 2.98 1.10 3.60**
BR 1.57 0.70 1.69 0.80 1.56 0.69 7.93**
CP 1.53 1.28 1.56 4.35 1.53 0.95 -2.15**
S 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 5.19**
DR 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 6.60**
FR 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 -2.27**
SR 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 5.03**
RR 0.03 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 -1.71**
F 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.23 15.18**
WR 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 -3.06**
CY 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.27 3.58**
H 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 -3.75**
AC 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 -3.93**
BC 0.22 0.32 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 5.77**
BB 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.21 -2.81**
TF 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.30 11.09**
E 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.42 -3.59**
G 0.21 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.40 -2.88**
PO 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 3.88**
AL 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.27 4.95**
Seller Attributes (Z’)
ST 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.29 0.91 0.29 10.87**
MI 58,770 17,409 64,015 18,268 56,646 16,550 2.74**
Market Conditions (M)
MT 7.09 3.48 6.89 3.34 7.09 3.49 -3.97**
AR 46.27 8.50 48.57 7.06 46.01 9.19 28.00**
CR -0.56 0.76 -0.52 0.78 -0.57 0.76 0.56
*Significant at 5% level.
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Auctioned properties also generally spend far less time on the market. Properties
sold under auction spend almost 50 days less on the market than do properties sold
under private treaty. This is in line with prior expectations that auctions tend to
sell faster and private treaty sales allow the seller a longer time to find a buyer with
a reservation price that exceeds the sellers’ reservation value.
Auctions tend to be used after periods where the auction clearance rate on
average is higher. This result is unsurprising. A sellers’ decision about which sales
mechanism to use is likely to be swung by how that sales mechanism has performed
in recent periods.
The properties that are sold under auction also come from higher income
postcodes on average. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test indicate the properties sold
under the two alternative sales methods are significantly different across most of the
variables in the property attributes, seller attributes and market conditions.
In the next section, I show the results of the regressions and discuss the
implications.
1.4 Results and discussion
1.4.1 Probit model selection equation
Table 3 shows the results of the probit model selection equation 1. All
of the equations were estimated using the MATLAB program. Table 3 shows the
Pseudo R-squared is low at only 10%. The selection equation shows that of the
property characteristics within the matrix X, property type, car parks, the presence
of a study, fireplaces, walk in wardrobes, balcony, barbecue, timber floors, garage,
pool and alarm are all generally not significant for explaining the sellers’ choice
of sales mechanism. 12 of the 23 property characteristics are not significant. The
probit model results suggests that property characteristics by themselves do not
fully determine the sellers’ choice of sales mechanism.
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Table 3: Probit Model Selection Equation
Variable Coefficient t stat Marginal Effects t stat
Constant 1.076** 28.73 0.291** 28.18
Property Characteristics (X)
PT 0.008 0.45 0.003 0.87
T 0.004** 12.39 0.001** 12.99
HS 0.004** 3.00 0.001** 3.32
B -0.021** -2.73 -0.006** -2.73
BR -0.093** -6.55 -0.29* -6.48
CP -0.002 -0.42 -0.001 -0.47
S -0.045 -1.81 -0.014 -1.69
DR -0.100** -3.87 -0.027** -3.74
FR 0.131 1.63 0.041 1.60
SR -0.172** -4.02 -0.054 -4.01
RR 0.091** 2.75 0.024** 2.85
F -0.217** -7.22 -0.056** -7.20
WR 0.079* 1.96 0.021* 1.98
CY -0.079** -2.68 -0.025** -2.64
H 0.108** 3.32 0.033** 3.31
AC 0.073** 3.74 0.024** 3.71
BC -0.032 -1.56 -0.010 -1.56
BB 0.105* 2.41 0.026 1.51
TF -0.154 -0.22 -0.046 -0.15
E 0.110** 4.51 0.028** 4.50
G -0.002 -0.08 0.000 -0.8
PO -0.083** -3.08 -0.028** -3.08
AL -0.083** -2.80 -0.022** -2.79
Market Conditions (M)
MT 0.005 0.88 0.001 0.94
AR -0.082** -12.19 -0.023 -12.30
CR 0.030 1.25 -0.008 1.30
Seller Attributes (Z’)
LMI -0.659** -21.45 -0.175 21.46
ST -0.0890** -3.18 -0.257** -3.20
Number of observations 89442
Pseudo R-squared 0.1037
Log likelihood 2718.90
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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The selection equation results show that only one of the three variables
in the market characteristics matrix M is statistically significant for the sellers’
choice of mechanism. The auction clearance rate is statistically significant but the
month of sale and the expected cash rate are not significant. A one percent rise
in the auction clearance rate reduces the probability that the property will be sold
by private treaty by 2.3%. The sign of the marginal effect makes intuitive sense.
Sellers should be more likely to choose an auction mechanism if auctions have been
clearing more.
Within the seller attributes matrix Z’, both the log of mean income of
the property postcode and the seller type is statistically significant for the sellers’
choice of sales mechanism. A one percent increase in the log mean income of the
area the property is situated in increases the probability the property will be sold
under auction by 18%. Better income areas may have intrinsically higher value
properties. So this could indicate that higher value properties are more likely to be
sold under auction. And if the seller is an owner-occupier, then the probability that
the property is sold under auction increases by 26%.
This probit selection equation forms stage one of the two-step Heckman
procedure described in Appendix C. I use the error terms from the probit selection
equation to estimate the inverse Millse ratio described in Section 1.2.
1.4.2 Hedonic price models
Tables 4 and 5 contain the results of the main price equation regressions.
Table 4 shows the results of the Heckman two-step estimation for the full
data set, and for the split between auction sales and private treaty sales. The
inverse Mills ratio variable IMR is included in the regression result. In Appendix
A I show the results for the simple ordinary least squares regression of the hedonic
price equations that excludes the selectivity variable IMR.
The two methods produce similar coefficients for the independent variables.
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Table 4: Hedonic Price Equation Models
Hedonic Model Auction Sales Private Treaty Sales
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat
Constant 3.220** 10.77 3.331** 7.34 2.900** 9.40
Property Characteristics (X)
PT 0.033** 4.26 0.058** 3.89 0.010** 3.56
T -0.003 -38.08 -0.001** -11.14 -0.003** -36.02
HS 0.000 -0.78 -0.001 -4.75 0.000 -0.58
B 0.088** 60.82 0.120** 17.79 0.082** 55.65
BR 0.241** 94.54 0.221** 16.34 0.236** 90.91
CP 0.001** 20.27 0.005** 3.52 0.003** 26.89
S 0.020** 20.86 0.080** 4.00 0.078** 20.33
DR 0.080** 9.64 0.095** 4.40 0.036** 8.57
FR 0.040** -1.81 0.162* 2.29 -0.014 -1.35
SR -0.019 -1.04 0.121* 1.64 0.030 1.31
RR 0.065** 0.36 0.141** 4.91 0.007* 1.95
F 0.002** 23.07 0.005** 10.80 0.126** 20.63
WR 0.014** 0.01 0.002 0.06 0.000 -0.01
CY 0.059** 12.30 0.059** 2.44 0.059** 12.72
H -0.056** -2.17 -0.053 -1.90 -0.100** -21.88
AC 0.075** 11.88 0.080** 4.27 0.033** 11.65
BC -0.034* 2.08 -0.001 -0.09 -0.069* -2.05
BB 0.065 0.47 -0.052 -1.36 0.004 0.67
TF 0.003 19.61 0.128** 5.80 0.084** 19.03
E 0.086** 9.30 0.127** 5.77 0.030** 7.88
G 0.035** 10.39 0.036** 1.95 0.029** 9.24
PO 0.032** 15.87 0.091** 3.98 0.064** 15.16
AL 0.067** 26.09 0.126** 5.13 0.122** 25.08
Market Conditions (M)
MT -0.011 -1.08 -0.003 -0.61 -0.002 -1.30
AR 0.123** 8.61 1.380** 6.53 0.120** 6.83
CR -0.009** -2.69 0.002 1.02 -0.010* -2.67
Seller Attributes (Z)
LMI 1.247** 2.69 1.429** 2.77 1.110** 2.59
Selectivity
IMR 1.073 0.99 1.097 0.88 1.032 0.486
Sales Mechanism
MC -0.234** -38.45 — — — —
Adj. R Squared 0.584 — 0.555 — 0.585 —
F Statistic 4258.96 — 154.22 — 4088.93 —
No. of Obs 89442 — 3571 — 85871 —
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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This is not surprising given that Table 4 shows that the selectivity variable IMR
is not statistically significant for the full data set, nor for the auction and private
treaty sales. The F-statistics for all three of the price equations in Table 4 indicates
that the independent variables help to explain the variance in sales prices.
The hedonic price equation for the full data set, including both auction
sales and private treaty sales, includes the mechanism choice variable, MC. The
coefficient on the variable is negative and statistically significant. MC takes the
value MC = 1 if the property was sold under a private treaty. The negative sign
indicates that private treaty sales achieve lower prices than auction sales. That
result fits with the descriptive statistics that showed auctions average $823709 per
sale, almost $300000 more than private treaty sales. I test the price differential more
thoroughly in subsequent Subsection 1.4.4.
The seller attributes variable LMI, log mean income, shows that the mean
income of the area that the property is situated does have a statistically significant
impact on the final sale price. Across all properties, a 1% increase in mean income
rises the final sale price by 1.25%. The impact is larger for properties sold under
auction. A one percent rise in mean income lifts final auction prices by an average of
1.43%, compared with a 1.11% increase on average for properties sold under private
treaty. The significance of this coefficient could indicate that higher value properties
exist in higher income areas. In Subsection 1.4.4, I consider the variance in prices
across different quantiles of the mean income zones.
The variable AR that measures the auction clearance rate is statistically
significant for the full data set and for the two sales mechanism sub-categories. A
1% rise in the auction clearance rate increases the price for properties sold under
auction by 1.38%. But properties sold under private treaty achieve only a 0.12%
price rise for the same lift in the auction clearance rate. A rise in the auction
clearance rate suggests the property market is improving.
The positive sign on the auction clearance rate coefficients should be ex-
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pected. And the higher price rise for properties sold under auction could reflect
the assertion in Lusht (1996) that sellers are more likely to choose auction as a
sales mechanism when the property market is strengthening. There could also be
a signalling element. When sellers see the auction clearance rate rising, they might
be more likely to choose an auction mechanism, thus ensuring prices are boosted
on average relative to private treaty during boom times. But the marginal effect of
AR was not significant for in the probit selection equation, and the presence of the
selectivity variable IMR should account for any selection bias.
Most of the coefficients for the property characteristics contained in X are
similar across the full data set and the mechanism sub-categories. But there are
some notable points worth teasing out. The first is for the variable PT that takes
the value PT = 1 if the property is a house and PT = 0 otherwise. The variable is
positive for all three regressions. The positive sign on the coefficients indicates that
houses achieve higher final sales prices than do apartments. And the magnitude of
that higher price is larger for houses that are sold under auction than those houses
that are sold under private treaty. I examine whether property type has a significant
impact on the price differential across sales mechanisms in Subsection 1.4.4.
The coefficient on the variable for the number of bedrooms B is statistically
significant across all three of the price equations. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient is
positive across all sales types. That is in line with an intuitive expectation that
extra bedrooms should lift the final sales price. The addition of an extra bedroom
increases the final price across all of the sales by 8.8% and by 8.2% for private treaty
sales.
The impact is larger for auction properties. The sales price increases by
12.0% for each extra bedroom. Extra bathrooms also lifts the final sales price. The
statistically significant coefficients on the variable BR shows that extra bathrooms
lifts the final price by even more than extra bedrooms. In contrast to the effect of
extra bedrooms, bathrooms have a greater impact on the final sales price in private
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treaty sales than in auction sales.
The presence of air conditioning AC lifts the average final price across all
sales by 7.5%. But the impact is greater for auction sales at 8.0% than it is for
private treaty sales at 3.3%. The presence of an ensuite also has a positive impact
on prices across all sales mechanisms. An ensuite lifts the average final price across
all sales by 8.6%. But once again, the impact is larger for auction sales where an
ensuite lifts the final price by 12.7% compared against the private treaty final price
that is only increased by 3.0%.
Heating, H and balconies BC have negative coefficients. The negative co-
efficients surprises me. Heating might decrease the price because of the location of
the properties. New South Wales generally has warm Summers and mild Winters.
Heating may be viewed as unnecessary. An interstate comparison could help test
this hypothesis. Alternatively, the presence of heating may signal to potential buy-
ers that the property is poorly insulated or old. This is particularly possible if the
variable air conditioning AC includes split system air conditioners, which include a
heating system. Then, the older heating systems may be contained H, dragging the
price.
I would expect balconies, on the other hand, to generally be seen as a
positive attribute for any property. The coefficient on balconies is significant at
the 5% level for the total data set and for properties sold under private treaty, but
not significant for auction sales. The negative coefficient could be registering that
balconies are more common on apartments than houses, and apartments have a
lower average price, dragging the hedonic price estimate lower.
The results from the hedonic price equations appear to indicate that prop-
erties sold under auction achieve higher prices than properties sold under private
treaty. But I want to test this further in the context of Wang (1993) who indicated
that the decision to auction could be motivated by unusual or hard to value charac-
teristics for the item being auctioned, or alternative that the item being auctioned
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is a higher value.
With my data, I split the auction and private treaty sales into property
type as a means to test this assumption. As a prior, it is reasonable to expect that
apartments are more likely to be homogenous across properties. They are probably
more likely to have a similar number of rooms, internal amenities and features. The
counter to this, as I mentioned earlier, is that apartments are probably more likely
to be situated in the inner regions of Sydney and so could have features such as
Sydney Harbour views or proximity to transport that are harder to value. The
following section discusses the results of the hedonic price equations by property
type.
1.4.3 Hedonic models by property type
Table 5 shows the results for the OLS hedonic price equations across the
different sales mechanisms and property types. Appendix B shows the results of the
Heckman two-step estimation for the equations.
The results of the four price equations corroborate the two mechanism equa-
tions in Table 4. Most of the coefficients retain the same sign, that is in line with
prior expectations. The F-statistics are high, indicating that all the independent
variables help to explain the change in the final sales prices.
There are fewer statistically significant variables in the auction price equa-
tions compared with the private treaty price equations. But for the variables that
are statistically significant, the size of the coefficient is generally larger for auctions.
As in the price equations in Table 4, bathrooms (BR), bedrooms (B) and
ensuites (E ) and carparks (CP) are all statistically significant and have large positive
impacts on the final sales price for private treaties. But an ensuite is only statistically
significant for house auctions, but not auctions of flats or apartments. In fact, the
presence of an ensuite increases the final auction price for a house by 17.4%.
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Table 5: Price Equations by Property and Mechanism Type
Flat Auctions House Auctions Flat PT House PT
Variable Coeff’t t stat Coeff’t t stat Coeff’t t stat Coeff’t t stat
Constant 3.902** 3.63 3.302** 3.88 2.896** 7.59 2.558** 7.85
Property Characteristics (X)
T -0.001** -3.04 -0.001** -7.73 -0.001** -21.01 -0.001** -31.93
HS -0.001** -3.94 -0.001** -3.29 -0.001 -0.44 -0.001 -0.08
B 0.093** 5.74 0.149** 15.08 0.089** 30.21 0.076** 46.55
BR 0.253** 6.04 0.278** 12.58 0.214** 45.05 0.233** 82.78
CP 0.003* 1.91 0.008** 5.95 0.036** 12.92 0.039** 23.74
S 0.101* 2.51 0.045 1.95 0.072** 9.65 0.076** 17.09
DR 0.015 0.35 0.050* 2.11 0.015 1.94 0.033** 6.91
FR 0.071 0.46 0.115 1.45 0.031 1.662 0.003 0.22
SR -0.011 -0.17 0.041 1.05 0.037** 2.73 0.051** 6.11
RR 0.085 1.53 0.171** 2.76 0.005 0.54 0.091** 2.99
F 0.051 1.54 0.011** 5.95 0.108** 10.51 0.103** 16.22
WR 0.011 0.16 0.061 1.57 0.009 0.89 0.003 0.47
CY -0.026 -0.56 0.042 1.51 0.070** 7.83 0.048** 8.94
H -0.009 -0.18 0.001 -0.01 -0.093** -11.04 -0.092** -17.64
AC 0.021 0.61 0.095* 2.26 0.037** 6.67 0.026** 7.85
BC -0.045* -2.61 -0.003 -0.16 0.072** 11.67 0.066** 18.32
BB 0.006 0.08 0.006 0.13 0.025 1.16 0.006 0.83
TF 0.055 1.48 0.044 1.92 0.071** 9.10 0.072** 14.91
E -0.046 -1.10 0.174** 3.08 0.024** 3.35 0.020** 4.74
G 0.040 1.05 0.021 0.97 0.033** 5.41 0.028** 7.56
PO 0.028 0.61 0.052* 2.03 0.055** 8.32 0.069** 11.42
AL 0.040 0.82 0.088** 3.19 0.112** 14.19 0.126** 21.51
Market Conditions (M)
MT 0.002 0.21 0.002 0.38 -0.002 -1.06 -0.002** -2.73
AR 0.060 1.52 0.057** 2.70 0.042 1.60 0.040* 2.40
CR 0.054 1.35 0.006 0.26 -0.003 -0.42 -0.009* -2.28
Seller Attributes (Z)
LMI 1.055** 22.22 1.093** 36.91 1.209** 113.15 1.178** 182.8
Adj. R sqd 0.545 — 0.563 — 0.587 — 0.583 —
F Stat 177.46 — 121.49 — 1187.92 — 3217.47 —
No. of obs 957 — 2614 — 22527 — 63344 —
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
Two step regression results can be found in Appendix B.
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The presence of an alarm (AL), pool (PO), and garage (G) all have a
statistically significant impact on private treaty sales for both property types. But
an alarm is only significant for houses under auction.
Interestingly, the coefficients on the house sales are generally higher than
the coefficients on the apartment sales for both mechanisms. And the coefficient on
house auctions is generally larger than on private treaty sales of houses. This would
seem to indicate that the presence of these characteristics has a larger impact on
the final sales price of houses, while apartments could be more homogenous. And
so sellers and buyers might be more certain of the final value of the apartment.
That larger impact from the independent variables on house prices could
be because house prices are on average higher. But the relative magnitude of the
coefficients could also suggest that houses, which may be more likely to have unusual
characteristics and be harder to value, achieve higher final prices under auction. This
is a key question for my research and I test this question in the following section.
1.4.4 Price differentials across mechanism types
In this section I use the formula from Lee (1978) to estimate how different
the final prices are between auctions and private treaty sales. I estimate the per-
centage price differences across all property sales. I also estimate the percentage
price difference for houses and apartments. As mentioned in earlier sections, my
prior expectation is that houses could have unusual characteristics that are harder
to value. According to Wang (1995), these types of properties should perform better
when sold under auction.
I then analyse whether the seller type (ST ) impacts the percentage price
differential and whether the mean income (LMI ) impacts the percentage price dif-
ferential. Price differentials are defined in subsection 1.2.
If the seller type does systematically impact the average price differential,
then it could indicate some excess bargaining power of a particular seller type. I
29
also consider the price differentials across different realised price quantiles.
Table 6 contains the results for the price differential calculations. All of the
results were significant at a 5% level, using Wilcoxon signrank tests.
In general, the average price differentials between auction and private treaty
are large. Across the entire sample, the price differential for properties sold under
auction is 21.86%. This price differential is of a similar magnitude to the coefficient
on the mechanism choice variable MC in the hedonic price equation from Table 4.
The results in Table 6 support the findings in Lusht (1996), that auctions
achieve a higher price on average than private treaty sales achieve. But the mag-
nitude of the price advantage for auctions is much larger in my research than the
8% higher price that Lusht estimated. Lusht focussed on a data set of house sales
over the period January 1988 to March 1989, in the city of Melbourne in Australia’s
state of Victoria.
The different price differentials suggest there could be spatial differences
to the housing market outcomes across Australia. There could also be a temporal
effect. I do not have time series data for house sales nor data across all Australia
states, but the difference in results do suggest that could be an avenue for further
research.
The price differential is not homogenous across mean income quantiles, price
quantiles nor across seller type. The highest mean income quantile has the largest
price differential for all properties. Similarly for the price quantiles. This could
be because properties situated in high mean income zones have intrinsically more
value. If that is the case, then the result in Table 6 would support the findings
in Wang (1993) that auctions should perform better than the alternative when the
item being auctioned has a higher value.
Interestingly, the middle 40% mean income and price quantiles have a lower
price differential than the lowest 30% quantile for all properties. The middle 40%
mean income quantile also has a lower price differential for houses and apartments.
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Table 6: Average Sales Price Differentials Between Auction and Private Treaty
Market Comparison Percent Difference
All properties Houses Apartments
All sales 21.86 25.26 18.01
Property Price Quantiles
Lowest 30% 20.18 22.58 16.69
Middle 40% 22.04 21.49 17.02
Highest 30% 25.85 27.34 20.84
Mean Income Quantiles
Lowest 30% 20.16 23.18 17.13
Middle 40% 20.15 22.38 17.06
Highest 30% 25.35 28.89 19.83
Seller Type
Owner-occupier 18.03 18.36 18.19
Investor 23.87 29.61 21.16
In the price quantiles, the middle 40% quantile has a lower price differential for
houses than the lower 30% quantile, but the result reverses for apartments.
The result for lower quantile houses to have a smaller price differential than
middle quantile houses could also support Wang (1993). Properties in the lower
income and price zones are likely to be lower value. But the characteristics could be
still be more difficult to value relative to properties within the middle mean income
quantile. The middle quantile could be more likely to contain properties that are
relatively homogenous. But in the lower quanitle, there could be the proverbial
‘diamonds in the rough’ that are harder to value. However, the divergence between
the percent differentials across the middle and lower quantile is not large.
By owner type, auctions achieve a higher price differential for investor-
type sellers than for owner-occupiers. The divergence between seller type is large;
23.87% for investors compared with 18.03% for owner-occupiers. The divergence is
even larger for investors that are selling houses. The price differential increases to
almost 30% for investors auctioning houses, while owner-occupiers achieve a price
differential of only 18.3%.
The results indicate that investor-type sellers systematically achieve a higher
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price outcome under auction relative to private treaty than do owner-occupiers, re-
gardless of the property type. That result could suggest that there is some bargain-
ing power accruing to investor-type sellers when selling under auction that does not
accrue to owner-occupier-type sellers. And if there is a systematic benefit accruing
to investor-type sellers, then the efficiency of the housing market in NSW could be
questionable.
But there is an alternative interpretation. It could be that owner-occupier-
type sellers have systematic bargaining power accruing to them for private treaty
sales. That is, owner-occupier sellers could achieve higher prices when selling their
property under private treaty relative to investor-type sellers. Owner-occupier-type
sellers could have more information about their property because they occupied the
property, while investor type sellers have less information. In comparison, for auction
sales, both seller types simply rely on competition generated by the mechanism itself
to achieve a higher price. Under auction, there is not the informational advantage
accruing to the owner-occupier-type seller.
Conversely, there could be some element of time preference. Investor-type
sellers could have a higher discount rate, or cost of waiting, to find a potential
buyer. If that is the case, it would make sense that these seller-types would prefer
the centralisation and immediacy of auction sales. Investors with a higher discount
rate that choose private treaty sales or negotiation will be willing to trade off a
faster sale for a lower sales price. So the larger price differential for investor-type
sellers could also reflect a lower private treaty price, not necessarily just a better
auction price.
Investor-type sellers may also be better experienced at reading the housing
market cycle. Those more experienced sellers might choose a better time in the
cycle to sell their property. Lusht (1996) indicated that in Australia, auctions are
more common during stronger housing markets. Investor-type sellers may be better
identifying these periods and setting auctions accordingly. Owner-occupier-type
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sellers may be less experienced and so choose worse times to set auctions. The
difference in experience then could help explain the higher price differential for
investor-type sellers.
I examine this question, whether there are significant differences in bar-
gaining power across seller types, in Chapter 2 of this Thesis. The larger price
differential for investor-type sellers of houses relative to apartments also supports
my prior expectation that houses probably have unusual characteristics, and the
findings in Wang (1993) that these properties should perform better under auction.
In Table 6, the dispersion of price differentials across the the different prop-
erty types is of key interest to the research question in this paper. On average,
houses achieve higher price differentials than apartments when sold under auction
across all of the data subsets. Across all sales, the price differential is 25.26% for
houses compared with 18.01% for apartments. While the price differential is lower
for apartments, the differential is still statistically significant at 5% using a Wilcoxon
signrank test. That finding contrasts against the finding in Frino, Lepone, Mollica,
and Vassallo (2010) that concluded there is no auction premium for sales of units.
The divergence between the price differential for owner-occupier-type sellers
is not large. But there is a large divergence for properties situated within the highest
30% mean income quantile. Houses sold under auction from within these zones
achieve on average a 28.89% price advantage compared with private treaty sales.
Apartments sold from within these zones achieve only a 19.83% price differential.
It would seem a reasonable assumption that detached houses within the top
30% mean income zones would be higher value and would be likely to have char-
acteristics that are unusual or difficult to value. Once again, these results provide
further support for Wang’s research showing higher value or unusual items perform
better under auction than under private treaty.
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1.4.5 Property differences and price differentials
Table 7 shows the results of the price differential regression. I regress the
percentage price difference P% for each property against PD, a measure of the
variance of the characteristic set for each property from the average property char-
acteristics and PT, a binary dummy variable that indicates whether the property is
a house or an apartment.
Table 7 shows the results for the regression across the full data set, and
across three price quantiles. The quantiles are the same as those used for Table 6.
In Appendix D I show results from the same regression, but across mean income
quantiles. The mean income quantiles are the same quantiles used in Table 6.
Table 7: Price Differentials and Property Differences by Price Quantiles
Variable Full Sample Lower Middle Upper
Quantile Quantile Quantile
Constant 0.259** 0.228** 0.241** 0.281**
(2.29) (5.18) (4.23) (7.15)
PD 0.048** 0.033* 0.041** 0.065**
(2.45) (1.98) (2.36) (3.51)
PT 0.032 0.016 0.013* 0.021*
(1.56) (1.62) (1.99) (2.04)
Adj. R sqd 0.034 0.028 0.041 0.036
F Stat 15.63 16.87 19.20 20.13
No. of obs 89442 26832 35777 26833
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
The results for the regression across mean income quantiles were very sim-
ilar to the results across price quantiles. That is unsurprising given the similarity
between the results in Table 6. Because of the similarities, I have moved the results
for the regression across mean income quantiles to Appendix D.
Across the entire data set, the two alternative sales mechanisms have a
25.9% price differential. The magnitude of that difference is similar to the average
price differential in Table 6, as one would expect.
34
The variable PD that measures the variance of each property compared
to the average property is statistically significant at a one percent level. But the
variable PT that denotes whether the property is a house or an apartment is not
statistically significant for the entire data set. PT is significant at a five percent
level for the middle and upper price quantiles.
The coefficient for PD indicates that as the property characteristics differ-
ence from the average property increases by one unit as measured by the Maha-
lanobis distance8, the price differential increases by 4.8%. The positive sign means
that as the property is increasingly unique, then selling the property under auction
is a better alternative to a private treaty.
The price differential is the percent difference in the estimated sales price for
a given property sold under auction versus private treaty. The positive result means
that more unique properties increase that price differential. Either the estimated
auction price gets larger, or the estimated private treaty price gets smaller. The
result then indicates that for more unique properties, or properties that have char-
acteristics that are unusual and harder to value, auction mechanisms will achieve a
higher sales price.
This result answers a key question for this research paper. Why do sellers
choose auctions over alternative price mechanisms? Table 7 shows that sellers will
be even better off from choosing an auction compared with the alternative of private
treaty when the property being sold is more unique relative to the average property.
The result supports the findings in Wang (1993) and Frino, Lepone, Mollica, and
Vassallo (2010).
The results contrasts against Chow, Hafalir, and Yavas (2011). Chow,
Hafalir, and Yavas suggest that it might be reasonable to expect unusual prop-
erties to perform better under private treaty that allows sellers an extended period
to find a buyer that will make an offer that matches the seller’s reservation price.
8I also carried out the regression using the Euclidean distance as a measure of character differ-
ences. The results were not significantly different to the results in Table 7.
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Furthermore, Chow, Hafalir, and Yavas assumes that properties with more
unique characteristics will spend longer on the market because there will be fewer
interested bidders. And fewer bidders may not raise the competitive pressure enough
to generate a high enough price for the seller.
That logic can be countered by realising that properties under auction may
be advertised for some time prior to the actual auction, and that allows time to
find potential buyers to attend the auction. It would be revealing to have data on
the number of registered bidders at the auction. Unfortunately those data are not
available. Also, properties with unique characteristics could attract more potential
buyers particularly in periods where the economy is performing well and household
incomes are rising relative to house prices.
That certainly could have been the case in New South Wales in 2011. The
Australian economy was recovering strongly from the impact of the Global Financial
Crisis, house prices were rebounding and nominal household incomes were surging
due to the terms of trade boom that Australia was experiencing. That provides
scope for further research on this topic, to test if the auction to private treaty price
differential changes across time periods and market conditions.
The coefficients across the three price quantiles can be used to see whether
auctions outperform private treaty across different price segments. Similarly, Table
27 in Appendix D measures whether auctions outperform private treaty across the
mean income quantiles. The results are broadly similar.
Table 7 shows that on average, the price differential between auctions and
private treaty is highest for properties in the highest 30% of prices. For those
properties, the Constant term in Table 7 shows that auctions outperform private
treaty by 28.1%. That average price differential is higher than for properties in the
middle 40% price quantile and higher than the lower 30% price quantile.
In fact, the average price differential increases with the price quantile. That
result lends support to Wang (1993) who found that auctions perform better when
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the value of the item is higher. This could also reflect that higher value properties
at the top end of the housing market could be harder to value but still be very
desirable. The competitive bidding under the auctioning mechanism could help
overcome potential buyer concerns about the value of the property.
The variable PD is statistically significant and positive across all of the
price quantiles. And similar to the Constant term, the impact on the price differ-
ential increases across quantiles. A one unit increase in the property uniqueness as
measured by the Mahalanobis distance increases the price differential by 3.3%, 4.1%
and 6.5% for the lower, middle and upper price quantiles respectively.
This result lends further support to the findings in Wang (1993) that auc-
tions perform better when properties are more unique. And that outperformance
continues across different price quantiles. In fact, sellers of higher value properties
benefit even more from setting an auction as opposed to selling through private
treaty.
The coefficients on the property type variable PT are statistically significant
at the five percent level for the middle and upper price quantiles. The variable PT
takes the value one when the property is a house, and zero when the property is an
apartment. The positive sign of the coefficients indicate that the price differential
is higher for houses than for apartments when the property in question is in the
middle or upper price quantile.
In other words, houses perform better under auction relative to apartments.
It is worth stressing that apartments still on average achieve higher prices under
auction than under private treaty. But houses, that are likely to be more unique
than apartments, on average achieve a higher price differential.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have compared the performance of auctions and private
treaty mechanisms across property sales in New South Wales in 2011. I asked why
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sellers choose auctions over private treaty sales. First, I tested for whether auctions
on average achieve a higher price than private treaty. The results indicate there is
a price advantage for sellers choosing auctions over private treaty. Then I tested
whether the uniqueness of the property, the property type and the value of the
property impact the price differential between the two alternative sales mechanisms.
My results show that on average, auctions achieved a 21.86% price increase
over private treaty sales. This price differential increases for houses compared with
apartments. Properties situated in higher mean income areas, and in higher market
segments, also have a higher price differential. Auctions achieve an increasingly
higher price relative to private treaty as the property becomes increasingly unique.
And investor-type sellers on average achieve higher auction sales prices relative to
private treaty sales prices than do owner-occupier-type sellers.
This paper uses data from only one calendar year. The analysis could be
improved by introducing a temporal element into the analysis. Changes in market
conditions could impact the performance of auctions relative to private treaty. And
the analysis could benefit from an increased spatial element. While New South
Wales is the largest housing market in Australia, there could be differences across
the states and territories.
My results indicate that in New South Wales in 2011, auctions were a bet-
ter option for sellers. This supports the findings of Lusht (1996) who considered
housing prices in Melbourne. But my findings contrast against studies conducted in
the USA9, that have found that auctions generally do not achieve a price premium
over alternative sales mechanisms. This difference could be driven by different per-
ceptions of auctions as a sales mechanism in the US relative to Australia. In the US,
auctions are used as a last resort or during periods of financial duress. In Australia,
auctions are more commonly accepted as a sales mechanism.
The benefit to the seller from setting an auction increased as the property
9For example, Mayer (1998).
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type was more valuable, or more unique. That finding supports the findings in
Wang (1993). It indicates that sellers should choose an auction when their property
is more difficult to value. The finding that investor-type sellers also achieve better
relative prices suggests that there could be some inefficiency in New South Wales
house sales. I explore that possibility in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
2 Bargaining power in NSW residential property sales
The decision to purchase a house is likely to be one of the most important
decisions faced by many households in Australia. Houses in Australia are expen-
sive10. A potential buyer is likely to burden themselves with a significant quantity
of debt over a lengthy period of time. So it is reasonable to expect that most buyers
will ask themselves, ‘how can I best get myself a bargain?’ A seller, on the other
hand, will be looking to achieve the highest possible sales price for their asset. They
will ask themselves the question, ‘how can I get the highest price possible for my
house?’
In Chapter 1 of this Thesis, I examined whether sellers of property could
achieve a better result for their sale by choosing an auction mechanism compared
with a private treaty mechanism. I tested whether unique properties perform better
under auction compared against private treaty. The results indicated that auctions
do achieve a higher price if the property is unique. That result supported the findings
in Wang (1993).
I also tested whether an investor-type seller on average could achieve a
higher auction price than owner-occupier-type sellers. The results indicated that,
on average, investor-type sellers do achieve a higher auction price. The better price
differential could reflect higher prices for investor-types across both sales mecha-
nisms. But it could also be the case that owner-occupier types achieved better
results in private treaty sales.
In this Chapter I extend the research from Chapter 1 to consider bargaining
power from the point of view of the seller and buyer. That is, I test whether a buyer
10According to international rating agency Fitch, Australian housing affordability in Australia is
the worst in the world, based on market debt-to-income ratios and house price-to-GDP ratios. See
Fitch Ratings (2013).
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or seller can achieve a better bargaining outcome by announcing or attending a
property auction as opposed to a private treaty sale. To my knowledge, this has not
been considered in Australia in the existing literature.
If certain types of sellers or buyers have a systematic bargaining advantage,
or if one type of sales mechanism achieves a better bargaining outcome, then it
raises questions about why participants are choosing other sales mechanisms.
In this paper, I find that owner-occupier type sellers tend to achieve better
bargaining outcomes than investor-type sellers for private treaty sales. But for
auction sales, there is no significant advantage to either type.
In the next section, I will discuss the existing literature on bargaining in
residential property sales. Section 2.2 discusses the empirical methodology used,
while Section 2.3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 contains
the results of analysis, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 Bargaining in residential property sales
I consider whether the ‘type’ of property seller and potential property buyer
impacts the bargaining outcome. Sellers and buyers of properties in NSW can be
readily segmented into one of two types, ‘owner-occupiers’ and ‘investors’. In the
following research, I test whether one type of seller or buyer regularly achieves a
better bargaining outcome. If a type of buyer or seller does achieve a significant
advantage in the bargaining outcome, then it could indicate an inefficiency in the
NSW housing market.
Prior research in this area has focussed on first home-buyers compared with
repeat home buyers. In Australia, investors accounted for almost 34% of the total
value of housing finance in 2012, while first home buyers accounted for only 18%11.
So the bargaining outcome comparison between owner-occupiers and investors is
11See Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012)
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relevant in the Australian housing market. And to my knowledge, this comparison
has not previously been considered in Australia or internationally.
Given the attention paid to the search process in residential property sales,
it is logical to question how the bargaining process works. In the search-matching
literature, potential buyers arrive sequentially and make an offer to the seller. Gen-
erally, sellers and buyers do not know the reservation price of their counterparty.
The lack of knowledge forces a bargaining element to the housing offer.
After the buyer and seller have made contact, bargaining ensues, and a
series of offers might be made. Offers must be accepted or rejected when they are
received. Sellers do not know the full universe of possible offers, so they may not
always accept the highest possible offer. And buyers might make offers different to
what their offer would be if they knew the reservation price of the seller.
Song (1995) makes the point that these uncertainties make it likely that
houses with similar characteristics may be sold at different prices. The distance
between the buyer and seller reservation price determines the size of the surplus
available to be divided between the buyer and the seller. The final sale price will
be between the buyer and seller’s reservation price, with the distance from each
depending on the bargaining power of the respective seller and buyer.
Quan and Quigley (1991) showed that buyers will stop searching for a prop-
erty sooner if sellers are not price takers. Then the buyer cannot extract as much
surplus. But when the buyer has stronger bargaining power, then the final sale price
will fall. In contrast, the sale price rises when the seller has more bargaining power.
Yavas (1992) constructed a simple model of search and bargaining in real
estate markets. Yavas points out that there is a link between the bargaining stage
and the search stage of a housing transaction. The price a party to the transac-
tion expects to emerge from the bargaining process will impact that party’s search
intensity.
Yavas found that a seller’s search intensity increases as the efficiency of the
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search increases and decreases as search becomes more costly. Yavas also found
that a seller’s search intensity increases as the seller’s bargaining power over a buyer
increases. In contrast, the search intensity for a buyer decreases as his bargaining
power decreases. And buyers search intensity increases with the buyer’s valuation,
but a seller’s search intensity falls with an increase in the seller’s valuation. Finally,
the ex-post price of the house increases with the seller’s bargaining power.
Yavas’s findings give some interesting context for my empirical question. I
consider whether the type of seller or buyer matters for bargaining outcomes. It
could be the case that investor-type sellers that might have relatively high costs for
the transaction will have a lower search intensity and so could bargain worse than
owner-occupier type buyers. And owner-occupier type sellers could have a higher
valuation for their property and so have a lower search intensity.
The impact of seller-type on the bargaining process is a key question for
this research. I describe the model I use to examine the impact of seller-type in
Section 2.2.
The empirical literature has typically focussed on information asymmetries
that give bargaining power to one of the agents in the sale. Examples of buyer
types that might have less information include first-time buyers or out-of-town buy-
ers. Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) found that first-time buyers and out-of-town
buyers had no bargaining disadvantage compared with experienced home-buyers
and in-town buyers. Watkins (1998) found a similar result in the UK. Both authors
concluded that the real estate market is efficient, and information benefit effects are
not present.
Song (1995) adopted a different approach to the hedonic price methods
used in Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) and Watkins (1998). Song considered whether
housing and household characteristics impacted the discount ratio. The discount
ratio is the ratio of the difference between the advertised or asking price and the final
sale price, and the asking price. Song found that first-time buyers do not bargain
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less than experienced home buyers. But Song did find that a buyer’s income and
the asking price do affect the discount ratio.
Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) focussed on a similar question to
Song. They found that some household attributes do affect the bargaining power
of buyers. Gender, wealth, family size and prior-home ownership all impacted bar-
gaining power for single-family homes in the US.
Wilhelmsson (2008) considered whether uninformed buyers were worse at
bargaining for single-family homes in Sweden than experienced buyers. Wilhelmsson
found that uninformed buyers typically do pay a higher price than informed buyers.
Wilhelmsson extends previous studies by adding characteristics of the buyer and the
buying process to the equation that he estimates. But the author does not consider
seller attributes.
The existing literature for bargaining power in residential property transac-
tions typically explains the bargaining power using buyer attributes, characteristics
of the sale process, and characteristics of the property itself.
To my knowledge, there are no existing research papers that include seller
attributes beyond the seller’s asking price, that is included in the discount ratio,
the dependent variable. In my data set, I add to the existing literature by including
seller types. The seller can be either an owner-occupier, or the seller can be an
investor. At the same time, I am also able to consider bargaining power of buyers
that can be owner-occupiers or investors. Furthermore, to my knowledge, there
are no existing studies that consider the impact of sales mechanism design on the
bargaining outcome of buyers and sellers using Australian data.
2.2 Methodology
To consider bargaining power in NSW housing transactions, I adopt a sim-
ilar econometric method used by Song (1995) and Wilhelmsson (2008). The model
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is a regression model that explains the bargaining outcome with reference to a com-
bination of real estate, household and buying process characteristics.
The dependent variable used in the regression is the discount ratio. The
discount ratio is defined as the ratio of the difference between the asking price of
the property and the sale price, and the asking price.
D =
AP − P
AP
× 100 (10)
The major drawback of the discount ratio as described by Equation 10 is
that the asking price, AP, is not necessarily the same as the seller’s offer price. But
because information about the seller’s true offer price is unavailable, I (and Song and
Wilhelmsson) use the asking price as a proxy. Chinloy (1990) and Song made the
assumption that the seller’s asking price is proportional to the seller’s reservation
price. In reality, the asking price would normally be expected to be larger than the
offer price.
The discount ratio is undefined in situations where the sale price is less than
the seller’s reservation price. In that scenario, no sale occurs. But the discount ratio
does not need to be strictly positive. The discount ratio could be negative if the
final sale price is higher than the seller’s asking price. Wilhelmsson terms periods
where this occurs ‘seller’s markets’. Conversely, when the discount ratio is positive,
the market is termed a ‘buyer’s market’.
A seller’s market happens if buyers have difficulty in finding a house. Tradi-
tionally, this might have occurred when there was an undersupply of housing. Table
9 indicates that investor buyers on average faced a seller’s market over the 2011
calendar year. This may have been due to the sharp population increase that NSW
underwent, while residential property construction lagged. Other causes of a seller’s
market could include a property bubble, such as that experienced in the USA and
parts of Europe in the lead-up to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
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To test for bargaining power across all property sales I estimate a linear
regression equation, using ordinary least squares, that relates the discount ratio to
buyer and seller attributes, market conditions, and the property characteristics. The
equation that I estimate is:
Dall = Mη +Xβ + Zγ +  (11)
M is a matrix of market conditions, X is a matrix of the properties’ char-
acteristics, Z is a matrix of the buyer and seller attributes and  is the random error
term. In Equation 11, the matrix M includes the binary mechanism choice variable
MC. MC takes the value one if the property is sold under private treaty and zero if
the property is sold under auction.
I also estimate two separate equations for properties sold under auction and
properties sold under private treaty.
Da = M
′η +Xβ + Zaγ +  (12)
Dpt = M
′η +Xβ + Zγ +  (13)
In Equation 12, Za differs from the matrix Z in Equations 11 and 13. The
data set does not include buyer type data for auction sales, so the variable BT is
not included for that equation. Also, the matrix M’ in Equations 11 and 13 do not
include the mechanism choice variable MC.
In the next section I describe the variables used in the model and the data
used in the regression.
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Table 8: Bargaining Summary Statistics
Full data set Auctions Private Treaty
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Wilcoxon Test
P 536,550 485,105 823,709 578,511 524,611 477,106 47.44**
D 0.02 1.73 0.01 1.70 0.04 1.83 6.05**
MC 0.96 0.20 — — — — —
Property Attributes (X)
T 110 142.41 73.84 129.67 111.13 142.73 -31.75**
PT 0.74 0.44 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.44 -0.75
HS 1,751 24,634 1,710 20,638 1,789 30,687 -0.865
B 2.98 1.10 3.07 1.12 2.98 1.10 3.60**
BR 1.57 0.70 1.69 0.80 1.56 0.69 7.93**
CP 1.53 1.28 1.56 4.35 1.53 0.95 -2.15**
S 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 5.19**
DR 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 6.60**
FR 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 -2.27**
SR 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 5.03**
RR 0.03 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 -1.71**
F 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.23 15.18**
WR 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 -3.06**
CY 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.27 3.58**
H 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 -3.75**
AC 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 -3.93**
BC 0.22 0.32 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 5.77**
BB 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.21 -2.81**
TF 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.30 11.09**
E 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.42 -3.59**
G 0.21 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.40 -2.88**
PO 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 3.88**
AL 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.27 4.95**
Seller Attributes (Z)
ST 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.29 0.91 0.29 10.87**
BT 0.90 0.28 0.91 0.28 0.90 0.29 10.63**
MI 58770 17409 64015 18268 56646 16550 2.74**
Market Conditions (M)
MT 7.09 3.48 6.89 3.34 7.09 3.49 -3.97**
AR 46.27 8.50 48.57 7.06 46.01 9.19 28.00**
CR -0.56 0.76 -0.52 0.78 -0.57 0.76 0.56
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2.3 Data
The data used for this Chapter are from the same data set used in Chapter
1. The data include information on the actual property transaction, including the
asking price, sale price, property type, time on market, and seller types for 89,442
residential property transactions that took place in New South Wales in the 2011
calendar year. But for this Chapter, I included data on buyer types and on the
discount ratio for each sale.
Table 8 lists the variables and the mean and standard deviation for each
variable. Table 9 shows the means for the variables across the different buyer and
seller types.
The summary statistics in Table 9 reveal some interesting points. First, the
final sale price is on average higher for investor-type buyers and investor-type sellers.
It is tempting to attribute the higher prices for investor-type sellers to stronger
bargaining power for those types. But higher prices for investor-type buyers could
indicate that those type of buyers seek higher value properties. That might enable
those buyers to achieve a higher rental return.
The average discount ratio for investor-type buyers is negative. That is,
on average, investor-type buyers pay more than the seller’s asking price. This is a
surprise. There are some possible explanations for this. First, investor-type buyers
might be tempted to enter the market when property prices are rising. Higher prices
might be a result of a seller’s market. In that case, investor-type buyers may be
less able or less inclined to bargain aggressively, under the belief they can sell the
property for an even higher price in the future.
Secondly, if sellers are aware that the buyer is an investor-type, they may
assume that the buyer is more informed about the type of property they are after.
The fact that the investor-type buyer has approached could be a signal that the
property in question is particularly desirable. In that case, sellers have an incentive
to ‘hold out’ on buyers, effectively hardening their bargaining stance.
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Table 9: Averages for Different Buyer and Seller Types
Buyer Type Seller Type
Variable Owner-Occupier Investor Owner-Occupier Investor
P 461129 538076 464461 503801
D 0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.00
Property Attributes (X)
PT 0.81 0.66 0.82 0.62
MT 7.17 7.16 7.17 7.15
T 135 118 132 141
HS 1723 1576 1711 1692
B 3.08 2.97 3.10 2.83
BR 1.54 1.60 1.54 1.61
CP 1.59 1.45 1.54 1.61
S 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.12
DR 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10
FR 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
SR 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
RR 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.04
FR 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03
WR 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.05
CY 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10
H 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.08
AC 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.30
BC 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.28
BB 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
TF 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.07
E 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.29
G 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.20
PO 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10
AL 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11
Seller Attributes (Z)
MI 58770 58550 60015 56646
Market Conditions (M)
AR 46.30 46.18 47.01 46.38
CR -0.56 -0.55 -0.56 -0.56
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Finally, it appears that investor-types purchase smaller properties on aver-
age than do owner-occupier types. Average property size and the number of beds
is smaller for investor-types. But the average number of bathrooms is higher. Fur-
thermore, investor-type sellers, on average, have their property on the market for
longer than owner-occupier types. This could indicate that investor-types are more
willing to wait for a better offer. Conversely, it might also be indicative of asking
prices that are too inflated and take longer to be bargained lower.
2.4 Results and Discussion
I have used three separate models to examine the bargaining outcome in
NSW residential property transactions. The bargaining outcome itself is the vari-
ation in the discount ratio. The models estimated using Equations 12 and 13 con-
siders the impact of buyer and seller types on the bargaining outcome. The results
for these two equations are contained in Table 10. Table 10 includes the buyer and
seller type variables BT and ST for the private treaty regression, but does not in-
clude BT for the auction regression. Table 10 also does not include a variable for
mechanism choice.
The Mechanism Choice model estimated using Equation 11 considers the
impact of the sale mechanism on the bargaining outcome. Results for Equation 11
are contained in Table 11. Table 11 includes the mechanism choice variable MC,
but does not include variables for the seller or buyer type.
It is apparent from Tables 10 and 11 that there are several variables in the
property attributes matrix X that are statistically insignificant. These variables
apparently have little impact on the bargaining outcome. This insignificant impact
might indicate that buyers and sellers have a similar level of understanding about the
implicit value of the housing characteristic. In particular, the property type is only
weakly significant in the equations in Table 10, and insignificant in the Mechanism
Choice model. Whether the property is a house or unit does not significantly affect
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Table 10: Bargaining Regression Results
Private Treaty Auction
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat
Constant 4.656** 12.7 2.725** 15.76
Property Attributes (X)
T 0.009** 32.04 0.019** 32.11
PT 0.388* 2.89 0.288* 2.88
HS 0.000 -0.51 0.000 -0.52
B 0.113* 1.97 0.013* 1.98
BR 0.095** 2.61 0.053** 2.15
CP 0.040 0.84 0.031 0.86
S 0.290** 2.68 0.187* 2.01
DR 0.063 0.43 0.087** 2.44
FR -0.495 -1.48 -0.625 -1.48
SR -0.399** 2.67 0.495* 1.94
RR -0.179 -1.09 -0.186 -1.13
F 0.992** 4.96 0.580** 4.94
WR 0.087 0.46 0.044** 2.46
CY -0.250 -1.55 -0.252 -1.56
H 0.467* 2.18 0.266* 3.17
AC 0.105** -3.07 0.208 1.09
BC 0.239* 2.75 0.135 1.80
BB -0.561* -2.84 -0.360* -2.84
TF -0.324* -2.20 -0.525* -2.21
E -0.178* -1.79 -0.082 -1.42
G -0.236* -2.18 -0.342* -2.23
PO -0.330** -2.21 -0.119* -2.20
AL -0.373* -2.20 -0.242* -2.20
Agent Attributes (Z)
MI -2.371** -11.21 -3.361** -8.17
ST -0.478** -3.47 -0.014* -2.00
BT -0.541** -3.60 — —
Market Conditions (M)
AR -0.511 -1.16 -0.483 -1.53
CR -0.199* -2.20 -0.141 -1.73
Adj. R Squared 0.5600 — 0.6302 —
F Statistic 3002.18 — 2917.54 —
Number of observations 85871 — 3571 —
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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the bargaining outcome.
The insignificant impact from many housing characteristics could be be-
cause the attribute is very common or accepted as standard, and so has a narrow
distribution of possible valuations. In Chapter 1 of this Thesis I tested whether
uniqueness of a property impacts the price differentials for properties sold under
auction versus private treaty. I found that uniqueness, measured using the Ma-
halanobis distance, was statistically significant in explaining price differentials. A
similar test for bargaining power could be an avenue for further research.
The market conditions variables auction clearance rate AR and cash rate
expectations CR were statistically insignificant for the bargaining outcome. These
variables are commonly considered by the Australian media to have particular rele-
vance to Australian housing outcomes. But the results show, at least for the single
2011 calendar year, these variables were not relevant to bargaining outcomes.
The insignificance could indicate that bargaining power among buyers and
sellers is not impacted strongly by expectations for market conditions. But that
contrasts with hypotheses from Wilhelmsson (2008) and Song (1995) about buyer’s
and seller’s markets. Wilhelmsson and Song hypothesised that seller’s markets
are associated with a negative discount ratio. Buyer’s markets are associated with
positive discount ratios.
If that were so, it would make sense that expectations for higher cash rates,
typically associated with an improving housing market, would have a negative im-
pact on the discount ratio. Similarly, higher auction clearance rates should nega-
tively impact the discount ratio. While the sign is as expected on the variables in
all four regressions, the result is not significant.
The insignificant impact might be explained by one of two possibilities.
First, Australian participants in housing transactions might use a much broader
set of variables to gauge housing market conditions. Certainly, Macfarlane (2006)
implied as much. Second, the use of only one calendar year of data might not
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capture enough variation in the market conditions. A longer time-series of data
would improve the analysis in this regard.
The significant relationship between time on the market T and bargaining
power is another clear result in Tables 10 and 11. Time on market matters for bar-
gaining power. It is strongly significant in both the mechanism regression equations
in Table 10 and the Mechanism Design regression equation in Table 11. As the
property spends longer unsold on the market, the discount ratio increases. That is,
the distance between the asking price and the final sale price is larger.
In the Mechanism Choice regression, the statistically significant, positive
relationship indicates that there is a 0.14 percentage points increase in the bargaining
ratio for every 10 days the property is on the market. This meets the common
sense criterion. If the property is on the market for longer, it could be a signal to
potential buyers that there are problems with the property. It could indicate the
seller has overvalued the property. Potential buyers might be willing to bargain more
as a result. Sellers could also become increasingly desperate to sell the property.
Particularly if, for example, a future property transaction is subject to sale of the
original property.
The mechanism choice variable MC in the Mechanism Choice regression is
the focus for one of the key questions in this research. That is, how does the choice
of sales mechanism impact the bargaining outcome. Table 11 shows that the mecha-
nism choice coefficient has a significant, positive relationship with the discount ratio.
The choice of a private treaty mechanism clearly increases the distance between the
seller’s asking price and final selling price of the property. Conversely, opting for an
auction mechanism decreases the discount ratio.
In 2011, the private treaty mechanism was used in NSW much more fre-
quently than the auction mechanism. Sellers opted for a private treaty sale an
overwhelming majority of the time. My finding in the Table 11 indicates that this
may not have been the best option for sellers. It appears that when choosing an
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Table 11: Mechanism Choice Regression Results
Variable Coefficient t stat
Constant 3.951** -3.98
PT 0.127 0.20
T 0.014** 120.43
MC 3.297** 25.99
Property Attributes (X)
HS 0.000 1.36
B 0.254** 8.68
BR 0.072** 1.46
CP 0.011 0.56
S 0.220** 2.76
DR 0.046 0.90
FR -0.189** -2.87
SR 0.590** 2.87
RR 0.064 0.64
F 0.663** 5.97
WR -0.100 -0.83
CY -0.145 -1.56
H 0.081 0.87
AC 0.119** 2.55
BC 0.030 0.48
BB -0.417** -3.43
T -0.156* -1.83
E -0.172** -2.30
G -0.087 -1.33
PO -0.183** -2.14
AL -0.187 -1.95
Agent Attributes (Z)
MI -2.767** 18.25
Market Conditions (M)
AR -0.217 -0.741
CR -0.122* -2.20
F Statistic 4018.78
Adj. R Squared 0.5802
Number of observations 89442
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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offer price, sellers that choose a private treaty mechanism overvalue the property
relative to potential buyers. Buyers are better able to lower the final sale price.
So why do sellers opt for the private treaty mechanism? One explanation
could be that sellers choose private treaty in buyer’s markets, but choose auctions in
seller’s markets. This fits with evidence suggested by Lusht (1996) who pointed out
that in Australia, auctions are favoured during periods of strong demand consistent
with a seller’s markets. In that case, buyers may feel less able to bargain. But during
buyer’s markets, they hold more bargaining power, hence the positive coefficient on
the mechanism variable.
There may also be an anchoring effect. Analysis by Bucchianeri and Minson
(2012) reveals the consensus among real-estate professionals is that for property
auctions, setting a low asking price is better than setting a high price. A low asking
price can encourage a ‘bidding war’. This consensus is supported by the literature.
Ku, Galinsky, and Murnighan (2006), Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2005) and
Simonsohn and Ariely (2007) all found that auctions that open with a low asking
price attract a greater number of bids and close with a higher sale price. Banerjee
(1992) explains the effect through herding behaviour. Early bids are a signal that
the auctioned item is competitively priced. That signal attracts more bidders.
But there is also evidence from the anchoring literature that suggests prop-
erty sellers would benefit from setting higher asking prices. Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) showed that an agent’s value judgements assimilate to a value ‘anchor’ after
exposure, even if that anchor is seemingly irrelevant. There are numerous authors
that show that anchoring does impact the final price that a buyer is willing to pay12.
In NSW then, it could be the case that both effects are at work during 2011.
Sellers might be tempted to overvalue their property and set a higher ‘anchoring’
value when they sell during a private treaty. But, particularly during a buyer’s
market, buyers are more willing to bargain that price lower. Sellers themselves may
12See for example, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) and Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, and
McFadden (1998).
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be willing to allow the price to be bargained lower, to attract the buyer and allow
the buyer to feel that he has ‘got a bargain’.
And if an auction mechanism is chosen, sellers could be swayed by the
prevailing consensus among real-estate professions to set a lower asking price. That
asking price may in turn attract buyers who are willing to bargain the price higher,
as they assume the asking price is set low.
The coefficient for mean income also stands out in the results tables. The
coefficient for mean income is significantly negative across all models. The mean
income variable captures the average income for the postcode where the property
being sold is situated in NSW. It is a measure of the quality of the postcode but
also the average seller income within that postcode. The negative coefficient means
that as the mean income increases, the discount ratio declines.
The negative sign for the mean income coefficient could reflect two impacts,
given the interpretation of the variable I gave in the previous paragraph. As a
measure of quality of a postcode, it could say that sellers underestimate the value of
the quality of their postcode as perceived by potential buyers. The higher the mean
income, or quality of the postcode, the more potential buyers are willing to pay.
But it could also be interpreted as indicating that higher income sellers are
better able to bargain with buyers than lower income sellers. Buyers are less likely
to get bargains when buying from higher income sellers. The reason could be that
higher income sellers have less imperative to sell the property and reap the revenue
from the sale. A higher income allows those sellers more time to wait for a buyer
who will pay more for the property.
The result is also interesting because it can be compared with the findings
in Wilhelmsson (2008) and Song (1995). Wilhelmsson includes a variable in his
bargaining outcome regression that captures the income class for buyers. The data
were obtained from a postal survey where 618 buyers self-reported their income
levels. The coefficient for the buyers’ income class was significantly positive. The
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discount ratio increased as the buyer’s income increases - so buyers are likely to
bargain more as their income increases.
Song found the opposite. In that research, as buyer income increased, the
discount ratio decreased. Song hypothesised that higher income buyers bargained
less because they they had higher opportunity costs of searching. So those buyers
spent less time in the search-matching process, and bargained less. Ideally, it would
be good to include a buyer income variable in my own research to assess the impact
on NSW residential properties.
While I do not have access to buyer income data, I do have access to buyer-
type and seller-type data for private treaty sales, and seller-type data for auctions.
These variables have not been used in prior bargaining outcome research, to the
best of my knowledge.
The coefficients for seller-type and buyer-type are significant and negative
in the private treaty regression in Table 10. Both variables are set up as dummy
variables that have a value equal to one if the seller or buyer is an owner-occupier
type, and zero if a non-owner-occupier type. The sign of the coefficients indicate
that the presence of an owner-occupier type in the property transaction decreases
the discount ratio.
From a buyer’s perspective, the result indicates that owner-occupier buyers
bargain less effectively than investor-type buyers for private treaty sales. The sign of
the coefficient fits with prior expectations. Owner-occupiers, on the whole, may be
less experienced at buying a property and have less knowledge about the potential
value of the property relative to investors.
The result also compares to Song (1995), who found that first-time buyers
bargain less than repeat-buyers with more experience. The difference is that Song
found the coefficient not to be significant, and concluded that the housing market
is efficient enough to protect buyers that might potentially be less-informed about
the value of a property. In this case, there is evidence that in NSW, the market is
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less efficient and owner-occupiers bargain less.
Because this paper only considers NSW property transactions, it is impos-
sible to confirm whether this potential inefficiency is peculiar to NSW or common
across all Australian states. But investigating whether the potential inefficiency is
more pervasive could be an important area for future research. Particularly if the
inefficiency reflects a market failure in the Australian housing market. In that case,
there could be scope for intervention to protect owner-occupier type buyers.
From a seller’s perspective, the result indicates that owner-occupier sell-
ers are better at bargaining than their investor-type counterparts. The result is
noteworthy because this question has not been considered in the bargaining out-
come literature before, and it is also not immediately obvious why this should be
the case. My prior expectation was that investors would achieve better bargaining
results.
The owner-occupier may have an informational advantage over an investor-
owner for a given property, because the owner-occupier has lived in the property
while the investor has not. This informational advantage could confer a bargaining
advantage relative to the investor-type seller.
There could also be an element of credit constraint in the result. For exam-
ple, an owner-occupier can choose to keep living in the current property until the
property is sold. There are fewer time-related costs for the owner-occupier in the
sale. But an investor-type seller could be selling the property to raise cash quickly.
The higher costs associated with waiting for a buyer to arrive and offer a sale price
close to the asking price could be relatively higher for the investor.
Finally, if the buyer is aware that the seller is an investor rather than an
owner-occupier might also make a difference to the bargaining position of the seller.
For example, if the seller is an owner-occupier, the decision to sell provides little
information to a potential buyer that would be useful in bargaining. The seller
could be upgrading to a larger property, or downsizing to a smaller. The seller may
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be moving interstate or overseas. The decision to sell does not impart any useful
information about the property’s value.
But if the seller is an investor, the decision to sell could be an adverse signal.
The potential buyer might wonder why the seller is selling. Several questions might
occur to the buyer. Does the seller need cash quickly, for example, strengthening the
buyer’s bargaining position. Does the property have a low rental yield. Are there
high maintenance costs associated with the property? All of these signals might be
expected to weaken the bargaining outcome for the investor-type seller.
The coefficient for seller type ST in the auction regression in Table 10
contrasts against the coefficient in the private treaty regression. The coefficient in
auction sales is still negative, but is larger at -0.014 compared with -0.478. And
the variable is statistically significant only at the five percent level compared with
significance at the one percent level in private treaty sales.
The coefficient in the auction regression still shows that owner-occupier
type sellers decrease the discount ratio. But not by as much as for private treaty
sales. This result could indicate that auctions remove some of the bargaining power
that owner-occupier type sellers achieve relative to investor-type sellers. That could
reflect the competitive pressure generated by auctions. It could also be that the
auction mechanism itself decentralises the act of bargaining between a seller of any
type and buyers of any type, to competing between buyers of any type.
The contrasting results for seller types across the two regressions in Table 10
is also interesting when viewed in the context of the average sales price differentials
reported in Table 6 in Chapter 1.
In Table 6, I showed that owner-occupier type sellers on average achieve
lower price differentials between auction and private treaty compared against investor-
type sellers. In Table 10 I show that owner-occupier type sellers tend to achieve
better bargaining outcomes than investor-type sellers, and that bargaining outcome
improves when the seller chooses a private treaty sale instead of an auction sale.
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This result in Table 10 suggests that the price differential arising in Table 6
in Chapter 1 is caused by owner-occupier type sellers having more bargaining power
and achieving better sales prices in private treaty sales, relative to the price achieved
in auction sales. But even with this extra bargaining power, it remains the case that
auctions achieve higher prices on average across all buyer types.
The result that auction sales achieve a higher price relative to private treaty
but private treaty sales impart a bargaining power boost to owner-occupier sellers
may help explain the massive reliance on private treaty instead of auctions. The
seller’s belief that they have achieved a bargain over the buyer could outweigh the
potential to achieve a higher price through auction.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have used standard regression techniques to consider the
efficiency of the private-treaty residential property market in NSW and the impact of
mechanism choice on the bargaining outcomes of residential property transactions.
The focus was on residential property transactions that took place over the 2011
calendar year in the state of NSW.
I found that while some housing characteristics do significantly impact bar-
gaining outcomes, they appear to be of less importance on a whole than mechanism
choice or buyer and seller characteristics. While the data that I used were rich in
terms of describing the residential properties, I found less than half of the property
characteristics to be significant.
I also found that the ‘type’ of buyer or seller involved in a property sale is
significant for the bargaining outcome. In fact, there is evidence that the private-
treaty market is not efficient enough to protect owner-occupier buyers from paying
more for comparable properties than do investor-type buyers. The auction market,
on the other hand, does appear to be more efficient in that sense. Comparing this
across all Australian States’ residential property markets could be an important area
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for future policy-driven research. The nature of the Australian residential property
market, with its differences across States and Territories, makes Australia ripe for
this type of research.
The choice of sales mechanism also has a significant impact on the final
bargaining outcome. The regression results indicate that opting for a private treaty
mechanism increases the discount ratio and worsens the bargaining outcome for sell-
ers. Conversely, choosing an auction improves the bargaining outcome. It appears
that sellers overvalue the property when choosing a private treaty.
The result is important because sellers opted for private-treaty in almost
90% of all property transactions held in NSW in 2011. The result could be insti-
tutionally driven. Real-estate professionals tend to encourage a lower asking price
when an auction is chosen as the sales mechanism. This can encourage a bidding
war and so improve the bargaining outcome. Conversely, when a private treaty is
chosen, asking prices might be set high to encourage an anchoring effect on buy-
ers. The impact could differ depending on whether the property is being sold in a
‘buyer’s’ or ‘seller’s’ market. But because the data set that I used only contains a
single year of data, that question is left for future research.
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Chapter 3
3 NSW Treasury Auctions
3.1 Introduction
Auctions have existed for thousands of years. Through history, auctions
have been used to sell a wide variety of goods. In 193 A.D the entire Roman Em-
pire was sold to the highest bidder through auction. Auctions are currently used
to sell goods to relatively unsophisticated retail buyers - through online auction
houses such as eBay, for example - but are also used in highly lucrative commercial
settings. Mineral rights, corporations and state-owned assets are all sold through
auction. Auction theory has been used to design mechanisms for the sales of public
assets as governments move towards privatisation. For example, Preston McAfee,
Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson influenced the design of the 1993-94 radio spec-
trum auction. In the UK, Ken Binmore and Paul Klemperer helped design the 3G
telephone auctions that raised US$34bn in revenue. And the US Treasury regularly
sells its debt securities, called Treasury Notes and Treasury Bills, through auction.
In 2009, the US Department of Treasury held 280 auctions selling around US$8.6
trillion in securities (Treasury, 2009).
Governments around the world use auctions to sell Government securities.
In the literature, these are called Treasury auctions. Treasury auctions are not
a new phenomenon. The US Government began auctioning short-term securities
(Treasury bills) in 1929 and long-term securities (Treasury notes and bonds) in
1970 (Treasury, 2009). Treasury auctions attract sophisticated economic agents
that bid regularly in competitive auctions. The auctions generally issue millions of
dollars of Treasury bonds13. So Treasury auctions provide an excellent framework
for empirically examining the findings of auction theory.
13For consistency, all government securities will be termed Treasury bonds through the remainder
of the paper.
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The existing empirical literature that estimates revenues from Treasury auc-
tions using bidder-level data typically ignores the presence of a secondary market
for Treasury bonds. But after a Treasury bond line has been established, auctions
held by the issuer are no longer the only place bidders can buy the bond. Bid-
ders can instead buy the bond on the secondary market. In this Chapter and the
subsequent two Chapters of this Thesis, I look at the impact of secondary markets
for Government Treasury bonds on decisions made by bidders and auctioneers in
Treasury auctions.
Secondary markets impact Treasury auctions in several ways. If a secondary
market for Treasury bonds exists parallel to the primary Treasury auction, then
bidders are able to purchase the Treasury bond either through the auction, by
bidding, or in the secondary market, that acts like a take-it-or-leave it fixed price.
Bidders must take the existence of the secondary market into consideration when
deciding their strategies. Treasury auctioneers aim to fund their Government at
the best price. So auctioneers of Treasury bonds must also take the existence of a
secondary market into consideration when they decide the format of the Treasury
auction.
This research answers several questions. I ask whether bidders in NSW
Treasury auctions do under-bid relative to their valuations for Treasury bonds. And
does the auction mechanism chosen achieve the best revenue results. These questions
have not been considered in an Australian perspective.
The size and value of Treasury auctions makes these important questions.
Treasury auctions are typically large values. The state of NSW in Australia, whose
Gross State Product was around $410bn in the 2009-2010 financial year14, regularly
auctions Treasury bonds with a face value of more than $100m. The interest rate
paid on that funding has wider implications for the real economy. Higher Govern-
ment funding rates can result in higher taxes and lower public spending. And if
14Approximately equal to 1
3
of Australia’s national GDP.
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potential bidders can achieve a higher rate of return on the Government Treasuries
than from alternative investments, then that could crowd out private sector issuance
and private sector investing.
The large values involved in Treasury auctions makes the research important
from the perspective of the bidders that seek to achieve the best rate of return on
their purchases of Treasury bonds, and from the perspective of Treasury auctioneers
that seek to fund their Governments at the cheapest rate of funding. Optimality
becomes an important consideration for Treasury auctioneers. And ignoring the
presence of a secondary market could alter the auctioneer’s decision making.
The presence of a secondary market helps explain the auctioneer’s premium.
That is, Treasury auctioneers typically are not monopolists. The Treasury bonds
that they issue can also generally be purchased on the secondary market. Treasury
auctioneers pay a premium relative to the secondary market price to encourage
potential bidders to attend the auction rather than purchase the Treasury bond at
a fixed price in the secondary market.
I introduce estimates for bidder valuations that include the presence of
secondary markets using a unique set of data from the NSW Treasury Corporation
to estimate bidder valuations. This has not been considered before in the existing
literature, to the best of my knowledge. This paper finds that ignoring the secondary
market results in estimates for bidder valuations that are as much as 60 basis points
too low.
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 review
the relevant Treasury bond auction literature and the models that are used to test
Treasury auctions. Section 3.4 discusses the estimation methodology for recovering
bidder valuations. Section 3.5 introduces the Australian and NSW Treasury bond
experience and discusses the data set that is used for empirical data testing.
The subsequent Chapter 4 considers the extent of bid shading in NSW
Treasury auctions and considers whether the current theory adequately captures
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reality through some simple forecasting and pooling of auction data, as well as
considering which auction format raises the most revenue for NSW Treasury bonds.
Chapter 5 extends the literature and introduces secondary markets to the analysis.
3.2 Treasury Auctions
Contributions to auction theory accelerated after Vickrey (1961) showed
that auction revenue is equivalent in first price and second price auctions. But this
‘revenue equivalence’ can break down if certain assumptions do not hold. The as-
sumptions include risk neutral, symmetric bidders with independent private values,
whose payment is a function of bids alone. These assumptions may be violated in
Treasury auctions.
Two common auction mechanisms are generally used in Treasury auctions;
discriminatory auctions and uniform-price auctions. Both formats are commonly
used in both financial and commodity markets to sell identical goods to multiple
buyers.
Uniform-price and discriminatory15 auctions differ in the payment rule.
Otherwise, the mechanism is fundamentally the same. Prior to the auction, the Gov-
ernment announces the supply - the amount of securities it will sell - and whether
the auction will be held in price space or yield space. After the auction has opened,
bidders submit a demand schedule. The demand schedule consists of either price
and quantity, or yield and quantity, pairs. In auctions that are held in yield space,
the price can be recovered from the yield16, and vice versa.
After the auction, the securities are awarded to bidders in order of descend-
ing price, or ascending yield, until the supply is exhausted. The participants that
enter bids above the market clearing price are allocated securities and pay the Gov-
ernment. The payment depends on the format of the auction. In a uniform-price
15Also called multiple-price or pay-as-you-bid auctions.
16Treasury security prices are inversely related to yield. That is, a high price implies a low yield.
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auction, each winning bidder pays the market clearing (or stop-out) price. In the
discriminatory auction, winning bidders pay what they actually bid.
As an example, consider a government issuing AUD$1000 of securities in
an auction. Suppose three bidders submit the demand schedules in the top panel of
Table 12.
Table 12: Discriminatory vs Uniform Auction
Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
(price,quantity) (price,quantity) (price,quantity)
103,500 102,100 102,300
101,100 98,300
99,100
Discriminatory
103,500 102,100 102,300
101,100
Uniform
101,500 101,200 101,300
The stop-out price for the auction is 101. Bidder 1 and bidder 3 have one
winning bid each, and bidder 2 has two winning bids. The lower two panes in Table
1 show the amount of securities awarded to each bidder and the price they pay
under the discriminatory and uniform-price auction format. In the uniform-price
format, the price paid is the market-clearing price. The government would receive
AUD$1024 by holding the discriminatory auction, but only AUD$1010 if it held the
uniform-price auction.
Ex-post analysis always shows that a discriminatory auction generates more
revenue for the seller. But ex-post analysis ignores bidders’ strategic behaviour.
Bidders will generally alter their bids depending on the payment rule used. Thus,
ex-ante, it is not clear that a discriminatory auction will dominate the uniform-price
auction in terms of revenue.
Nonetheless, a 2005 survey by Brenner, Galai, and Sade (2009) revealed
that a majority of countries do use a discriminatory auction format. Of 48 coun-
tries surveyed, 24 used the discriminatory auction format, 9 used the uniform-price
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auction format, and 9 used either, depending on the security being issued. Six used
auction formats that were not clearly discriminatory nor uniform.
Friedman (1960) argued that uniform-price auctions could reduce the fund-
ing costs of the US Treasury compared to discriminatory auctions. Economists and
policymakers have argued the relative merits of each format since. All US Treasury
bonds have been issued via uniform-price auctions since November 1998, and in the
UK inflation linked Treasury bonds are issued via uniform-price auctions.
In the theoretical literature,Treasury auctions are usually described in either
a common values or private values framework. Most securities sold in Treasury
auctions have a resale value in a secondary market. In common value settings, the
expected value of the auctioned security to each bidders is its expected resale price.
The common value framework usually ignores the possibility of a private component
to each bidder’s valuation.
The common value assumption has some problems. Gordy (1999) suggests
that significant transaction costs in the secondary market could add a private com-
ponent to bidders’ valuations. Hortacsu (2002) reports a survey by Alkan (1991)
that showed a significant number of bidders in Turkish Treasury auctions partici-
pated in the auctions primarily to meet the liquid asset reserve requirements of that
nation’s Central Bank. There are parallels in Australia, where Semi-Government
Treasury bonds are deemed eligible Tier 1 assets for repurchase agreements at Aus-
tralia’s central bank, The Reserve Bank of Australia, under new Basel III banking
regulations.
Similarly, some participants in Treasury auctions may bid on behalf of an-
other bidder. This could be the case where only a small number of bidders have
primary dealer status - the status required to be allowed to bid in the Treasury
auction. The indirect bidder could have a different motivation for bidding for the
security, introducing a private value component.
The winner’s curse is an issue under the common values auction model. The
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security that is auctioned has a common resale price after the auction is complete
that is unknown to the bidders at the time of the auction. Each of the participating
bidders receives a signal about that post-auction price. If the post-auction price is x
then each of the I bidders receives a signal si that has a mean of x and a standard
deviation of σ. Bidders will have different estimates of the post-auction price. Once
a bidder learns that he is the auction-winner, his updated valuation of the security
is reduced. Winning suggests that the bidder over-valued the object.
Auction theory has not settled the debate over which payment format domi-
nates. Milgrom (1982) and Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) argued that a uniform-
price auction reduces winner’s curse compared to discriminatory auctions. The
argument is essentially a multiple-unit extension of the Milgrom and Weber (1982)
result for single unit second-price auction compared to first-price auctions. But this
early work tended to model Treasury auctions as multi-unit auctions where bidders
demanded at most one unit of the good and submitted only a single price bid. These
assumptions can be rejected in most Treasury auctions. Bidders tend to submit a
schedule of bids.
Rational bidders should submit bids that are lower than their estimates to
compensate for the winner’s curse. That is, bidders shade their bids. In single unit
auctions, holding a second price auction can help mitigate the level of bid shading.
Ausubel (2004) suggests that the winner’s curse could be more pronounced in a
multi-unit auction than in a single unit auction. In multi-unit auctions, there is
more than one good to share amongst more than one winning bidder. Under the
common values framework, each bidder is worse off the greater the quantity that
he wins. Ausubel (2004) calls this the champion’s plague and shows that rational
bidders adjust for the champion’s plague by lowering their quantity demanded at
any given price.
Wilson (1979) introduced a multi-unit auction model known as the ‘share
model’. Wilson’s model was later extended by Back and Zender (1993). The share
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model explicitly takes into account bidders’ demand schedules. Risk neutral bidders
submit downward sloping demand schedules and the market clearing price is the
price that each bidder’s demand curve intersects his residual supply curve.
The residual supply curve is the total supply minus the demand of all other
bidders as a function of the price. That is, the residual supply is found by subtracting
the competing bidders’ aggregate bid function at each price from the total supply.
If there are N bidders, then the aggregate bid function that bidder i faces is the
horizontal summation of the N-1 other bidders.
Each bidder has monopsonist power over his upward-sloping residual sup-
ply curve. Under a common value uniform-price model, bidders can exercise their
market power by submitting a downward sloping demand schedule. A bidder’s abil-
ity to exercise market power over the final price is a concern for commercial users
of uniform-price auctions, given the potentially very large values of Treasury bonds
being issued.
The uniform-price auction can then encourage implicit price collusion amongst
bidders resulting in endogenous underpricing. If bidders submit a steep enough de-
mand curve, the security market price might then be undervalued relative to the
common value of the security. Essentially, bidders exert market power on the clear-
ing price by submitting some low bids in equilibrium. The steep demand curves can
commit bidders to a self-enforcing collusive arrangement. Deviating bidders earn
lower expected profits.
Each bidder faces a tradeoff between a price improvement and an increase
in his allocation of Treasury bonds. In Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993),
it is this tradeoff that determines the degree of underpricing. Bidders are unable
to increase their allocation substantially by making minor adjustments to the price.
Bidders are then reluctant to bid aggressively.
Back and Zender (1993) show that there was a class of equilibria in the
uniform-price auction that could be particularly bad for the auctioneer. Bidders
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could make stop-out prices very low by submitting very steep demand schedules.
The steep portion of the schedules consists of inframarginal bids that are costless
because of the unique award price and the rigidity of the Treasury supply.
But empirical research has not found a lot of support for the severe un-
derpricing envisaged by the Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993) models.
Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) show that underpricing exists in US Treasury bond
data, but it amounts to only a fraction of a basis point in yields17. And Keloharju,
Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005) find little evidence of bidders exercising monopsonistic
market power in a study of Finnish Treasury auctions using individual bidder level
data.
The discriminatory auction is not susceptible to underpricing from the
monopsonist power. Each bidder pays his bid. Submitting a steep demand curve
risks winning bidders having to pay the high price in his demand schedule.
Discriminatory auctions can reduce the potential for implicit collusion re-
sulting from monopsonist market power that is found in uniform-price auctions. But
uniform-price auctions are less susceptible to bid shading from the winner’s curse.
In the US, a natural experiment was conducted by the US Treasury. Prior
to 1991, US 2-year and 5-year Treasury bonds were auctioned using a discriminatory
auction. In 1991, the US Treasury switched to uniform-price auctions.
The results of the experiment suggested that uniform auctions achieved
lower award concentration - awards were more dispersed across bidders - than dis-
criminatory auctions (Nandi, 1997). The uniform-price auctions also achieved higher
average revenues but the variance of revenue from auction to auction was higher.
The result was driven by bidders’ tendency in the uniform-price auctions to submit
steep demand schedules.
But Beierlein and Kato (2003) find this is not a universal result. In the
Japanese IPO market, for example, the winner’s curse steepens demand curves in
17A basis point is 0.01%.
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discriminatory auctions. In Israel’s Treasury auctions, the demand schedules were
flatter under uniform-price auctions. Other studies also make it difficult to con-
clusively say that one format dominates the other. Felmand and Reinhart (1996),
Tenorio (1993) and Umlauf (1993) show that uniform-price auctions outperformed
discriminatory auctions for IMF gold auctions, Zambian foreign exchange auctions
and Mexican treasury auctions, respectively. But Simon (1994) presented evidence
that uniform-price auctions actually performed worse in a 1970s US Treasury bond
experiment.
3.3 The Theoretical Models
Researchers generally use one of two methods to analyse bidder behaviour in
Treasury auctions. The literature can be broadly divided into ‘natural experiment’
studies, and structural model studies.
The first approach takes advantage of a natural experiment: that is, changes
in the actual auction mechanism used by a Treasury bond issuing agency. This
method is limited to markets that have had the ‘natural experiment’ conducted
- where the authority conducting the Treasury auctions have switched between
uniform-price auctions and discriminatory auctions.
The attraction of this approach is that it is exactly the type of experiment
that a researcher would like to conduct. The true value and bid-price is estimated.
Researchers can then gauge the effect of mechanism choice on the difference between
the bidders’ true value and his bid value, controlling for observables.
The results from studies using this method have been mixed. Umlauf (1993)
finds that uniform-price auctions result in less revenue than discriminatory auctions,
using Mexican 30-day Treasury bill auctions. Simon (1994), Nyborg and Sundare-
san (1996) and Malvey and Archibald (1998) use US Treasury auction data. Simon
(1994), like Umlauf (1993), finds that the uniform-price auction gives less revenue.
But Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) and Malvey and Archibald (1998) find no sta-
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tistical difference between the alternative mechanisms.
The drawbacks of the ‘natural experiment’ method are the reliance on bid-
ders’ true values being reflected in the resale market. That is, the Treasury auction
is assumed to be strictly common values. Also, changes in the information from the
close of the auction until aftermarket trading must be controlled for, or assumed to
not exist.
The second approach typically adopted by researchers is a structural model
approach. A strategic model of equilibrium bidding can be created based on some
assumed value structure. Observed bids are then mapped into estimations of the
unobserved true values for the Treasury bonds, as long as the bid function is invert-
ible. The estimate model can then be compared against a counterfactual auction to
determine which format creates more revenue.
For example, Hortacsu (2002) estimates a demand function for discrimina-
tory auctions of Turkish Treasuries, and then compares that demand function to
the counterfactual uniform-price auction. Kang and Puller (2008) compare revenue
from auctions of Korean Treasuries to the counterfactual efficient Vickrey auction.
The structural models assume that bidders are bidding according to a strate-
gic equilibrium, and use non-parametric techniques to identify the value function.
Structural models have their basis in the share auction model of Wilson (1979). The
share auction model was designed to take advantage of a smooth and continuous
bid schedule.
But Treasury auctions generally have bid schedules that are better charac-
terised as discrete ‘step’ bid functions. Hortacsu (2002) and Nautz (1995) extended
the continuous share model to discrete situations. Perfect divisibility of the goods is
maintained, but it is restricted to lie on a discrete price grid. The extended model
allows bidding in discrete strategy space, where bidders can submit a finite number
of bid points connected by a step function.
Structural models require a value structure to be assumed. The value struc-
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ture could be independent private values, common values, or affiliated values. In
independent private values, the bidder knows his own values but not his rivals. In
the common value setting, each Treasury bond has the same common value to all
bidders, but each of those bidders gets a different signal of the common value.
In the structural model literature, the underlying value structure is crucial.
Common value models are most appropriate when each bidder’s motivation to own
the Treasury bond is to then trade it in the secondary market. An independent
private values assumption is likely to better represent reality if bidders buy and
hold the Treasury bond to maturity, or if the bidder can purchase bonds on behalf
of other investors.
The valuation function can be non-parametrically identified if the assump-
tions that the value structure is correctly specified, and bidders play a strategic
equilibrium, hold. The estimated valuation or demand function can then be used to
compare revenues against other strategic models of bidding. For example, the exist-
ing structural model literature generally asks, if theory is correct, then which format
would raise the most revenue. So, if the actual auction mechanism is a uniform-
price auction, then given the recovered value function, would the counterfactual
discriminatory auction raise more revenue?
The models used to estimate valuation functions assume bidding is a static
game with participating bidders acting to maximise their profits. Bidders are as-
sumed to be ex-ante symmetric and to know the total supply of Treasury bonds
for sale, the total number of participating bidders and their own value function.
Bidders do not know competing bidders’ valuation functions, but they do have a
common prior on the distribution of the valuation function.
Treasury bonds are only one amongst many similar and competing low-risk
financial assets that bidders can choose to purchase. This allows for a reasonable
assumption that bidders are risk neutral. Of course, if Treasury bonds were pur-
chased to, say, satisfy reserve requirements, and the Treasury bonds were the only
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potential source to satisfy that reserve requirement, then bidders would risk having
to purchase the bonds in secondary market if they lose the auction. In this case,
the assumption of risk neutrality might not be reasonable.
Assuming ex-ante symmetry amongst bidders implies that each bidder has
the same distribution of latent demand. Kang and Puller (2008) points out that
this may be questionable because potential bidders could be large banks or security
houses with different underlying motivations to purchase Treasury bonds. This
could be the case for Treasury auctions that do not involve a dealer panel structure.
But in a dealer panel structure, bidders are all typically large, sophisticated financial
institutions with similar motivations for being involved in the auction. This certainly
holds true in the case of NSW Treasury bonds. Kang and Puller (2008) allowed for
asymmetries but the conclusions and results were unchanged.
3.3.1 Value Structures
Auctions are usually modeled as non-cooperative games with incomplete
information. The auctioneer does not know with certainty the bidders’ values for
the item that is to be auctioned. So, we need to make assumptions about the
underlying value structure or information structure to model the auction as a game
of strategic behaviour.
The two information structures that are commonly assumed in the literature
are the independent private values model (IPVM) and the common values model
(CVM). The IPVM assumes that bidders assign a value to the object being auctioned
independently from other bidders. In the CVM the object is worth the same for
all bidders. A third information structure, the affiliated values model, assumes that
the value to the bidder of each unit is a function of their own private signal and
some unknown common value.
In the theoretical and econometric research for single unit, indivisible good
auctions, the information structure is usually modeled as IPVM. But for multi-unit
74
auction research, and particulary for Treasury auctions, both information structures
have been assumed nearly equally in the structural empirical research. On the
theoretical side, the majority of research has focussed on CVM.
The IPVM has an empirical advantage over the CVM because the IPVM
does not assume that the object to be auctioned is valued the same by all bidders.
Both the optimality of the auction and the efficiency of the auction can be considered
under the IPVM assumption. Optimality is considered in terms of revenue accruing
to the auctioneer, and efficiency considers whether the auction format allocates the
object to the highest valuation bidder.
Denoting random variables in capitals and their realisations in lower-case,
in the general setting for common value auctions, the item being auctioned has a
value X that, at the time of the auction, is common to all bidders but unknown by
each bidder. Each bidder i receives a signal ti that has a conditional density known
to all bidders, denoted fT |X(t|x). The signal ti is an unbiased estimator of the true
value of the object. In CVM, the difference in bidders’ individual signals explains
the difference in bids in any given auction.
In IPVM, each bidder has a valuation Xi that is independently and iden-
tically distributed according to the distribution FX(x). FX(x) is commonly known
by all bidders. Each bidder i knows his own valuation xi but does not know the
realisation of xj∀j 6= i.
Clearly, the affiliated values model is an attractive information structure,
because real-life government Treasury auctions most likely have an information
structure that is captured by elements from the IPVM and CVM. But there has
been no work done that uses affiliated values models to research share auctions.
Paarsch and Hong (2006) point out that assuming affiliated values is difficult in
practice because the models are unidentified. That is, in an econometric sense, the
joint distribution of bidders’ valuations and signals is not uniquely determined by
the joint distribution of the bids. And, unfortunately, robust tests of the underlying
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value structures in divisible goods auctions do not exist in the current literature. So
it is necessary to identify possible sources of private information and consider these
on a case-by-case basis.
Common value models are generally justified with regard to the secondary
market for Treasuries. Generally, government bonds that are purchased in an auc-
tion can be sold in the secondary market. And the secondary market is used to
approximate a common value for the object. But not all bidders go on to sell their
Treasuries in the secondary market. Some buy and hold for reasons that introduce
elements of private information.
Hortacsu (2002) and Kang and Puller (2008) identify some sources of private
information. Each bidder might have different reserve requirements for holding the
Treasury bonds, or might have different liquidity availability that its rivals will not
know. I would add the point that bidders might also be bidding on behalf of other
customers. This source of private information could be particularly common in
Treasury auctions that use a primary dealer (or panel dealer) setup. A primary
dealer setup allows only a discrete number of bidders to bid in the primary market.
These primary dealers might have strict requirements to guarantee to bid in each
auction, for example. Non-primary dealers that want to purchase Treasury bonds in
the primary market have to place their bids through a primary dealer, and passing
those preferences and constraints confers private information to the primary dealer.
Another source of private information that I can identify could come from
bidders having different forecasts for long-run interest rates. Different forecasts
would generate different values for holding the Treasuries. And seasonality can play
a role for bidders in Treasury bonds. Different institutions may need to hold more or
less Treasury bonds at different periods of the year to meet regulatory requirements,
affecting their demand during auctions.
Independent private values might also be particularly appropriate for both
Commonwealth issued and semi-government issued inflation-linked bonds in Aus-
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tralia. NSW TCorp issues into the semi-government Treasury bond market18. The
turnover in inflation-linked bonds is much lower than the turnover for nominal bonds.
For example, the turnover in nominal bonds in 2010 was $1.9tn, according to the
Australian Financial Market Association. Inflation-linked bonds accounted for 9%
of bonds outstanding, so at first glance inflation-linked turnover might sensibly be
expected to be around $152bn19, but in fact turnover was only $35.5bn.
The lower turnover suggests that the secondary market for Australian inflation-
linked bonds is less liquid. This could reflect investors buying inflation-linked bonds
to match longer-term inflation liabilities and risks rather than to take a short-term
position on inflation. Once the liabilities are matched, there is no great incentive
for the holder to sell the bond. The NSW inflation-linked bond market has similar
hallmarks to the Australian Government market. The lower turnover in inflation-
linked bonds relative to nominal bonds suggests that the independent private values
framework might adequately capture the inflation-linked market.
3.3.2 Optimality Condition
Strategic bidding in these divisible goods auctions can be modeled follow-
ing Wilson (1979). The bidders’ demand functions are modeled as discrete step
functions. Hortacsu (2002) and Kang and Puller (2008) develop methods to model
bidding in a discrete strategy space where bidders submit a finite number of price-
quantity pairs, that are connected by a step function.
Q is the total supply of Treasury auctions available. The N bidders, i =
1, ...N,N ≥ 2, and their identities, are known to all participants. Bidders are risk
neutral. xi is bidder i ’s true demand (or marginal valuation) function for Treasury
bonds. Bidder i has a private signal ti that is only known to himself, while s is a
18Inflation-linked bonds have an inflation protected coupon payment. The Australian Govern-
ment has around $13bn of inflation-linked bonds on issue, representing 9% of total Australian
Government bonds on issue. The NSW Government has around $4bn inflation-linked bonds on
issue, also around 9% of total NSW Government bonds on issue
199% of $1.9tn.
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signal known to all bidders. Bidder i ’s demand function is denoted xi = xi (q, ti, s).
xq ≥ 0 and it is possible that ti and s are correlated.
I make the assumption that conditional on s, the private signals ti are
independent. This assumption about the information structure will be important
for the analysis in the paper.
First, I will discuss the signal s. s represents the common information
available to participants in the auction, both the auctioneer and the bidders, prior to
the auction. Essentially, s is the set of economic variables relevant to the Treasuries
being auctioned. s is easily and readily observable to all auction participants.
In Australia, and for NSW Treasury bonds, information that might be par-
ticularly relevant for s include the current setting of monetary policy at the Reserve
Bank of Australia, NSW state and Australian Federal fiscal policy settings, recent
economic data releases, inflation levels and inflation expectations, and political news.
s might also include information about the pricing of alternative securities.
In our NSW Treasury case, this could include so-called semi-government
bonds from the other Australian State issuers. Each State and Territory in Australia
has a Treasury bond issuer, for example, the Queensland Treasury Corporation or
the Treasury Corporation of Victoria. It could also include Australian Government
bonds. In essence, s includes all of the information that participants can access
through their trading terminals and through discussions with their strategists and
other market participants.
How reasonable is the assumption that conditional on s, private signals are
independent? There is a remarkably large amount of information available to bidders
and the auctioneer preceding the auction. Remembering that all participants are
large, well-informed institutional bidders, that have vast resources to access the
information and are also able to discuss with each other their institutional views on
s, it does seem reasonable to assume that conditioning on s, participants’ different
views on the underlying value of the Treasury bond being auctioned, captured by
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ti, will be independently distributed. A further reason to assume independence, as
mentioned by Hortacsu (2002), is to obtain the existence of an equilibrium of the
game.
3.3.3 Independent Private Values Models
Because the model is IPV, xi (q, ti, s) = x (q, ti). The price vector p is a grid
of prices with elements separated by ∆p. Bidder i ’s bid vector comprises a series of
quantities for each element in p. So, qi : qi0 ≥ qi1 ≥ ... ≥ qiK+1.
In some Treasury auctions, q is restricted to a maximum number of bid-
quantity points. For example, according to Kang and Puller (2008) Korean Treasury
auctions allow a maximum of five bid points. In reality, Korean Treasury auction
participants rarely use the full quota of allowable bids. And in many Treasury
auctions throughout the world, participants use less than the maximum possible
bid-quantities. Kastl (2008) suggests that there is a cost to submitting bid functions,
and describes a method to estimate this implicit cost. But it is arguable that most
Treasury auction participants find a less refined demand schedule to be sufficient
for creating a flexible bid function.
After all of the bids have been submitted, the Treasury calculates the market
clearing price. The market clearing price is the price that total demand falls just
short of the total supply. That is, pk∗ : k
∗ = min k :
∑N
i=1 qik ≤ Q.
At pk∗ ,
qi(pk) ∼= Q−
N∑
j 6=i
vj(pk∗)
pk∗ is the price where bidder i ’s demand function intersects the residual supply. The
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distribution of pk∗ conditional on the bidder i ’s demand function is
H(pk,qi) ≡ Pr
qi,k ≤ Q− N∑
j 6=i
qj,k

= Pr (pk∗ ≤ pk|qi)
In other words, the probability of having excess supply at any given price,
pk is H(·), conditional on bidder i ’s particular demand function. Excess supply at
the given price implies that the market clearing price is lower than pk. Then, H(·) is
also the probability that the market clearing price is less than pk. The uncertainties
faced by a particular bidder - the private information held by rival bidders and the
market clearing price - are captured in H(·), that is assumed to be continuous and
differentiable with respect to quantity.
It is instructive to consider the case of continuously differentiable downward
sloping demand functions before moving to the extensions proposed by Hortacsu
(2002) and Kang and Puller (2008). In the independent private values models
with symmetric bidders as proposed by Wilson (1979), bidder i ’s demand function,
D(p, ti) is a function of the price and the bidder’s private signal. Bidder i faces the
maximisation problem:
max
q
∫ ∞
0
(∫ q(p)
0
[x(q, ti)dq − p(q)] dq
)
dH(p, q(p))
The Euler-Lagrange necessary condition for the optimisation problem is derived in
Appendix G. In the uniform-price auction, the Euler-Lagrange necessary condition
is given by:
x (q(p), ti) = p− Gq(p, q(p))q(p)
Gp(p, q(p))
(14)
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In the discriminatory auction, the Euler-Lagrange necessary condition reduces to:
x(q(p), ti) = p+
H (p, q(p))
Hp (p, q(p))
Intuitively, it is clear that there is no incentive for a bidder to bid above his valuation.
This is is also clear from the above equations. In the discriminatory auction, bidders
shade their bid so that x(q(p)) ≤ p. In the discriminatory auction, where the bidder
pays the bid for each unit won, the shading term is given by
Hq(p;q(p,ti))
Hp(p;q(p,ti))
. The
numerator of the shading term captures the effect of a change in the bidder’s bid
on the probability distribution of the market clearing price. A higher bid raises the
market clearing price, and lowers the chance that the market clearing price is lower
than any price p.
In other words, the numerator will be close to one for prices that are ma-
terially larger than the expected market clearing price. The size of the bid-shading
will be large. Bidders can shade their bids by more because the lower bid will not
significantly alter the probability of winning, but could significantly lower the pay-
ment for that unit. In contrast, the size of the shading will be lower for bid prices
that are closer to the expected market-clearing price. The trade-off is between a
lower payment, conditional on winning, against a lower probability of winning.
In the uniform-price auction, the bid-shading term is increasing in the num-
ber of units won. For the uniform-price auction, the numerator captures the effect
on the distribution of the market clearing price from increasing the bid quantity
holding the price constant. In other words, a higher quantity demanded will push
up the market clearing price and reduce the likelihood that market clearing price is
less than a given price, p. So, if there is some probability that a certain bid price will
set the market-clearing price, then the bidder has an incentive to shade that bid.
Bids for higher quantities will be shaded more, because the lower market-clearing
price will reduce the price paid for all units won.
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3.3.4 Discriminatory Auctions
A risk neutral bidder in a discriminatory auction that submits a bid vector
q has an expected payoff given by:
K+1∑
k=0
[Pr (pk∗ = pk : q)]× (payoff if pk∗ ≥ pk)
=
K+1∑
k=0
[H(pk,q)−H(pk−1,q)]×
K+1∑
j=k
(∫ qj
qj+1
x(q, ti)dq − pj(qj − qj+1)
)
Bidders choose price and quantity bid points to maximise their expected
profit, subject to the constraint that the bid schedule must be monotonic. This
monotonicity constraint is explicit in the formulation of the maximisation problem.
The first order condition shows valuation as a function of price and the bid
shading term20.
x(qk, ti) = pk +
H(pk−1) [pk − pk−1]
H(pk)−H(pk−1) −
∂H(pk)
∂qk
(∫ qk
qk−1
x(q, t)dq − pk (qk − qk−1)
)
H(pk)−H(pk−1)
But this first-order condition can only be used to estimate the bidders’actual
valuation function if every price on the price grid has an associated quantity bid.
In reality, bidders generally only submit bids on a subset of the possible prices.
The literature suggests two alternate arguments why bidders do not submit unique
bid-points across the entire potential price grid.
Nautz (1995) and Hortacsu (2002) explain limited bidding using the mono-
tonicity constraint. They suggest that empty or zero bids are caused when the
monotonicity constraint that requires bids be strictly decreasing in prices is binding
at the unobserved bid-points. A flat distribution of the market-clearing price across
the unobserved bid-points is a sufficient condition for the monotonicity constraint
to be binding. That is, if H(pj) = H(pj+1).
20The derivation of the first order condition is shown in the Appendix H.
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Hortacsu (2002) shows an example that if a bidder bids at p3 and p6 but
not at p4 and p5, then intuitively, there is no q4 such that x3 < x4 < x6 that would
alter the market-clearing price and the probability of winning, under any realisation
of residual supply.
Kastl (2008) suggests an alternative explanation. In discriminatory auc-
tions, bidders submit unique bids at only subset of the possible prices because there
is some cost to adding bid-points, and that cost outweighs the potential benefits
from refining the bid function. It could be the case that there is only a small
amount of extra expected benefit from adding bids at some locations on the price
grid, and some bidders will not find it profitable to calculate and submit that bid-
point. Kastl (2008) explicitly models the cost of submitting extra bid-points, and
estimates bounds on the costs using Czech Treasury auctions.
Returning to the first-order condition, we need to impose a functional form
on the valuation function between bids in able to calculate the integral
∫ qk
qk−1
x(q, t)dq.
Following Hortacsu (2002) and Kang and Puller (2008), the marginal valuation
function is assumed to be a step function that has constant values of x(qk) between
(qk−1, qk). Under this functional form, the integral becomes x(qk)(qk − qk−1) and
the marginal valuation step function can be solved from the simplified first-order
condition:
x(qi,k, ti) = pk +
H(pk+1; q) (pk − pk−1)
H(pk; q)−H(pk−1; q)
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3.3.5 Uniform-Price Auctions
In the uniform-price auction, a bidder that submits a bid vector q has an
expected payoff given by:
K+1∑
k=0
[Pr (pk∗ = pk)× (payoff if pk∗ = pk)]
=
K+1∑
k=0
[H(pk,q)−H(pk−1,q)]
(∫ qk
0
x(q, ti)dq − pkqk
)
Kang and Puller (2008) arranged the first order condition to show that the bidders’
valuation at each bid-point is a function of the price plus a shading term21:
x(qk, ti) = pk −
∂H(pk)
∂qk
(∫ qk
qk+1
x(q, ti)dq + pk+1qk+1 − pkqk
)
H(pk)−H(pk−1)
Bidders in the Treasury auctions only submit bids for a subset of the prices on the
price grid. More structure needs to be imposed on the observed data to be able
to express the valuation as a function of the observed bids. Intuitively, if a bidder
submits bid-points at, say, p4 and p1 but not at p2 and p3, then it is reasonable
to assume that the bidder believes that between his submitted bids, rivals will
not submit bids that cause the residual supply to be between q4 and q1. So, at
unobserved bid points j, H(pj) = H(pj+1) is imposed to derive an expression for
valuation at those unobserved bid-points.
Assuming, as in the discriminatory-price auction, that the marginal valu-
ation follows a step function, the integral in the uniform-price auction first-order
condition,
∫ qk
qk+1
x(q, ti)dq becomes x(qk)(qk−qk−1) and the first-order condition can
be rewritten as22:
x(qk, ti) =
pk (H(pk; q)−H(pk+1; q))−G(pk; q) (pk−1qk−1 − pkqk)
H(pk; q)−H(pk+1; q) +G(pk; q) (qk − qk−1)
21The derivation of the first order condition is shown in the Appendix H.
22G(·) is defined in Section 3.4.
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3.4 Estimation Methodology
Each bidder’s valuations can be estimated using the first order condition
derived in the previous section. The estimated, unobserved valuations are expressed
as functions of observed bids and the distribution of the market-clearing price, given
by H (·). The marginal valuations, denoted x (q (p, ti) , ti) that correspond to each
point in the bid function q (p, ti) can be identified using the estimated H (·).
Hortacsu (2002) demonstrates a resampling method to estimate H (·). The
resampling method relies on assumptions about how the actual bids are generated.
Bidders are assumed to have a common prior on the distribution of the independent
private signals. There is an equilibrium mapping from those signals to the observed
bids. Assuming that bidders play a pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, it
follows that the bids contain the bidders’ beliefs about H (·). The advantage of
Hortacsu’s method is that it does not require information about the distribution of
private values.
Hortacsu proposes the following approach:
1. Fix bidder i among the Nl bidders in auction l.
2. Draw a random sample of (Nl-1) demand functions with replacement from
the Nl demand functions in auction l. Attach a probability (1/Nl) on each
demand function from the original sample.
3. Construct the residual supply function that is generated by these (Nl-1) re-
sampled demand functions.
4. Using the fixed bidder i ’s observed demand function, and the resampled de-
mand functions, find the market clearing price that equates aggregate demand
and supply.
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4, B times, where B is a large number.
6. Repeat steps 1 to 5 for each bidder i in auction l.
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The procedure obtains a resampled realisation of the market clearing price con-
ditioned on bidder i ’s demand function. The distribution of the market clearing
prices, H (·), can then be estimated by counting the fraction of draws that has a
resampled market clearing price less than a given p.
Kang and Puller (2008) extends Hortacsu (2002) to the uniform-price mech-
anism. Because data are not available on the signal distribution and the literature
does not provide closed-form solutions to equilibrium bids of multi-unit discrimi-
natory and uniform-price auctions, some assumptions need to be made about how
observed bids are generated.
Kang and Puller (2008) assume that bidders have a common prior on the
distribution of independent private signals and an equilibrium mapping from those
signals to the expected profit-maximising bids. Then, if firms play a pure-strategy
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game, the bids will capture bidders’ beliefs about
the distribution of the market-clearing price. They take advantage of the fact that
the distribution of the market clearing price can be represented as a function of the
sum of the N -1 rivals’ bid quantities, that bidder i treats as i.i.d random variables.
So,
G (pk, qi(p)) = Pr{pk∗ ≤ pk|qi(p)}
= Pr{qi(pk) ≤ Q−
∑
j 6=i
qj(pk)}
Kang and Puller (2008) show that given a price pk, the probability that the
market clearing price is less than or equal to pk is the same as the probability that
bidder i ’s quantity demand bid is less than the residual supply at pk.
If residual supply at p, denoted RSi(p), represents the deterministic total
supply net of the stochastic aggregate rival demand, and F (qi(pk)) and f(qi(pk))
are the cdf and pdf of RSi(pk) conditional on qi(pk), then
86
G (pk, qi(pk)) = 1− F (qi(pk))
And,
Gy (pk, qi(p)) =
∂
∂qi(p)
(1− PR (RSi(pk)) ≤ qi(pk))
=
∂
∂qi(pk)
(1− F (qi(pk)))
= −f(qi(pk))
Then, Kang and Puller (2008) show that using the B resampled residual
supply functions, a kernel estimation can be used to estimate f (qi(pk)). Kang and
Puller (2008) use a normal kernel function with bandwidth h equal to the standard
deviation of the resampled residual supplies multiplied by B−1/5.
So, Gˆq (pk, q(p)) = − 1Bh
∑B
i=1
(
RSi(pk)−q(pk)
h
)
. They calculate Gq (·) numer-
ically using G(q,pk)−G(q+∆q,pk)∆q for small ∆q.
3.5 The Australian Experience
In Australia, both the Federal Government and the State and Territory
Governments issue Treasury bonds. In Australia, the first public bond issue was
conducted in 1915. Bonds were issued as part of the financing for the First World
War.
Prior to the 1980s, Australia’s financial markets were very highly regu-
lated. The Australian dollar exchange rate was fixed, banks were tightly regulated
and interest rates and lending in the banking system were closely regulated. The
Australian Treasury bond market reflected this regulated financial landscape.
In this regulated environment, Australian bond issuance was conducted
using a fixed-price, or ‘tap’, system. The investor base was predominantly domestic.
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The market for Australian Treasury bonds was mostly buy-and-hold. There was
extremely little secondary market activity. Only the physical Treasury bonds were
tradable - Treasury bond derivatives were not available. And overshadowing the
entire market was an unclear separation between the Commonwealth Government’s
monetary policy and its debt management.
Australian financial markets were increasingly deregulated during the 1980s.
The Australian exchange rate was floated. Debt management and monetary policy
were separated. Banks’ interest rates were deregulated and foreign banks entered
the Australian market, increasing competition. The removal of regulation helped
the development of the Australian Treasury bond markets.
The most significant operational developments in the Australian Treasury
bond market were reforms to issuer behaviour and issuance mechanisms. In the
former, a requirement to act responsibly was introduced. This included performing
transparent and predictable debt management activities and maintaining regular
communication with market participants.
In the latter, the mechanism for issuing Commonwealth Treasury bonds
changed from only using the fixed-price mechanism, to auctioning Treasury bonds.
The first Australian Commonwealth Treasury bond auctions were held in 1982. A
dealer panel was introduced. The dealer panel uses a selection of market participants
that are able to purchase the Treasury bonds in the primary auction. These dealers
can then sell the Treasury bonds in the secondary market.
Australia has also used other mechanisms to issue Treasury bonds, espe-
cially when issuing new Treasury bonds. The alternative mechanisms include un-
derwriting syndicates and bookbuilds.
The Australian Government Treasury was responsible for the Australian
Commonwealth Treasury bond issuance until 1999. But on 1 July 1999, the Aus-
tralian Office of Financial Management (AOFM) was created as a prescribed agency
within the Treasury under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.
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The AOFM has since had responsibility for the issuance of Commonwealth Trea-
sury bonds. While the AOFM has responsibility for issuing Commonwealth Treasury
bonds, each State also has a central funding authority that issues Treasury bonds
in that State’s name. In NSW, that responsibility is undertaken by NSW Treasury
Corporation. The NSW Treasury Corporation is discussed in the next subsection.
3.5.1 NSW Treasury Corporation: Background and Data
The NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) is the central borrowing authority
for the NSW State Government. TCorp was established in June 1983 in accordance
with the Treasury Corporation Act (1983). TCorp was created to be the State’s
central borrowing authority, borrowing on behalf of all NSW semi-government au-
thorities and electricity councils.
Prior to TCorp’s creation, from 1923 until 1990, State borrowing was co-
ordinated with the Commonwealth through the Loans Council. The Commonwealth
issued on behalf of the States and the States and the Commonwealth contributed
toward a sinking fund to repay the loans. After the States began borrowing in their
own right, NSW was issued a AAA credit rating from international rating agency
Standard & Poor’s. AAA is the highest credit rating achievable.
The market for state government debt, commonly called the semi-government
bond market, enables the NSW State Government to fund its budget and support
infrastructure investment. The market has grown in recent years, and provides
investors with low-risk investments over long maturities.
The deepening of the semi-government bond market has also increased fi-
nancial market liquidity and NSW Treasury bonds are a significant share of the
liquid assets of Australia’s financial institutions. Demand for NSW Treasury Bonds
is likely to increase in coming years as the introduction of Basel III reforms forces
banks to hold higher levels of liquid assets, including semi-government securities.
NSW TCorp is the second largest of the semi-government issuers, account-
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ing for around 25% of the total semi-government market. Table 13 shows each
state’s borrowing corporation’s total securities outstanding, as at end-June 2011.
Table 14 shows TCorp’s Treasury bond issuance largely comprises long-term debt
securities with an original term-to-maturity of greater than one year. Long-term
debt is largely made up of benchmark bonds. Benchmark bond lines are liquid lines
that the TCorp commits to maintain a minimum $1bn outstanding at any one time.
Table 13: State and Territory Treasury Corporations’ Borrowing
Long-term Short-term
State or Onshore Offshore Onshore Offshore Total Credit
Territory $bn $bn $bn $bn $bn rating
Qld 63.8 2.7 2.9 1.8 71.1 AA+
NSW 44.7 6.2 1.9 1.7 54.5 AAA
Vic 24.8 0.7 0.3 1.9 27.7 AAA
WA 19.4 0.0 3.4 3.2 26.0 AAA
SA 8.5 0.3 1.4 1.1 11.2 AAA
Tas 2.2 0.0 1.9 1.6 5.7 AA+
NT 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.8 AA+
ACT 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.5 AAA
The semi-government bond market has grown to be broadly in-line with the
size of the Commonwealth Government bond market. In NSW, the electricity sector
is the largest recipient of funding from TCorp. TCorp had total loans outstanding
to the electricity sector of $13.7bn at June 2010. The water sector and transport
sector are the next biggest sectors in terms of loans outstanding.
TCorp has also been active in issuing inflation-linked bonds. Some utility
and infrastructure companies prefer inflation-linked debt because their revenues are
sensitive to inflation over the long term. Insurers, superannuation funds and mutual
funds are typical investors for inflation-linked bonds, because they offer long-dated
maturities and provide an inflation hedge.
The NSW government’s explicit backing of the TCorp’s debt issuance means
that TCorp’s bonds are typically viewed by the investor market as low credit risk.
So TCorp’s bonds have historically traded at tight spreads to similar maturity Com-
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Table 14: NSW Treasury Bonds Outstanding, June 2011
Maturity Outstanding ($bn)
Nominal Bonds
5.5% 01 August 2013 3.4
6.0% 01 April 2015 2.0
6.0% 01 April 2016 5.0
5.5% 01 March 2017 3.4
6.0% 01 February 2018 4.5
6.0% 01 April 2019 3.5
6.0% 01 May 2020 1.1
6.0% 01 June 2020 5.0
6.0% 01 March 2022 1.0
6.0% 01 May 2023 3.5
Inflation-Linked Bonds
3.75% 01 November 2020 1.6
2.75% 01 November 2025 2.3
2.75% 01 November 2035 1.0
monwealth Government bond yields.
But during times of extreme market stress, such as following the Global
Financial Crisis dislocations in 2007, TCorp’s bond yield spreads to Commonwealth
Government bond yields widened as investors preferred to hold only the Common-
wealth Government bonds. The preference largely reflects offshore investors that are
unfamiliar with the extent of the vertical fiscal integration in Australia, where state
governments receive a large share of their revenue via redistributions of Australian
Government tax receipts.
After state bond spreads blew out in 2009, the Australian Government
announced a scheme that guaranteed state and territory bond issuance. The scheme
allowed State and Territory Treasury corporations to opt in voluntarily to have any
new or existing Australian dollar debt guaranteed by the Australian government in
return for a fee. New South Wales and Queensland opted in to the scheme that
closed to new issuance on 31 December 2010. The majority of the the auctions
that I analyse in this paper are NSW State Guaranteed Treasury bonds rather than
Commonwealth Government Guaranteed Treasury bonds.
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NSW TCorp issues its bonds through a dealer panel system. Membership
of the dealer panel comprises the major participants in the Australian fixed income
markets23. Members of the dealer panel are under no commitment to purchase NSW
TCorp bonds, but their performance is constantly monitored and acknowledged as
essential to the liquidity of NSW Treasury bonds. Dealer panel members provide
prices in NSW Treasury bonds to market participants and other panel members.
NSW TCorp announces its intention to tender Treasury bonds on its website
and via a media release. A preliminary announcement is typically released up to a
week before the auction is scheduled to take place. The preliminary announcement
states the date the auction will take place, and the intended auction format and
the time that NSW TCorp will be accepting bids. The preliminary announcement
is followed by an announcement the day before the auction date. The subsequent
announcement confirms the auction, and announces the Treasury bonds that NSW
TCorp intends to auction and the total quantity that will be available in the auction.
On the day of the auction, members of the dealer panel submit their bids
during a 15 minute window, usually between 10.45am 11.00am. Bids are private,
and bidders know the number of participants allowed to submit bids. Bidders are
not limited in the amount of bonds that they can bid for, nor in the number of
bid-points they can submit.
Table 15 shows the bidders’ bids in the auction that took place on 21 Jan-
uary 2010, for the 2025 maturity inflation-linked bond. Seven bidders participated
in the auction. The bidders submitted bid quantities across 16 different prices. Bid-
der 1 submitted five bid-points, bidder 2 submitted two bid-points, bidder 3 three
bid-points, bidder 5 five bid-points, bidder 6 four bid-points and bidders 9 and 10
submitted six bid-points each.
When the auction closes, the bid-points are organised from highest to lowest
price (lowest to highest yield) within the computer programme Yieldbroker. The
23See Appendix E for a list of participants in the dealer panel.
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Table 15: Bids at 21 January 2010: $150mn 20 November 2025 Inflation-Linked
Bond
Price Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 5 Bidder 6 Bidder 9 Bidder 10
$m $m $m $m $m $m $m
97.877 10 39 10 30
97.815 10
97.754 10
97.631 12
97.509 5 18
97.448 13
97.387 5 7 35
97.265 10 5 5
97.204 10 5
97.143 40
97.083 10 10
96.779 10
96.598 5 20
96.356 5 20
96.296 10 10 5 20
95.936 10
submitted bid-points above or at the market clearing price are winning bid-points.
NSW TCorp releases the auction results on the day the auction is held. The an-
nouncement is made public and includes a range of information. The information
includes, the total amount of bids allocated, the highest and lowest yield allocated,
the best bid, the bid-to-cover ratio and the total amount of the Treasury bond that
is on issue.
The unique data set used in this study includes 17 Treasury auctions of six
separate maturities24. Two of the auctions are openings of new benchmark lines, and
were conducted as uniform auctions. The remaining auctions were discriminatory
auctions. The Treasury auctions are summarised in Table 16. Appendix F contains
descriptive statistics on bidding data at the auctions.
The auctions represents the NSW Treasury Corporation’s auction activity
24I wish to express particular thanks to NSW Treasury Corporation for allowing me to use the
data in this research. Without their support the study would not have been possible.
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Table 16: NSW Treasury Auction Data Set
Maturity Auction Date Value $m Bid-Cover Ratio MCP** Mechanism*
1 Aug 2013 25 Feb 2010 750 3.5 36.5 U
1 Apr 2015 24 May 2011 1000 2.9 37.25 U
1 Apr 2019 18 Sep 2009 150 7.7 44.5 D
20 Nov 2020 20 Nov 2009 150 3.6 3.615 D
18 Nov 2010 150 2.6 3.275 D
17 Feb 2011 175 4.6 3.260 D
24 Mar 2011 150 4.4 2.930 D
20 Nov 2025 20 Feb 2009 100 2.8 2.890 D
20 May 2009 100 3.0 3.875 D
21 Jan 2010 150 2.3 3.525 D
18 Feb 2010 200 3.2 3.565 D
20 May 2010 200 5.2 3.420 D
20 Aug 2010 100 3.5 3.255 D
18 Nov 2010 100 3.7 3.450 D
19 May 2011 200 4.4 3.040 D
18 Aug 2011 100 5.0 2.700 D
20 Nov 2035 19 May 2011 50 4.4 3.245 D
*Uniform-Price = U Discriminatory = D
**Market clearing price, in yield
after the episode commonly known as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but before
the episode now commonly called the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. That is,
between the years 2009 to mid-2011. Data for three auctions during the crisis
are omitted, because of the weaker liquidity in the markets during the time that
are unlikely to satisfy risk neutral assumptions. A data set that included several
auctions through the GFC could provide opportunities to study bidder behaviour
during times of extreme market stress versus normal market operations. A change in
bidder behaviour could change the results for optimal Treasury auction mechanisms.
At each NSW Treasury auction, each participating bidder must choose the
number of bid-points it will submit in its bid-schedule. Over the 17 auctions in the
data set, a total of 527 bids were submitted. An average of seven bidders participated
in each auction.
According to most theoretical models, researchers assume a continuous
94
downward sloping bid-schedule. The bidder’s decision is the functional form of
the demand curve. Kastl (2008) suggests that if there is no cost of submission for
bids, then bidders’ bid-schedules should reach the maximum size they are permitted.
But empirical research shows that bidders do not exhaust the maximum number of
permitted bids - and the NSW TCorp data are the same. Table 17 shows that four
to five bids are the most commonly submitted bid-schedules, followed by three to
four bids.
Table 17: Number of Bids Submitted
Number of Bids Percent
1 to 2 10.8%
2 to 3 14.9%
3 to 4 23.2%
4 to 5 35.2%
>5 15.9%
Kastl asserts that it is the cost to bidders of submitting bids that prevents
bidders from submitting the maximum allowable number of bid-points. But with
electronic bidding systems, sophisticated bidders with vast human and capital re-
sources that partake in repeated auctions of the same Treasury bond over time, this
assertion is harder to justify.
Kastl also suggests that bidders do not optimally decide their bid-prices.
Rather, he assumes that the participating bidders’ choose the optimal demand at
each point in their bid-schedule. But this appears to be at odds with the TCorp
data. While bidders rarely submitted the same bid-prices, across auctions, almost
75% of the bid-points were for $5m, $10m, $15m or $20m quantities, regardless of
the total size of the auction25. The much larger variability in bid-price across bid-
points compared with bid-quantities suggests that in NSW Treasury auctions, the
participating bidders’ decision variable is the price of the bid, not the quantity.
25This is true for all but the two largest auctions by face value, that auctioned $1000m and $750m
respectively. In these auctions, bids that were multiples of $10m were most common.
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Chapter 4
4 NSW Treasury Auctions Results
The size and value of Treasury auctions make questions of optimality and
efficiency very important for Treasury auctioneers and for bidders in Treasury auc-
tions. Bidders aim to achieve the best rate of return on their purchases of treasury
bonds. They are likely to try to under-bid for Treasury bonds relative to their true
valuation. And Treasury auctioneers will seek to fund their Government at the
cheapest possible rate of funding.
I consider both of these issues in Chapter 4. I test whether bidders in NSW
Treasury auctions do under-bid relative to their valuations for Treasury bonds. My
results show that bidders in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions in NSW do
under-bid.
NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) typically uses discriminatory auctions
to issue their Treasury bonds. The existing empirical literature has not reached a
consensus on which auction mechanism achieves the best revenue results for Trea-
sury auctioneers. I test whether the actual revenue achieved by TCorp exceeds the
revenue that could have been achieved in a counterfactual multi-unit Vickrey auc-
tion. My results show that on average, the discriminatory auction used by TCorp
typically achieves lower revenue than the counterfactual Vickrey auction.
The result raises the question, why would TCorp, and indeed other issuers
that may face a similar problem, persists with the mechanism that appears to achieve
lower revenue. I hypothesise that it could be the case that bidders take into con-
sideration the presence of secondary markets for Treasury bonds when announcing
their bid-schedules. I test that hypothesis in Chapter 5.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 shows
the results of the estimates of bidder valuations. Sections 4.2 considers whether
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the bidder valuations from one auction can be used to estimate possible bidder
demand-schedules in subsequent auctions. Section 4.3 compares the revenue from
the actual discriminatory auctions with a counterfactual multi-unit Vickrey auction.
And Section 4.4 concludes the Chapter.
4.1 Bidder Valuation Estimation Results
The results of the estimation process show that bidders in NSW Treasury
auctions do shade their bid-price below their actual valuation. This supports ev-
idence from other empirical research on multi-unit Treasury auctions discussed in
the previous Chapter.
Table 18: Bid Shading in NSW Treasury Auctions
Maturity Mechanism* Median Under-bid (bp) Mean Under-bid (bp)
1 August 2013 U 4 6
1 April 2015 U 8 11
1 April 2019 D 17 12
20 November 2020 D 21 32
20 November 2025 D 16 30
20 November 2035 D 15 25
*Uniform-price = U, Discriminatory = D
Table 18 shows that the uniform-price auctions had a lower median and
mean under-bid in terms of basis points. Both of these uniform-price auctions were
used to open new benchmark lines. This is an interesting feature of NSW Treasury
auctions. Uniform-price auctions are preferred for opening benchmark lines. That
in itself raises an interesting question, of whether uniform-price or discriminatory
auctions perform better in the absence of a secondary market price. Unfortunately,
the data are not rich enough to empirically test this in a definitive sense, and I leave
it as a question for further research.
The simplest way to illustrate the estimation method adopted from Hor-
tacsu (2002) and Kang and Puller (2008) is to show estimates of the marginal val-
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uation and the distribution of the market clearing price for a bidder in a particular
auction.
In the auction on 21 January 2010, AUD$150bn of 20 November 2025
inflation-linked bonds were auctioned using a discriminatory auction. Six bidders
participated in the auction. A total of 25 bid-quantities were submitted, and 10 of
those bids were successful. The bid-to-cover ratio, that is the total quantity of bids
received relative to the total quantity of bonds issued, was 2.26. The cut-off yield
was 3.525%, and, after converting the yields to prices, the bid-prices ranged from a
maximum of 97.877 to a minimum of 95.936.
The following analysis shows the results of the valuation estimation proce-
dure for bidder number nine. Bidder nine submitted six bids in the auction. The
bidder’s highest bid (in terms of price) was for 20% of the total supply, and the
lowest bid was for 77% of the total supply. Figure 1 shows bidder nine’s submitted
bid-schedule and the residual supply curve for the January 2010 auction.
Figure 1: Auction 21 January 2010: $150bn 20 November 2025 inflation-linked bond
Bidder nine’s bids are held constant, and five bid-schedules are randomly
chosen from the six possible bid-schedules submitted for the auction. The five
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bid-schedules are chosen with replacement giving equal 16 probability to each bid-
schedule in the sample. The randomly chosen bid-schedules form a residual sup-
ply curve. The residual supply curve is intersected with bidder nine’s demand-
schedule to arrive at a market-clearing price. The process is then repeated to derive
5000 market-clearing prices using 5000 different randomly chosen residual supply
curves. The market-clearing prices are used to construct the estimated distribution
of market-clearing prices, H(·), for bidder nine. Bidder nine’s bid-schedule and the
estimated H(·) is then applied to the first-order condition to arrive at an estimate
of bidder nine’s marginal valuation at each bid-quantity.
Table 19 shows bidder nine’s estimated probability distribution at each of
the bid-prices submitted. Bid shading will be increasing in the probability that the
market-clearing price is lower than the bid-price, but decreasing in the density of
the market-clearing price. So at very high bids, estimated values should be much
larger than the submitted bid, because it is unlikely that the market-clearing price
will actually be that high. Similarly, at lower bid-prices, the shading will be lower
because there is less chance that the market-clearing price will be below the lower
bid.
Table 19: Bidder 9 Estimated Probability Distribution, 21 January 2010: $150bn
20 November 2025 Maturity
Price H(p; q)
97.877 1.0000
97.815 0.9750
97.754 0.9218
97.631 0.8074
97.509 0.5934
97.448 0.3800
97.387 0.1806
97.265 0.1494
97.204 0.0844
97.143 0.0318
The actual submitted bid-schedule and the estimated valuations for bidder
nine’s in the auction are shown in Figure 2.
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The valuations are much higher than the bid-price for the first bid - that
is, for bid p1. This could be due to a misjudgement by the bidder. A bid this high
does not appear rational given the estimated distribution function. But there is an
alternative explanation. The high bid also reflects that the market-clearing price is
less likely to be as high as this price. The second, third and fourth bid-prices, p2, p3
and p4, are much closer to the bidder’s estimated valuations. This is because there
is a smaller probability that the market-clearing price will be below these bid-prices.
Figure 2: Estimated Marginal Valuation Function for Bidder 9, 21 January 2010:
$150bn 20 November 2025 Maturity
And more importantly from an economic perspective, the initial high bid
could reflect a very high demand for the initial quantity of bonds. This could reflect
a strong desire to hold some NSW Treasuries as part of the institution’s risk capital
requirements. It may also reflect a desire by participating bidders to be ranked
highly according to the NSW TCorp dealer panel criteria.
The bidder’s estimated valuation corresponding to the three lowest bids is
much closer to the bidder’s actual bid. We can see from Table 19 that the probability
that the market clearing price falls below the three lowest bids is very low. So it
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makes sense to bid close to the valuation if the bidder is more certain that at that
bid-price he will never win the auction.
The estimation for the valuations does have pitfalls. Kang and Puller (2008)
points out that because H(pk) = 0, where K is the lowest price on the price grid,
then H(pk−1) in the numerator of the first-order condition can be equal to zero.
Similarly, at sufficiently low prices H(pk) − H(pk+1) in the denominator can be
zero. That is, when H (ˆpk; q) = H (ˆpk−1; q). If that happens, it can be impossible
to recover the marginal value at some low prices. And in other cases, the estimate
may give the result that the bidder’s bid-price, pk, at quantity qk is higher than the
valuation at that quantity, xk. This does not make sense, as a rational bidder will
not submit a bid that is above his valuation.
The problem can be alleviated somewhat by imposing the restriction that
the valuation function is weakly decreasing in quantity, and that at very low prices
below the expected market-clearing price, bidders are assumed not to shade their
bids below their valuation. In this case, the valuation is replaced with the bid-price
at that quantity. In the data set, 18% of the recovered valuations were below the
submitted bids, and were replaced with the bid-price at that quantity.
In the auction held on 25 February 2010, AUD$750bn of 1 August 2013
nominal bonds were auctioned using a uniform-price, exchange for physical auc-
tion26. Ten bidders participated in the auction. A total of 65 bid-quantities were
submitted, and 28 of those bids were successful. The bid-to-cover ratio was 3.5 and
the EFP clearing margin was 36.5 basis points. After converting the EFP margins
to prices, the bid-prices ranged from a maximum of 94.85 to a minimum of 94.75.
The following analysis again focuses on the results of the valuation estima-
tion procedure for bidder nine. Bidder nine submitted a total of 17 bids in the 25
February auction. The bidder’s highest bid was for 1.3% of the total supply, and
26In an exchange for physical auction (EFP), each bidder’s bid is submitted as a margin against
a given bond future contract. In the auction held on 25 February, the spread was against the March
2010 3-year bond futures contract.
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the lowest bid was 70% of the total supply. Figure 3 shows bidder 9’s submitted
bid-schedule mapped against its residual supply curve for the auction.
Figure 3: Auction 25 February 2010: $750bn 1 August 2013 bond
The estimation methodology follows Kang and Puller (2008). The kernel
estimation assumes a normal kernel with bandwidth equal to the standard devia-
tion of the 5000 resampled residual supply curves faced by each bidder, scaled by
B−
1
5 . Table 20 shows bidder nine’s estimated probability distribution. The amount
of shading for each bid is shown in Figure 4, with the difference between the ac-
tual submitted bid-schedule and estimated valuations for bidder nine measuring the
magnitude of the bid shading.
In the equilibrium-bidding model for the uniform-price auction, bid shading
is increasing in the effect of an individual bidder’s bid on the market-clearing price
paid for all units, captured by G(·), and also in the quantity demanded, qi(p).
Intuitively, a bidder has a greater incentive to bid beneath his actual valuation
for a unit of the good if there is some chance that bid lowers the market clearing
price. In my data set, the uniform-price auction valuation estimates find that no
bidder shades his bid at his highest submitted bid-price. This characteristic was
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Table 20: Bidder 9 estimated probability distribution, uniform auction
Price H(p; v)
94.8075 1.0000
94.7975 0.9992
94.7950 0.9988
94.7925 0.9986
94.7900 0.9788
94.7875 0.8838
94.7850 0.7562
94.7825 0.5690
94.7800 0.4558
94.7775 0.3762
94.7750 0.2998
94.7725 0.2022
94.7700 0.1422
also present in Kang and Puller (2008). The shading increases with quantity after
the first bid-points.
Figure 4: Estimated marginal valuation function for bidder 9, 25 February 2010:
$750bn 1 August 2013 bond
In the uniform-price auction estimation, estimates of an individual bidder’s
valuation may be unrecoverable ifH(pk; q) = H(pk−1; q) and G(·) = 0. This was not
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an issue in the uniform-price auctions in this analysis. Further, recovered valuations
may lie below the bidder’s bid in cases where H(pk; q) = H(pk−1; q). If this occurs,
the bid submitted at k does not affect the bidder’s expected payoff. Similar to
the case in the discriminatory auction analysis, such a result does not make sense,
because a rational bidder will not enter a bid-point that is above his valuation at
the corresponding quantity demanded. This rationality condition is violated in 5%
of the submitted uniform-price auction bid-points. For these violating bids, the
estimated valuation is substituted with the bidder’s submitted bid-price.
Figure 5: Aggregate Bid-Schedule 21 January 2010 Discriminatory Auction: $150bn
20 November 2025 bond
Figures 5 and 6 show the aggregate bid functions and estimated marginal
valuation functions for the 20 November 2025 inflation-linked bond discriminatory
auction and the 1 August 2013 nominal uniform-price auction respectively.
The uniform-price aggregate bid-schedule is steeper than the discriminatory
auction. This aligns with my prior expectations, because bidders have more incentive
to shade their bids at higher quantities in the uniform-price auction, compared with
the discriminatory auction. In the discriminatory auction the incentive is to shade
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Figure 6: Aggregate Bid-Schedule 25 February 2010 Uniform-Price Auction: $750bn
1 August 2013 bond
bids at all prices that the bidder assigns a chance of winning units. Thus, in the
discriminatory auction, the bid-schedule is materially flatter than the recovered
valuations.
The mean and median under-bid is largest in the 2020 maturity auctions.
The 2025 maturity auctions have the next largest mean under-bid. The data also
suggest that the under-bid increases as the maturity of the Treasury bond is ex-
tended. This could be because the common information relevant to the economic
outlook over a longer horizon is more uncertain - economic forecasting is less ac-
curate for those time horizons. That forecasting difficulty could introduce some
uncertainty into bidders’ private valuation for the value of holding the Treasury
bond.
With a richer data set, this could be tested using a regression similar to
that adopted by Matti, Kjell, and Kristian (2005). Matti, Kjell, and Kristian uses
a regression with secondary market volatility and the number of bidders to as ex-
ogenous variables to explain bid-shading, bidder demand and award concentration,
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amongst others, in Finnish Treasury auctions. Similar regressions could be used to
test the effect of maturity on bid-shading27.
4.2 Pooled Auctions
The previous discussion of the estimation methodology assumed the com-
mon information available to the bidders preceding the auction, s, applies to that
auction only. The assumption simplifies the estimation process considerably. But
the assumption also reduces the potential bid schedules available to conduct the
resampling estimation. A small number of bidders in each auction can reduce the
precision of the estimates of the bidder’s marginal valuation functions for that auc-
tion.
In this section, I pool auctions of the same underlying Treasury security and
use the pooled submitted bid schedules to estimate the bidders’ marginal valuations.
Pooling the auctions results in a larger sample of bid schedules to conduct the
resampling estimation procedure. And that larger sample of bid schedules should
increase the precision of the marginal valuation estimates.
But pooling the bids across auctions is problematic, from both a indepen-
dent private values, ti, point of view, and with reference to the assumptions about
the common information available to the participants given by s. First, consider
ti. The private value element of the auction derives from participant’s investment
decisions, reserve requirements, the demand from bidder’s customers that are not
members of the dealer panel and forecasts of long-run interest rates. These ele-
ments need not be independent across auctions. Each element could be affected by
previous auction results or correlated across auctions.
And the common information available to the set of participants in one auc-
tion is not necessarily the same as the information available in subsequent auctions.
27Although in Matti, Kjell, and Kristian the focus was on bid-shading in common value Treasury
auctions.
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If s is not static, it may not be appropriate to pool the auction data. That is, when
the economic environment can change over time such that the public information
available to each participant in the auction changes prior to each auction, it may be
inappropriate to combine the bid schedules to estimate marginal valuations.
But in some cases, the common information available to bidders may be
similar. Assuming an unchanged s across auctions is probably most suitable in
high frequency divisible goods auctions. Some examples could include electricity
markets or daily cash market auctions. But for Treasury auctions, the frequency is
often lower. In NSW, auctions might be held only monthly, or quarterly.
Kastl (2008) points out that with richer data, the resampling method could
be adjusted to allow for some auction covariates Z. Then, instead of resampling
with replacement with 1N probability on all bid functions, a probability distribution
Γ(Z,N) could be used 28.
My sample of auctions includes neighbouring auctions of the same maturity
Treasury security that were held within short time frames. For example, on 21
January 2010, AUD$150bn of 20 November 2025 bonds was issued. Less than one
month later, on 18 February 2010, AUD$200bn of the same securities were auctioned.
The economic conditions at the time were little changed. At the time of
the January auction, the secondary market yield for the 2025 bond was 3.53%. At
the time of the February auction, the secondary market yield was 3.53%. Market
participants’ expectations for future inflation were also little changed over the pe-
riod. Ten-year inflation expectations are measured using break-even inflation rates,
that measure the yield differential between nominal bond yields and inflation-linked
bond yields of a given maturity.
At the time of the January auction, the break-even inflation rate derived
from the NSW TCorp bond yield curve was 2.99%. The break-even inflation rate
28Hortacsu and Kastl (2008) develop a procedure to carry out this extension. But the dimension
of conditioning variables in s needs to be small to avoid the curse of dimensionality problem. Also,
the selection of bandwidth parameters for smoothing kernels in deriving the probability distribution
materially affects the results of the estimation procedure.
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had edged only 0.02% lower by the February auction, reaching 2.97%. And another
key driver of bond yields, the Reserve Bank of Australia’s official cash rate, had not
been changed over the period. The RBA had started a cycle of tighter monetary
policy in October, but the official cash rate was unchanged at 3.75% in January and
February. I therefore assume that s is static in this environment and pool the bid
schedules.
Figure 7: Bidder 9 Pooled Auction Estimated Marginal Valuation Function 21 Jan-
uary 2010
Pooling the auctions increases the estimated valuation at the lower bid-price
quantities relative to the estimated valuations for the un-pooled auctions. In effect,
bidder 9’s valuation estimates flattened when the bid-schedules were pooled across
the two auctions.
This flattening could be because in discriminatory auctions the incentive is
to shade bids at all prices that the bidder assigns a chance of winning units. Thus,
in the discriminatory auction, the bid-schedule is typically materially flatter than
the recovered valuations. I conclude that pooling the subsequent auctions allows an
increase in precision, and the results are consistent with prior expectations.
But the risk remains that pooling two auctions introduces potential mea-
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Figure 8: Bidder 9 Pooled Auction Estimated Marginal Valuation Function 18
February 2010
surement biases, from the presence of factors that are unobservable to the researcher
that vary from auction to auction. So the trade-off remains, between increasing the
precision of the estimation method and introducing unobservable factors into the
estimation. If the common information available to all bidders at both auctions were
the same, then some of those unobservable factors might be mitigated. I discuss this
more in the next section.
4.2.1 Bid-Schedule Forecasts and Information Test
Bidders in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions will not bid more than
their valuation, that is, pi ≤ xi. I can use this and the estimated valuation functions
from the bidders’ actual bid schedules in the auctions to try and forecast the bid
schedule in another auction. By making this comparison, I can achieve two goals.
First, I can test the theory itself. In effect, instead of assuming the theory
is correct and testing the counterfactual revenue in a competing auction format, I
can test whether the structural estimation used to recover the estimated valuations
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actually represents and captures the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a convincing
manner. Second, I can go some way toward testing if the assumption that the
common information s, available to the bidders is static across auction periods. If
that is the case, then the trade-off between increasing the precision of the estimation
method and introducing unobservable factors into the estimation from the pooling
of bid-schedules across two auctions, used in the previous section, favours pooling
the auction data.
The forecasts will be subject to some error as s, the set of common economic
information available to each participating bidder at the distinct auctions within the
pooled sample, will be different to some extent. But if that difference is not too
great, then I would expect to see a particular bidder’s forecasted bid-schedule in
auction l + 1 be close to the bid-schedule submitted in the preceding lth auction. I
use the jackknife standard errors from the lth auction as the margin for error in the
l + 1 auction29.
The first-order condition that is used to recover the estimated valuation
functions for each bidder in the uniform-price auction is given by:
x(qk, ti) =
pk (H(pk; q)−H(pk+1; q)) +H(pk; q) (pk−1qk−1 − pkqk)
H(pk; q)−H(pk+1; q)−H(pk; q) (qk − qk−1)
and in the discriminatory auction by:
x(qi,k, ti) = pk +
H(pk−1; q) (pk − pk−1)
H(pk; q)−H(pk−1; q)
I can rearrange these optimality conditions to achieve a given bid-price, pk, in terms
of the recovered valuations. For the uniform-price auction, rearranging obtains:
pk =
x [H(pk)−H(pk+1)−H(pk) (qk − qk−1)]−H(pk)pk−1qk−1
[H(pk)−H(pk+1)−H(pk)qk]
29Jackknife estimates are a nonparametric technique for estimating the standard error of a statis-
tic. The technique takes repeated subsamples from the original sample of independent observations,
but omitting one observation at a time. See Efron (1981).
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And rearranging the discriminatory auction first-order condition:
pk =
x [H(pk)−H(pk−1)] + pk−1H(pk−1)
H(pk)
If I index the original auction l and the subsequent auction, that I am trying
to forecast and test the theory, l + 1, then the bid-price equation for uniform-price
auctions can be rearranged to:
pl+1k =
xlk
[
H(plk)−H(plk+1)−H(plk)
(
ql+1k − ql+1k−1
)]
−H(pk)plk−1ql+1k−1[
H(plk)−H(plk+1)−H(plk)ql+1k
] (15)
Using the same convention for the discriminatory auction, the bid-price
equation becomes:
pl+1k =
xlk
[
H(plk)−H(plk−1)
]
+ plk−1H(p
l
k−1)
H(plk)
(16)
The bid-price, pk, is still in terms of the surrounding bid-prices, pk−1 and
pk+1. The bid-forecasts are constructed under two alternative scenarios. The first
scenario uses the actual bids from the initial auction. The second scenario makes
the assumption that bidders bid truthfully in the subsequent auction.
Truthful bidding would achieve the competitive outcome of the auction.
That is, the bidders, by bidding truthfully, reveal their estimated marginal valua-
tions. The competitive outcome is the upper bound of the revenue from a Vickrey
auction30. Assuming truthful bidding will add an upward bias to the estimated bids
in the subsequent auction. Under truthful bidding, Equation 16 becomes
pl+1k =
xlk
[
H(xlk)−H(xlk−1)
]
+ xlk−1H(x
l
k−1)
H(xlk)
(17)
30A Vickrey auction, or a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction for multiple goods, is an auction that
allocates the items being auctioned in the socially optimal outcome. The auction charges each
bidder the harm they cause to other bidders, ensuring for each bidder that the optimal bidding
strategy is to bid the true valuation for the item. See Krishna (2010).
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and Equation 15 becomes
pl+1k =
xlk
[
H(xlk)−H(xlk+1)−H(xlk)
(
ql+1k − ql+1k−1
)]
−H(xk)xlk−1ql+1k−1[
H(xlk)−H(xlk+1)−H(xlk)ql+1k
] (18)
Unfortunately, my data set does not allow for a test of the uniform-price
auctions. In NSW, uniform-price auctions have been used to open new benchmark
lines only. I leave carrying out the uniform-price test as an option for further
research.
4.2.2 Discriminatory Auction Forecast
In this section, I consider bidder nine’s bid-schedules over the two consecu-
tive discriminatory auctions described in the Section 4.2. The first, for AUD150bn
of the 20 November 2025 bonds, was held on 21 January, 2010. The subsequent
auction was held less than one month later on 18 February, 2010. The 18 February
auction was for AUD200bn of the 20 November 2025 securities. The economic con-
ditions prevailing at the time of the two auctions were similar, and are described in
the previous section.
Before the bid-prices can be forecast, the bidders’ data need to be rear-
ranged. Each bidder only submits a finite number of bid-points on the price grid.
And in reality, each bidder does not submit the same bid-quantities for each bid-
price across auctions. Consider the following bid-schedules submitted by the same
bidder in two consecutive auctions for the same security. The auctions were held
less than one month apart.
In Figure 9, the bid-schedules have been switched into yields for easier
comparisons across time31. Figure 9 demonstrates that in the January auction, the
bidder submitted 5 bid-quantity points and in the subsequent February auction, the
31For Treasury securities, the yield is inversely related to the price. So, the lower the yield, the
higher the corresponding price of the Treasury.
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Figure 9: Bidder 9’s bid schedules in consecutive auctions: 21 January 2010 and 18
February 2010
bidder submitted 6 bid-quantity points.
Creating forecasts for a given bidder’s bid-schedule in a subsequent auction
is made difficult because for most bidders, the bidder’s bid-schedule does not extend
to every point on the price grid32. Bidders only submit price-bids on a subset of
the possible price grid. And bidders place bids for different quantities in subsequent
auctions.
The inconsistency of the bid-quantity points across consecutive auctions
highlights a difficulty in creating forecasts for a bidder’s bid-schedules. Equation 16
implicitly assumes that the kth bid-point in auction l exists in auction l + 1.
Engelbrecht-Wiggins and Kahn (1998) explain the missing bid-points in
terms of the monotonicity constraint, qik ≥ qik+1. The constraint introduces a cost
of submitting a bid at each price. The monotonicity constraint is binding from
above and below at points were there is no unique bid-point. But the monotonicity
constraint binds only from below at each new unique bid-point.
32This is the case for all bidders in NSW Treasury Auctions.
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The monotonicity constraint results in some pooling between consecutive
quantities on the price-grid. Engelbrecht-Wiggins and Kahn (1998) show that a
bidder’s decision to submit a quantity-bid at any price-point also depends on that
bidder’s decision for the subsequent price-point.
Figure 10: Monotonicity Constraint and Missing Bid-Points
Figure 10 gives an example of this pooling of bids beneath marginal valu-
ations. The valuations, marked with a cross in Figure 10 are the valuations that
are consistent with the observed bids, that are shown as blue diamonds. The red
diamonds signify potential bids that would also be consistent with the valuations.
The forecasting method is as follows:
1. Fix bidder i among the Nl bidders in auction l.
2. Change bidder i ’s K price-bids in auction l into yield. Convert the K yield-
bids in auction l into price-bids for the date of the auction l + 1.
3. Align the K converted price-bids from auction l with the appropriate bid-
quantities in auction l + 1.
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4. Perform the forecast using Equations 16 and 17 for discriminatory auctions
and Equations 15 and 18 for uniform auctions.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the actual bid-schedule submitted by bidder nine in the
February auction compared to the forecast bid-schedule based on the discriminatory
auction forecasting equation. Figure 11 shows the forecasted bid-schedule using the
actual bid-schedule submitted by bidder 9 in the 21 January auction. That is, Figure
11 uses Equation 16 to construct the forecast. Figure 12 uses bidder 9’s estimated
marginal values to construct the forecast - so the forecasts assume truthful bidding.
Figure 11: Forecast Bid-Schedules Using Bids: Bidder 9, 18 February 2010 Auction
Figures 11 and 12 show that the forecasted bid-schedules under both method-
ologies described above do fall within the 95% confidence band obtained from the
jackknife standard errors in the 18 February discriminatory auction. This was the
case for almost 75% of the pooled auction forecasts.
So, I conclude that the structural estimation used to recover the estimated
valuations does represent and capture the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a convinc-
ing manner. And Treasury auctioneers can use Equation 16 to gauge the likely
bid schedule for a potential bidder in a subsequent auction where the economic en-
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Figure 12: Forecast Bid-Schedules Using Values: Bidder 9, 18 February 2010 Auc-
tion
vironment and the common information available to all potential bidders is little
changed.
Second, in the two auctions that I have pooled, it is reasonable to assume
that the common information s that is available to the bidders across the auction
periods is static. That implies that there is benefit in pooling the two auctions to
increase the precision of the estimates of the valuations for each bidder.
4.3 NSW Treasury Auction Revenue
The recovered estimated marginal valuation functions can be used to make
a variety of comparisons and forecasts. In particular, the estimated valuation func-
tions allow comparisons between actual revenue received in the Treasury auction
and the revenue that could be achieved under a counter-factual auction format.
Unfortunately, multi-unit auctions do not have closed-form solutions that
allow the valuations to be transformed directly into equilibrium bidding strategies
under all alternative formats. So a direct revenue comparison is not possible. Two
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alternative comparison methods have been suggested, by Hortacsu (2002) and Kang
and Puller (2008).
Hortacsu (2002) compared the actual revenue achieved by Turkish gov-
ernment discriminatory auctions with the counterfactual; the hypothetical revenue
that could have been achieved in a uniform-price auction. Hortacsu adopted the as-
sumption that the bids in the hypothetical uniform-price auction were the estimated
marginal valuations - that is, Hortacsu assumed truthful bidding.
It is important to note that under the assumption of continuously differ-
entiable downward sloping demand functions, bidders will not ever submit a bid
price that is above the marginal valuation at a given quantity point. So by assum-
ing truthful bidding, Hortacsu is assuming a best-case scenario for the hypothetical
uniform-price auction. The highest revenue possible to be achieved by the seller in
the auction is in fact achieved when the bidder bids truthfully.
Hortacsu found that the discriminatory auction achieved higher revenue
than the hypothetical uniform auction. He went on to conclude that the discrimina-
tory format achieves higher revenue for a government auctioning Treasuries. But if
Hortacsu had found that the counterfactual uniform-price auction achieved higher
revenue, then an expected revenue ranking of the two mechanisms would not have
been possible.
Kang and Puller (2008) adopt a different method to compare auction rev-
enue. They compare the observed revenue under discriminatory auctions and uniform-
price Korean Treasury auctions to a common benchmark. The common benchmark
used by Kang and Puller (2008) is the multi-unit Vickrey auction, that has a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium that can be calculated using the estimated valuation
functions.
In a Vickrey auction, the dominant strategy equilibrium is to bid the true
valuation function. So, Kang and Puller (2008) are able to calculate the revenue
under the common benchmark and compare it to the actual revenue in the observed
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auctions.
In the Vickrey auction, the payment of each bidder is independent of his
own bids, conditional on the number of units won. In effect, the winning bidders
pay the opportunity cost that their presence introduces to other participants in the
auction. So truthful bidding is an equilibrium that results in an efficient allocation
and there is no incentive for bidders to shade their bids.
The M highest bids win in a standard Vickrey auction for M units of a
good. Each bidder that wins k units pays the sum of the k highest rejected bids,
other than his own. The payment Pi of a bidder, i that wins vi(p) is:
Pi = yi(p)p−
∫ p
p−i
(1− yi(r)) dr
where p is the market clearing price, p−i is the market clearing price that would have
prevailed had bidder i not been present in the auction, and yi(·) is the aggregate
demand of the other bidders in the auction.
The common benchmark that Kang and Puller compute is the upper bound
on the revenue under the Vickrey auction. The upper bound R¯ is calculated as the
market clearing price under truthful bidding multiplied by the total supply, p×Q. R¯
is then compared to the actual revenue under the discriminatory and uniform-price
auctions. In other words, the benchmark calculated by Kang and Puller is the same
as the counterfactual auction that Hortacsu uses.
However, R¯ always exceeds the actual revenue under the uniform-price auc-
tions. Because R¯ is the revenue in a perfectly competitive uniform-price auction,
but bidders shade their bids in uniform-price auctions under equilibrium, the effi-
cient auction raises more revenue. Kang and Puller (2008) show that because R¯
can be higher or lower than the discriminatory format, a ranking can nonetheless
still be made between the discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. If Rd is the
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observed revenue in the discriminatory auction and Ru is the observed revenue in
the uniform-price auction, then Kang and Puller conclude that because Ru− R¯ < 0,
the discriminatory auction is revenue superior if Rd − R¯ 0.
In this section I compare the actual revenue achieved by NSW TCorp in
the discriminatory auctions against the counterfactual revenue that could have been
achieved in a uniform-price auction.
Table 21 shows the revenue that the discriminatory auction achieved, given
the bids that each bidder submitted, in the column labeled (I). And the column
labeled (II) shows the hypothetical revenue that could have been obtained in the
counterfactual uniform-price auction that assumes bids were the estimated marginal
valuations. That is, it assumes the best-case scenario for the hypothetical uniform-
price auction.
The final column in Table 21 calculates the difference between the revenue
achieved in the actual discriminatory auction and in the hypothetical uniform-price
auction. A positive difference indications that the actual discriminatory auction
obtained higher revenue for NSW TCorp than the revenue that could have been
gained in the alternative auction format.
Table 21 shows that the actual revenues in the discriminatory auction are
typically lower than the auction revenue that could have been achieved in the hy-
pothetical uniform-price auction. The revenue in the hypothetical uniform-price
auction exceeds the actual discriminatory auction revenue by an average of $0.1m,
or 0.03%. Summing across all of the auctions, TCorp achieved a total of $1.8m less
revenue than it could have achieved, had it instead used the uniform-price auction33.
The initial revenue results show that from the perspective of TCorp, the
decision to use discriminatory auctions results in smaller revenues than could be
achieved using a Vickrey upper-bound auction. But the size of the foregone revenue
33I test if these differences are statistically significant in Appendix I, using a test proposed by
Kang and Puller (2008). The tests show that I cannot reject that actual discriminatory revenue is
less than the revenue achieved in the counterfactual auctions
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Table 21: Revenue Comparisons Under Alternative Mechanisms
Discrim Alt (II) Diff
Maturity Auction Date (I) Vickrey Upper I-II
($m) Bound ($m) ($m)
1 Apr 2019 18 Sep 2009 745.3 746.3 (1.0)
20 Nov 2020 20 Nov 2009 152.7 151.6 1.1
18 Nov 2010 147.1 147.5 (0.4)
17 Feb 2011 173.1 173.2 (0.1)
24 Mar 2011 148.7 148.5 0.2
20 Nov 2025 20 Aug 2008 97.9 98.0 (0.1)
20 Feb 2009 96.1 95.5 0.6
20 May 2009 98.2 98.3 (0.1)
21 Jan 2010 146.7 147.1 (0.4)
18 Feb 2010 193.6 193.7 (0.1)
20 May 2010 198.9 199.1 (0.2)
20 Aug 2010 98.1 98.2 (0.1)
18 Nov 2010 97.6 97.5 0.1
19 May 2011 195.3 196.4 (1.1)
18 Aug 2011 98.9 99.0 (0.1)
20 Nov 2035 19 May 2011 48.4 48.5 (0.1)
is very small in absolute terms. The small differences between revenues in the
different formats could indicate that individual bidders do not have very strong
incentives to shade marginal bids.
Previous studies have suggested that small differences between revenues
could be driven by competitive markets that reduce the incentives for bidders to
shade marginal bids in all auction formats. As the number of bidders increases
and the auction becomes more competitive, a bidder in a uniform auction has less
influence on the market clearing price and so has a greater incentive to bid close
to their actual valuation. And in a discriminatory auction, as bidder competition
increases, bidders have less incentive to shade marginal bids but more incentive
to shade inframarginal bids. Swinkels (1999) demonstrates that bidders behave as
price-takers as the number of bidders runs to infinity.
Another potentially more practical explanation exists for bidders bidding
close to their valuations and delivering small economic differences in revenues across
different formats. The set of potential bidders in each Treasury auction are all part
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of the NSW TCorp dealer panel. This structure exists in other Semi-Government
agencies and in many global government Treasury auctions.
Membership of the dealer panel could be (and often is) bundled with other
benefits. Bidders could receive benefits from the auctioneer for consistently win-
ning Treasury auctions (and so funding the Government). Benefits could include
preferential involvement in more lucrative alternative funding measures, such as for-
eign currency placements or syndicated issuance. This potentially could reduce the
incentive for bidders to shade bids below their valuation in each of the different
formats, lowering the revenue differences across mechanisms.
4.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter I focus on under-bidding in NSW Treasury auctions and the
impact on auctioneer revenues. I test whether bidder behaviour in NSW Treasury
bond auctions shows similar characteristics to bidder behaviour in previous studies. I
ask whether bidders shade their bids below their valuations. And I test whether that
bid-shading lowers the actual revenue raised by the auctioneer in the discriminatory
auction relative to the revenue that could be raised in a counterfactual multi-unit
Vickrey auction.
My research shows that bidders in NSW Treasury auctions do shade their
bids below their valuation, by an average of 23bps. Also, bidders appear to use the
price as their decision variable when entering their price-quantity bid-points. These
findings support previous studies.
I also test whether bidder valuations from one auction can be used to help
the Treasury bond issuer predict possible bid-schedules for a subsequent Treasury
bond auction that is held in close proximity, and for the same maturity Treasury
bond. My results suggest that bidder valuation estimates might be useful for pre-
dicting subsequent bid-schedules.
In this Chapter, I find that the revenue raised in the actual discriminatory
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auction held by TCorp is less than the potential revenue that could be achieved in
the counterfactual multi-unit Vickrey auction. But the revenue shortfall is small in
absolute terms and is also not statistically significant.
Even so, the result does raise the question, why might an auctioneer persist
with the discriminatory auction? I hypothesis that the current empirical literature
ignores the presence of secondary markets for Treasury bonds, that might act as
a fixed-price alternative for Treasury bond bidders. I consider this possibility in
Chapter 5 of this Thesis.
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Chapter 5
5 NSW Treasury Auctions With A Competing Secondary
Market
In this section I extend the analysis of Treasury bond auctions to take
account of the secondary bond market. To the best of my knowledge, in all of the
IPVM Treasury auction literature to date, the auctioneer of the Treasury auction
has been treated as a monopolist seller. Each potential bidder’s demand can only
be met by the announced supply in the auction.
This is certainly true for all bond auctions that are opening a new maturity
or a new line of bonds. But after a bond line has been established, either through an
initial auction or through some form of book-building, auctions held by the issuer
are no longer the only place that bidders can buy the bond. In reality, for most
Treasury auctions, bidders can also purchase the bond on the secondary market.
In Chapter 4, I found that the actual discriminatory auction predominantly
used by NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) achieved on average less revenue than a
hypothetical multi-unit Vickrey auction would achieve. But the revenue estimations
ignored the presence of secondary markets that exist for established Treasury bonds.
In this Chapter, I hypothesise that bidders under-bid relative to their valuations by
a greater extent when there is a secondary market for the Treasury bond. In other
words, bidders should incorporate the presence of secondary markets in their bidder
strategies.
I expect that greater level of bid-shading will result in revenue estimates for
the counterfactual auction that are lower than the estimates in Chapter 4. If that
is the case, then the actual revenue achieved in the discriminatory auction could
exceed that raised in the counterfactual mult-unit Vickrey auction.
My results in this Chapter support the hypothesis. Bidders do appear to
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shade their bids by more when there is a secondary market. And I find that the
actual revenue raised by TCorp in the discriminatory auctions is higher than what
could have been achieved in the counterfactual auction, reversing my findings in
Chapter 4.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 I discuss the issue of secondary markets for Trea-
sury bonds. Section 5.3 describes the auction that bidders and auctioneers must
consider when there are secondary markets for the Treasury bonds on issue. In Sec-
tions 5.4 and 5.5, I derive the necessary condition of optimality for a pure strategy
equilibrium when bidders have the secondary market option in discriminatory and
uniform-price auctions. I compare the bidder valuations in Treasury auctions that
have secondary markets against the valuations that would have been estimated if it
is assumed there is no secondary market available in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7 I
present estimates of bidder valuations in auctions with secondary markets. I com-
pare Treasury auctioneer revenues in Section 5.8 and Section 5.9 concludes Chapter
5.
5.1 Treasury Bond Auctions and Secondary Markets
The secondary bond market is the marketplace that exists for bonds that
have already been issued in the primary market. After a Treasury bond has been
issued by the auctioneer in the primary market, for example, by TCorp, the initial
purchaser of the bond may hold that bond until maturity and receive the coupon
payments on that bond. Alternatively, the initial purchaser can sell that bond as
he sees fit. If the purchaser sells the Treasury bond in the secondary market, the
payment for the bond accrues to that seller, not to TCorp.
While the effect of the secondary market price as an outside alternative to
a Treasury auction has not been considered, the secondary market price has been
used in common value models to proxy the true value of the Treasury bond to
participating bidders. Castellanos and Oviedo (2004) and Keloharju, Nyborg, and
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Rydqvist (2005) have shown that the government typically sells the Treasury bonds
in the auction at a lower price than the one present in the secondary market. This
is called underpricing in the literature. Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist showed
that on average, the difference between the true value of a Finnish Treasury bond,
proxied by the secondary market price and the market clearing price of the Finnish
Treasury auction, was 0.041% of the face value from 1992 to 1999.
But not all government auctions exhibit underpricing. In fact, Riccardo
(2007) assumes a CVM framework and shows that European government bonds
are usually overpriced in bond auctions relative to the secondary market. Riccardo
does not attribute the overpricing to successful issuing technique or to the discretion
enjoyed by some issuers in the market-clearing price setting procedures.
Rather, Riccardo attributes the overpricing to the presence of bundling
in the auction procedure. In many European Treasury auctions, a panel dealer
system exists. Being a member of a panel is associated with profitable privileges in
contrast with non-primary dealers. Panel members also must fulfill certain duties.
For example, members are usually expected to participate in each auction, and to
facilitate liquidity in the Treasury bonds in the secondary market by price making.
The NSW TCorp auctions also use a dealer panel system. Being a member
of the dealer panel delivers some privileges for members. And being a panel member
in NSW confers some duties for members, although bidding in each auction is not
one of them. That raises the question, why is there underpricing in NSW Treasury
auctions?
The presence of underpricing can be explained in terms of a premium. That
is, the auctioneer of the Treasury bond pays a premium to attract bidders to his auc-
tion rather than bidders purchasing in the secondary market. That premium could
be paid through extensive privileges granted to dealer panel members. Alternatively
it could be paid through lower prices in the auction relative to the secondary market.
The presence of this premium is an important point. The current literature
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uses primary market Treasury auction data to estimate bidder marginal valuations.
But that literature ignores the premium that the issuer needs to pay to attract
bidders to the auction. And so there is a risk of underestimating the true valuations.
The issuer pays the premium because issuing the Treasury bonds is mo-
tivated by funding requirements. But for bidders, purchasing the Treasuries is
generally motivated by investment opportunities and a return on capital. So the
auctioneer pays a premium, in the form of a discount to the secondary market price,
to attract the bidders to the auction as opposed to a secondary market.
The underpricing in NSW Treasury auctions relative to secondary markets
- the premium that needs to be paid to bidders - could also reflect the nature of
the Australian fixed-income market. State-issued Treasury bonds are differentiated
from Australian Commonwealth government issued Treasury bonds. Both NSW
and Australian Commonwealth Treasury bonds have the highest credit rating from
international credit rating agencies. But market participants may assign lower risk
of default to Australian Commonwealth Treasury bonds relative to NSW Treasury
bonds.
There has also historically been periods of stronger demand for Australian
Commonwealth Treasury bonds. So the premium paid to the bidders, or the level
of underpricing, might need to be larger to encourage participation.
As further research, it could be interesting to revisit the European situa-
tion now that similar discrimination of Government Treasury bonds is occurring.
European governments with significantly worsening credit ratings and increasing
sovereign risks could find that the level of underpricing in their Treasury auctions
increases.
The level of underpricing could be used to test how much attention bidders
pay to credit-ratings. And the level of underpricing could help inform Treasury
auctioneers how assiduously they must conform to credit ratings before bidders
demand a higher premium to participate in the Treasury auction. This higher
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premium risk would lift the issuer’s cost of funding. Clearly, the difficulty in such
tests would be getting competing Treasury auctioneers to share information that
could negatively feedback into potential bidders’ strategic decision making, lifting
the cost of funding.
5.2 Secondary Market Prices
In the NSW Treasury discriminatory auctions, the market clearing price
is typically lower than the secondary market price immediately prior to the auc-
tion. Figures 13 and 14 show that the the market clearing price is usually below
the secondary market price in NSW Treasury auctions, both before and after the
auction.
The numbers along the x-axis in Figures 13 and 14 and Figures 15 and 16
represent the auction number from the data set.
Because Figures 13 and 14 are in terms of yield, a positive result represents
a higher secondary market price relative to the market clearing price.
Figure 13: Market Clearing Minus Secondary Market Yield Prior to Auction
In fact, not only is the market clearing price typically below the secondary
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Figure 14: Market Clearing Minus Secondary Market Yield After Auction
market price in NSW Treasury auctions, the highest winning bid (in price terms)
is typically below the secondary market price. Figures 15 and 16 show that the
outside option of the secondary market effectively establishes an upper-bound for
each bidder’s demand schedule.
Figure 15: Highest Bid Minus Secondary Market Yield Prior to Auction
The establishment of the upper-bound is unsurprising. Each bidder has
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Figure 16: Highest Bid Minus Secondary Market Yield After Auction
the option to satisfy his demand for Treasury bonds at a fixed price because of the
existence of the outside option. It is not optimal for a bidder to bid above that fixed
price. From a potential bidder’s perspective, the secondary bond market creates an
alternative to purchasing the Treasury bond from the initial issuer. Each bidder
can choose between trying to satisfy his demand by attending the sales mechanism
announced by the primary market auctioneer, and purchasing in the secondary
market, assuming that bidder’s valuation is above the secondary market price. If
the secondary market is deep and liquid, then we can assume the outside option
acts much the same as a fixed price alternative. Bidders become price takers in the
secondary market.
The upper-bound that is established in the secondary market could also,
more worryingly for auctioneers, indicate the possibility of collusion on behalf of
bidders. If bidders believe that auctioneers will use the price in the secondary market
prior to the auction to try and anchor bidders’ expectations about the auction result,
then bidders may have an incentive to collude in the secondary market to try and
push the price paid for Treasury bonds in the secondary market lower. That collusion
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would have the impact of driving down auction prices. The incentive to collude in
this way would be higher for auctions where Dealer Panel members are obligated to
bid in every auction - or in cases where bidders expect to buy more Treasury bonds
on the primary market relative to the secondary market.
It is worth noting that the presence of the outside option will not always
establish an upper-bound to participating bidders’ bid-points. There are at least
two reasons that participating bidders might choose to place a bid that is above the
secondary market price. Both reasons are related to market liquidity.
If the secondary market is not deep, that is, if there are only a limited
amount of the Treasury bonds on issue, then the bidder might reasonably suspect
that he can not satisfy his demand for Treasury bonds in the secondary market. In
these situations, the outside option no longer exists and bidders face an auction as
described by Hortacsu (2002). On the other hand, the bidder might assume that he
can synthetically replicate the Treasury bond using alternative securities. If that is
the case, then this first reason is less likely to occur.
The second reason that a bidder’s bid-point might exceed the fixed price also
relates to liquidity. It also relates to risk aversion events in Treasury markets. One
reason that market participants demand Treasury bonds is for capital requirements.
Australian and International banking regulations require financial institutions to
hold a certain amount of capital reserves. These capital reserves must be highly
liquid and be low risk - that is, they must have a strong credit rating. In Australia,
Commonwealth Government securities and Semi-Government securities, including
TCorp Treasury bonds, are eligible as capital reserves.
Secondary markets can become illiquid as market participants hoard highly-
rated capital during times of market stress and heightened risk aversion in financial
markets. In effect, markets are looking to hold safe-haven assets. Participants focus
on the return of capital, rather than a return on capital.
Prices of bonds are pushed higher and yields fall. This phenomenon was
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particularly evident during the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2008. During
these periods of market stress, the primary issuer of Treasury bonds becomes the
only viable source of safe assets. And so bidders might have an incentive to bid
above the secondary market price to ensure they obtain their required amount of
safe-haven assets.
5.3 Set-up of the Auction
In this section we set up the framework for analysing the Treasury auction
game with the fixed-price outside option.
The framework will be important for analysing the impact on each bidder’s
bidding strategy. There are two competing-mechanism frameworks that might be
considered in analysing the Treasury auction with competing fixed-price sale. These
are either a Treasury auction with a simultaneous fixed-price alternative, or the
Treasury auction with a sequential fixed-price alternative.
In this analysis, I focus on the sequential fixed-price alternative. Arguably,
both the simultaneous and the sequential fixed-price alternatives are valid for anal-
ysis. Certainly, in reality, market participants may bid in a primary market issue
while simultaneously attempting to satisfy his demand in the secondary market.
But doing so introduces the risk that the bidder wins both the Treasury auction
and purchases Treasuries in the secondary market. That is, the bidder introduces a
chance that he wins more than he demands. That would be an inefficient outcome.
And from a practical point of view, a bidder that bids in the Treasury auction
but at the same time attempts to purchase in the secondary market is adopting
a more costly strategy. The effort involved in buying in the secondary market is
un-necessary if the bidder satisfies his demand in the Treasury auction. And finally,
a sequential fixed-price alternative offers a more tractable analytical framework.
I make the following assumptions about the secondary market in the anal-
ysis.
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First, the auctioneer and the bidders recognise the outside option as the
only competition for the Treasuries that are being auctioned. There are no com-
peting auctioneers for those particular Treasury bonds. This is realistic insofar as
TCorp is the only issuer of NSW Treasury bonds, for example, just as the Com-
monwealth Government of Australia is the only issuer of Australian Commonwealth
Government bonds.
But the assumption may not entirely capture reality if each bidder is happy
to hold similar securities in lieu of NSW Treasury bonds. For example, a bidding
bank may switch between NSW Treasury bonds and South Australian Treasury
bonds. But the assumption approaches reality as bidders will typically have rela-
tive value or absolute value reasons, based on market prices and credit quality, for
pursuing a particular issuer’s bonds at that point in time.
Second, each bidder can satisfy his entire quantity of Treasury bonds de-
manded at the fixed price, called pF . This assumption is satisfied if the market for
the Treasury bonds is deep and liquid. This assumption seems reasonable for NSW
Treasury bonds. Table 14 in Chapter 3 shows the total issued value in Australian
dollars of NSW Treasury bonds.
Third, the secondary market price approximates a fixed take-it-or-leave it
price. The fixed price is assumed to be the mid-price that is quoted on the Bloomberg
screen34 in the morning prior to the auction. This assumption needs some discussion.
In reality, while Treasury bond trading can take place on over the counter
markets, where prices are fixed by each individual seller to each enquiring pur-
chaser, most purchases are made through an intermediary or broker where pricing
is extremely competitive. So for simplification, I assume that every bidder is able
to access bonds at the mid-price that is quoted on the Bloomberg screen.
Assuming the fixed price that each bidder faces is the mid-price quoted
prior to the auction might be more problematic. Prior to the auction, a potential
34Bloomberg is standard software that provides timely and accurate market pricing information
to a large number of trading desks worldwide.
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bidder knows that every other bidder will not bid higher than the secondary market
mid-price that is quoted on Bloomberg. If a bidder chose to bid higher than that
quoted price, then it would be sub-optimal. The bidder could ignore the auction and
instead purchase the bonds in the secondary market before the auction and achieve
a larger payoff with positive probability. So, the secondary market mid-price is
established as an upper-bound on bid-prices in the market.
Now, if the mid-price in the secondary market is an upper-bound for the
auction, then it follows that immediately after the auction, the secondary market
price will be higher than any winning bid-price in the auction. In that case, the
bidders that were not awarded their demanded quantity, but had a valuation that
was greater than the secondary market price, are able to purchase Treasury bonds
in the secondary market at that mid-price. Sellers in the secondary market have no
incentive to lower the mid-price to match the awarded Treasury auction prices.
In actual treasury markets, the yield in the morning prior to the auction is
generally the same or higher than the traded yield after the auction. That suggests
that it is justifiable to make the assumption about the mid-price being similar to a
fixed-price.
Third, the fixed price establishes an upper limit on the market-clearing
price, pF ≥ pm. Effectively, I am assuming that the Treasury markets are deep and
liquid, and that no bidder will bid above the secondary market price. It is easy to
show that if markets are deep and liquid, then bidding above the secondary market
price is not optimal.
A bidder will always bid below his valuation. That is, pk < vi(qk, si) for
any bidder i. Otherwise, the bidder makes a loss on the kth bid-price with positive
probability. But the same rationale applies to the fixed price. If pF < pk, then the
bidder guarantees himself a smaller payoff if he wins the auction with the kth bid.
Assume that for a given share of Treasuries, qk, a bidder’s valuation is vi(pk, si).
Given a fixed price alternative, pF , the bidder’s payoff from purchasing qk at pF
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is qi × (vi(qk, si) − pF ). But if the bidder submits a bid-point (pi, qi) : pi ≥ pF ,
assuming competing bidders follow the strategy of not bidding above the fixed price
alternative, then the bidder’s payoff is qi× (vi(qk, si)− pk), that is a smaller payoff.
In the sequential game, the auctioneer first announces an auction format
and the value of Treasury bonds that are to be issued. Potential bidders know the
number of other bidders that they will be competing against. The Treasury auction
takes place in time t. Bidders are able to submit a bid schedule just as they could
in our analysis of the stand-alone Treasury auction without a competing fixed-price
alternative. But in the sequential game, each bidder can approach a fixed-price seller
post-auction, in period t + 1. In reality, the length of time between periods t and
t+ 1 could be arbitrarily small. So I ignore the effects of discounting of valuations
by bidders between the two periods.
Figure 17: Auction With a Fixed Price Outside Option
Bidders place their bids in the auction. At the completion of the auction,
the bidder then has the opportunity to purchase Treasury bonds in the secondary
market at the fixed price. For example, in Figure 17, the bidder values 0.1% of the
shares higher than the fixed price. If the bidder is unsuccessful in the auction, he
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can purchase that quantity of shares at the fixed price pF post-auction.
In the next section I derive the bidders’marginal valuations for Treasury
auctions that have a secondary market alternative.
5.4 Discriminatory Auction: A Heuristic Derivation For Necessary
Conditions
In a discriminatory auction, Hortacsu (2002) characterised the necessary
condition of optimality for a pure strategy equilibrium in the case that there is no
fixed-price alternative. I use a heuristic derivation to characterise the necessary
condition when bidders face a fixed-price outside alternative.
In the auction with a fixed price alternative, there are two states that we
are interested in. In one state, the bidder has a valuation at a given price-quantity
pairing that is below the fixed price for the Treasury bond. The bidder is unwilling
to purchase the Treasury bond in the secondary market. In that state, bidders
proceed as though there is no outside option for that quantity. Bidders will bid
according to the game set out in Hortacsu (2002).
In the second possible state of the game, the bidder has a valuation for a
given price-quantity that is above the fixed price for the Treasury bond. In that
case, the bidder can purchase the Treasury bond in the secondary market and still
achieve a positive payoff. Ignoring the fixed price alternative will have consequences
for the estimation of the marginal valuations in that state of the game.
Consider the auction described by Figure 18. Consider a bidder that devi-
ates from the pure strategy equilibrium given by ~qi(si) with a ∆q change to the k
th
component of the bidder’s demand schedule.
In the following analysis, I drop the subscript i that denotes the i ’th bidder.
135
Figure 18: Heuristic Derivation for Necessary Conditions
In expectation, the deviation delivers the bidder the following benefit:
E (Benefit) =
(∫ ~q+∆q
qk
x(q, s)dq − pk∆q
)
× (H(pk, ~q + ∆q)−H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q))
+
(∫ ~q+∆q
qk
v(q, s)dq − pF∆q
)
× (1−H(pk, ~q + ∆q)
As in Hortacsu (2002) the benefit from deviating comes from the extra ∆q
that is won whenever the market clearing price falls between the bidder’s kth and k-
1 st bid-price. That happens with the probability (H(pk, ~q + ∆q)−H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q)).
But we also need to take into account that if the bidder is unsuccessful in
the auction, then for all y : x(q, s) > pF , the bidder can purchase at the fixed price
outside option. That is given by
(∫ ~q+∆q
qk
v(q, s)dq − pF∆q
)
× (1−H(pk, ~q + ∆q) in
the above equation.
The probability of this occurrence is (1−H(pk, ~q + ∆q). Note that the
probability should be (H(pF , ~q + ∆q)−H(pk, ~q + ∆q)). But we have made the as-
sumption that pF is an upper limit on the market price. That is, no bidder will bid
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higher than the price that they can purchase the Treasury bond outside the auction.
So H(pF , ~q + ∆q) = 1.The payoff component is the area under the valuation curve
but above the fixed price.
On the other hand, if the market clearing price is below than pk−1, the
bidder derives no benefit from the deviation. In fact, the bidder pays the following
cost:
E (Cost) = (pk ×∆q)− (pk−1 ×∆q)×H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q)
= ∆q × (pk − pk−1)×H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q)
Now, for ∆q not to be a profitable deviation, it must be the case that
E(Cost) ≥ E(Benefit). That is,
∆q × (pk − pk−1)×H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q) ≥(∫ qk+∆q
qk
x(q, s)dq − pk∆q
)
× (H(pk, ~q + ∆q)−H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q))
+
(∫ ~q+∆q
qk
v(q, s)dq − pF∆q
)
× (1−H(pk, ~q + ∆q)
Simplifying this obtains
(pk)×H(pk, ~q + ∆q)− (pk−1)×H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q) + pF (1− (H(pk, ~q + ∆q)))
(1−H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q)) ≥
1
∆q
(∫ qk+∆q
qk
x(q, s)dq
)
And if the bidder instead decreases his quantity bid by ∆q, then the fol-
lowing bound is obtained.
(pk)×H(pk, ~q −∆q)− (pk−1)×H(pk−1, ~q −∆q) + pF (1− (H(pk, ~q −∆q)))
(1−H(pk−1, ~q + ∆q)) ≤
1
∆q
(∫ qk−∆q
qk
x(q, s)dq
)
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Consider the limit case of the upper and lower bounds that are obtained
when ∆q → 0.
xi (q, si) =
pk (H(pk, ~qi)) + pF (1−H(pk, ~qi))− pk−1 (H(pk−1, ~qi))
1−H(pk−1, ~qi)
=
pF + (pk − pF ) (H(pk, ~qi))− pk−1 (H(pk−1, ~qi))
1−H(pk−1, ~qi)
So the marginal valuation estimation in a discriminatory auction for Trea-
sury bonds that are also available in a secondary market is given by:
xi (q, si) =
pF + (pk − pF ) (H(pk, ~qi))− pk−1 (H(pk−1, ~qi))
1−H(pk−1, ~qi) (19)
5.5 Uniform-Price Auction
In this section I extend the work done by Kang and Puller (2008) in deriving
first order conditions for uniform-price auctions. Kang and Puller show that in a
uniform-price auction, with no fixed-price alternative, then the first-order condition
that solves for bidder i ’s marginal valuation is given by:
x(qk, ti) =
pk (H(pk; ~q)−H(pk+1; ~q))−G(pk; ~q) (pk−1qk−1 − pkqk)
H(pk; ~q)−H(pk+1; ~q) +G(pk; ~q) (qk − qk−1)
Now consider a participating bidder in the auction that has the opportunity
to purchase bonds in the secondary market at a fixed-price. The changed auction
format alters the participating bidders’ optimal behaviour. That changes the dis-
tribution of the market clearing price, so I use G(p, q(p)) to denote the distribution,
compared with H(p, q(p)) in the discriminatory auction. Furthermore, this sec-
tion also nests the first-order condition for Kang and Puller (2008)’s uniform-price
auction extension of Hortacsu (2002) and Nautz (1995). In cases where there is
no fixed-price alternative, the first-order condition collapses to Kang and Puller’s
condition, that is shown at the end of the section.
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Assume that all bids lie upon an arbitrarily fine price grid, such that p0 <
p1 < · · · < pk+1. I adopt the same assumptions that Kang and Puller (2008) use.
First, the lowest point on the grid lies below the support of the distribution of the
market clearing price. So G(pk, q(p)) = 0 at the price p0 and for all prices that are
below p0. Second, no bidder submits a bid-point at the price p0, so that the quantity
demanded at p0 = x1, and x0 = x1. Third, at the highest price on the price grid,
bidders submit zero demand, so that for qK+1 = 0∀p ≥ pK+1.
The expected payoff is given by:
K+1∑
k
= 0 [Prob(MCP = pk)× (payoffifMCP = pk)] =
K+1∑
k
= 0 [G(pk, ~q)−G(pk−1, ~q)]
[∫ qk
0
x(q, si)dq − pkqk
]
+
K+1∑
k
(1−G(pk, ~q))
[∫ qk
0
x(q, si)dq − pF qk
]
Since
[∫ qk
0
x(q, si)dq − pkqk
]
=∫ qk−1
0
x(q, si)dq − pk−1qk−1 −
∫ qk−1
qk
x(q, si)dq − pkqk + pk−1qk−1
the Lagrangian can be formed using the monotonicity constraints as:
L =
K∑
k=1
[∫ qk−1
0
x(q, si)dq − pk−1qk−1 −
∫ qk−1
qk
x(q, si)dq − pkqk + pk−1qk−1
+ (1−G(pk, ~q))
[∫ qk−1
0
x(q, si)dq − pk−1qk−1 −
∫ qk−1
qk
x(q, si)dq − pF qk + pk−1qk−1
]]
+λ(qk − qk+1)
As Kang and Puller (2008) indicates, imposing the first and second bound-
ary point assumptions causes the partial sum for k = 0 to disappear. And after
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imposing the first and third assumptions, the following summation for the interior
points in the price grid can be obtained:
L =
K∑
k=1
G(pk)
(
pk+1qk+1 + qk(pF − pk)−
∫ qk+1
0
x(q, si)dq
)
+
(∫ qk
0
x(q, si)dq − pfqq
)
+ λ(qk + qk+1)
The first order condition at each interior point pk on the price grid is:
G(pk) (pF − pk − x(qk, si)) + ∂G(pk)
∂qk
(
pk+1qk+1 + qk(pF − pk)−
∫ qk+1
0
x(q, si)dq
)
+x(qk, si)− pF +G(pk−1) (pk + x(qk, si))
+
∂G(pk−1)
∂qk
(
pk+1qk+1 + qk(pF − pk)−
∫ qk+1
0
x(q, si)dq
)
+ λk − λk−1 = 0
If a bidder submits a unique bid quantity at each point on the price grid,
then the monotonicity constraints are not binding and λk = 0∀k = 1 · · ·K. And
solving the first order condition gives us:
x(qk, si) =
pF (1−G(pk)) + pk (G(pk)−G(pk−1))
1−G(pk−1)
−
∂G(pk)
∂qk
(
pk+1qk+1 + qk(pF − pk)−
∫ qk+1
0 x(q, si)dq
)
1−G(pk−1)
If I assume that the bidder’s marginal valuation follows a step function, the
integral in the first-order condition becomes −x(qk)qk. And given that ∂G(pk)∂qk =
H(pk), then the first-order condition can then be rewritten as
x(qk, si) =
pF (1−G(pk)) + pk (G(pk)−G(pk−1))
1 +H(pk)−G(pk−1)
−H(pk) (pk+1qk+1 + qk(pF − pk))
1 +H(pk)−G(pk−1)
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5.6 Marginal Valuation Comparison
I can compare the valuation for a bidder that attends a discriminatory
auction and has an outside option with the valuation for a bidder that is assumed
to have no alternative to the auction. And I can do the same for a bidder that
attends a uniform-price auction that has an outside option with the valuation for a
bidder with no outside option.
The first order conditions derived by Hortacsu (2002) and by Kang and
Puller (2008) can be directly compared with the two first order conditions obtained
in the previous section because they rely on the same inputs. The inputs are the bid-
ders’ price-quantity schedule and H(pk, ~q), the probability that the market clearing
price is below a given price, conditional on the bidders’ bid vectors.
It is important to note here that I assume H(pk, ~q) is the same for compar-
ison purposes. This assumption is only valid for calculating whether the presence
of a fixed-price alternative to the auction results in over- or under-estimation of the
marginal valuations. So I can make the assumption for ex-post comparison.
I cannot use the assumption to compare an auction that does not have a
fixed-price alternative, such as an auction that opens a new line of Treasury bonds,
with an auction that does have a fixed-price alternative, such as an auction for an
established line of Treasury bonds. Bidders will take the presence of the fixed price
alternative into account when they submit their bid schedules, and that will change
the values for H(pk, ~q) in the two alternative auctions.
I start with the discriminatory auction. The marginal valuations that are
calculated, vi(qik, si) are the valuations that rationalise the quantity bids observed
in the bidders’ price-quantity data. I find that ignoring the outside option results
in estimates for the marginal valuation that are too low. Put another way, ignoring
the outside option results in estimates for a bidder’s valuation that underestimates
the true extent of bid shading.
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A bidder’s valuation without the fixed price is given by
xi(q, si) = pk +
H(pk−1, ~qi) (pk − pk−1)
H(pk, ~qi)−H(pk−1, ~qi)
If we drop the ~qi for ease of exposition, then we can see that the estimated
valuation with a fixed price alternative is larger than the valuation without the fixed
price alternative whenever
pk +
H(pk−1) (pk − pk−1)
H(pk)−H(pk−1) ≤
pF + (pk − pF ) (H(pk))− pk−1 (H(pk−1))
1−H(pk−1)
If we consider the case where pF → pk, then that happens whenever
pk ≤ pk (1−H(pk−1))
H(pk)−H(pk−1)
1 ≤ 1−H(pk−1)
H(pk)−H(pk−1)
And because 1 ≥ H(pk), this condition is always satisfied with positive
probability. So we see that ignoring the existence of a fixed price alternative results
in underestimation of bidders’ valuations. The bidders with an outside option shade
their bid by more than bidders that do not face an outside option.
I next consider the uniform-price auction. The estimated valuation with a
fixed price alternative is larger than the valuation without the fixed price alternative
whenever
pF (1−G(pk))
1−G(pk−1) +
pk (G(pk)−G(pk−1))
1−G(pk−1)
−
∂G(pk)
∂qk
(
pk+1qk+1 + qk(pF − pk)−
∫ qk+1
0 v(q, si)dq
)
1−G(pk−1)
≥ pk −
∂G(pk)
∂qk
(∫ qk
qk+1
v(q, si)dq + pk+1qk+1 − pkqk
)
G(pk)−G(pk−1)
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Using a similar method to the discriminatory auction, that is the case whenever
pF − pk
≥ ∂G(pk)
∂qk
[((
qkpF −
∫ qk+1
0 v(q, si)dq
)
(1−G(pk))
)
−
(
(pk+1qk+1 − pkqk)
(G(pk)−G(pk−1))
)
−
(
(1−G(pk−1))
∫ qk
qk+1
v(q, si)dq
(1−G(pk)) (G(pk)−G(pk−1))
)]
The expression to the left of the inequality is always positive, by the as-
sumption that a bidder will not bid more than the fixed-price alternative. On the
right of the inequality, the first part of the expression is negative inside the brackets.
The following expressions are positive, so the expression to the left of the inequality
is negative overall. So we can see that, similar to the discriminatory auction, ignor-
ing the existence of a fixed price alternative results in underestimation of bidders’
valuations.
5.7 Results and Discussion
The previous section found that ignoring the presence of the secondary
market results in estimates for the bidder’s marginal valuation function that are
lower than would be the case if the secondary market fixed-price were included in
the estimation. I can use the NSW TCorp data set to empirically test this finding.
The results are best demonstrated graphically.
The following analysis considers the results from the discriminatory auction
of $200m of the 20 November 2025 bonds held on 18 February 2010. Seven bidders
participated in the auction and a total of 49 bid-quantities were received. 17 of those
bids were successful. The bid-to-cover ratio was 3.2. And the market clearing yield
was 3.565% or a price of 96.812. The submitted bid-prices ranged from a maximum
of 97.147 to a minimum of 95.758.
Figure 20 shows the results of the valuation estimation procedure for bidder
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Figure 19: Estimated Marginal Valuation Function For Bidder 9, 18 Feb 2010:
$200m 20 November2025
nine. Bidder nine submitted six bid-points in the auction. The bidder’s highest bid
(in terms of price) was for 10% of the total supply, and the lowest bid was for 56%
of the total supply.
Figure 20 looks remarkably like the stylised prior expectation captured in
Figure 18. The empirical results highlight several points. Bidder nine’s estimated
valuation is above the secondary market price for the four highest bid-points. But
the bidder has submitted bid prices that are below the secondary market price, as
expected. Bidding below the market clearing price for these valuations ensures that
the bidder obtains positive payoff if the bidder does win that share of the auction,
and if he does not. If bidder nine’s highest four bid-points do not win at the auction,
the bidder can purchase the bonds at the secondary market with positive payoff.
Ignoring the secondary market option results in estimates for the bidder’s
marginal valuation that are too low. In Figure 20, the valuations estimated including
the secondary market price are higher at every-bid-quantity than the estimates
obtained ignoring the secondary market price. On average, ignoring the secondary
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Figure 20: Estimated Marginal Valuation Functions 18 Feb 2010: $200m 20 Novem-
ber2025
market price results in bidder nine’s estimated valuation being 92bps lower than
when the secondary market price is included. Table 22 shows that similar results
were obtained across the remaining auctions35. Clearly, the secondary market price
makes a substantial impact on the estimates of bidders’ marginal valuation functions.
Table 22: Average Under-Bidding in NSW Treasury Auctions
Maturity Secondary No Secondary
Market (bps) Market (bps)
1 April 2019 47 12
20 November 2020 87 32
20 November 2025 81 30
20 November 2035 68 25
The results in Table 22 are potentially important for Treasury auctioneers.
Treasury auctioneers are concerned with optimality - they aim to fund their Govern-
ment’s borrowing requirements at the lowest possible rate. Previous studies have
focussed on marginal valuations that have been estimated without including the
35Note that the auctions that took place for the 1 August 2013 and 1 April 2015 maturities are
not included. This is because these auctions opened new benchmark bond lines, and so did have a
developed secondary market.
145
impact of the secondary market. As a result, the extent of underbidding has been
mis-estimated. And there is a risk that revenue comparisons between alternative
auction mechanisms misstates the optimal format. I consider this in Section 5.8.
5.8 NSW Treasury Auction Revenue
In this section I compare the actual revenued achieved by NSW TCorp
in the discriminatory auctions against the counterfactual revenue that could have
been achieved in a uniform-price auction. The marginal valuations used to calculate
the potential revenues under all of the following scenarios assume that secondary
markets exist.
In Table 23, the column labeled (I) shows the revenue in millions of Aus-
tralian dollars that the discriminatory auction achieved, given the bids that each
bidder submitted. Each cell contains the same value as the corresponding cell in
Table 21. The column labeled (II) contains the hypothetical revenue that could
have been achieved in a counterfactual uniform-price auction, with no secondary
market alternative. It is analogous to the column labeled (II) in Table 21. And
the comparison is in line with the a priori expectations. That is, because I expect
the marginal valuations derived by including secondary markets to be higher than
the marginal valuation derived ignoring secondary markets, then the auctioneer’s
ex-poste revenue should also be higher.
The column labeled (III) estimates the revenue that the counterfactual auc-
tion would have achieved using estimates for marginal valuations that include sec-
ondary market prices in the estimation process, but the revenues also assume that
there is a secondary market for the counterfactual auction.
So, in the fifth column, I must account for the presence of the secondary
market fixed-price option. That means bidders’ strategies will change. For example,
in Section 5.8, I assume that bidder i submits the bid pk = x(qk, ti). But the same
bidder will not bid pk = x(qk, ti) if their valuation is above the secondary market
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price where they can alternatively buy the Treasury bond outright. Clearly, bidding
one’s value is dominated by capping the bid at the secondary market price. Bidder
i ’s bid strategy in the counterfactual auction becomes:
pk =
 x(qk, ti)∀x(qk, ti) < pFpF∀x(qk, ti) ≥ pF
Table 23: Revenue Comparisons Under Alternative Mechanisms
Discrim Alt (II) ($m) Alt (III) ($m) Diff Diff
Maturity Auction Date (I) No Secondary Secondary I-II I-III
($m) Market Market ($m) ($m)
1 Apr 2019 18 Sep 2009 745.3 747.3 744.0 (2.0) 1.3
20 Nov 2020 20 Nov 2009 152.7 152.8 152.3 (0.1) 0.4
18 Nov 2010 147.1 148.0 146.7 (0.9) 0.4
17 Feb 2011 173.1 174.1 172.5 (1.0) 0.6
24 Mar 2011 148.7 149.2 148.7 (0.5) 0.0
20 Nov 2025 20 Aug 2008 97.9 98.2 96.9 (0.3) 1.0
20 Feb 2009 96.1 95.1 95.3 1.0 0.8
20 May 2009 98.2 98.5 98.2 (0.3) 0.0
21 Jan 2010 146.7 147.2 146.6 (0.5) 0.1
18 Feb 2010 193.6 194.2 193.3 (0.6) 0.3
20 May 2010 198.9 199.3 198.8 (0.4) 0.1
20 Aug 2010 98.1 98.5 98.2 (0.4) (0.1)
18 Nov 2010 97.6 97.8 96.9 (0.2) 0.7
19 May 2011 195.3 196.5 194.7 (1.2) 0.6
18 Aug 2011 98.9 99.0 98.7 (0.1) 0.1
20 Nov 2035 19 May 2011 48.4 48.9 48.1 (0.5) 0.3
The final two columns in Table 23 show the revenue differences between
alternative mechanisms. A positive difference indicates the original discriminatory
auction obtained higher revenue than the alternative revenue obtained in auctions
(I) or (II).
Table 23 shows that if I ignore the presence of the secondary market in the
counterfactual auction, the actual discriminatory auction is ranked lower in terms
of expected revenue than the upper bound of the Vickrey auction, that is the best
case uniform-price auction outcome.
Under the assumption of no secondary market for the Vickrey auction,
147
the actual revenues are lower in the discriminatory auction that TCorp actually
performed compared with the upper bound of the Vickrey auction that is reported
in the column labeled (II). The revenue achieved by the upper bound Vickrey auction
exceeds the discriminatory auction revenue by an average value of $0.50m. That
is 0.29% in percentage terms. Over the period that the auctions were conducted,
Table 23 indicates that TCorp achieved a total of $8.0m less revenue than the
Vickrey upper bound auction could have achieved. This result is is line with the
result I obtained in Section 4.3.
But including my addition of an external secondary market to the Vickrey
auction alters the results. Table 23 shows that revenue in the Vickrey upper bound
auction, including a secondary market, is less than revenue obtained in the actual
discriminatory auction held by TCorp for all except two of the auctions. The rev-
enue obtained in the actual discriminatory auction held by TCorp now exceeds the
revenue in the counterfactual upper bound Vickrey auction by an average value of
$0.3m, or 0.31%36. Over the period that the auctions were conducted, Table 23 in-
dicates that TCorp achieved a total of $6.7m more revenue than the Vickrey upper
bound auction with secondary markets could have achieved.
The results of the revenue tests demonstrate two points. First, the presence
of a secondary market price for the Treasury bonds being auctioned does matter for
revenue comparisons of alternative auction formats.
Ignoring the presence of the secondary market results can give misleading
results in revenue comparisons. Auction formats that were previously considered
optimal in terms of revenue may be sub-optimal when the secondary market price is
considered. So the secondary market price should be included in empirical studies
of auction formats and should be considered from the perspective of the Treasury
36I test if these differences are statistically significant in Appendix I, using a test proposed by Kang
and Puller (2008). The tests show that when the secondary market price is included in the marginal
valuation calculations, then for most of the auctions , I can reject that actual discriminatory revenue
is less than the counterfactual auctions. However, I cannot reject the test for most of the auctions
when the secondary market price is not included.
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bond auctioneer, who should be aware that the presence of a secondary market may
introduce an upper limit on bidders’ bid-schedules.
And second, while I found statistically significant differences between the
revenue for the discriminatory auction and the alternative with a secondary market,
the size of those differences was small in economic terms.
From the perspective of TCorp, the decision to undertake discriminatory
auctions dominates a Vickrey upper bound auction for Treasury bonds that are
available on the secondary market. But the revenue differences are small. This
suggests that for other agencies that issue Treasury bonds that have a secondary
market alternative, the choice of auction format may not be the most important
decision from a revenue perspective.
Finally, the presence of other Semi-Government Australian State Treasury
bond auctioneers in Australia raises an interesting question. In the previous para-
graph, I showed that TCorp’s discriminatory auction formation dominates the Vick-
rey upper bound auction. But TCorp (and the other Australian State Treasury Cor-
porations) might also be interested about whether they are paying a large seller’s
premium to encourage bidder participation, particularly relative to competing is-
suers. I cannot test this with only the data set that I have available. But the
relative differences between bidder valuations and submitted bids across the State
Treasury auctioneers could be instructive. I would expect that State Treasury Cor-
porations that issue bonds with a lower credit rating would pay a higher seller’s
premium than better-rated issuers, all other things being equal. I leave this as an
area for further research.
5.9 Conclusion
Treasury auctions introduce a further element of complexity to the standard
single-unit auction. Bidders must choose how many bid-points to submit, as well
as the price and quantity pairing for each bid-point. The broader strategic space
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complicates the theoretic analysis of Treasury auctions.
Treasury auctions provide a rich area for practical research. If Treasury
auctioneers were willing to make their data available, researchers could test many
questions. Which auction mechanism performs better for opening new Treasury
bond lines? Do bidders discriminate across competing Treasury auctioneers based
on the auction mechanism? Do bookbuilds or syndications outperform auctions in
terms of revenue?
In this Chapter, I extend the existing empirical literature to take account of
the existence of secondary Treasury bond markets on bidder valuations and Treasury
bond auction revenues.
The existing empirical literature indicates that bidders in NSW auctions do
shade their bids below their valuation. My results in Chapter 4 suggest that the
discriminatory auction format used by TCorp raises less revenue than the alternative
mechanism. I did not find the revenue differences to be statistically significant. And
the revenue differences were very small from an economic sense.
But the existing empirical literature ignores the presence of a secondary
market for Treasury bonds. Bidders in Treasury bond auctions, however, are very
unlikely to ignore the presence of the secondary market when calculating their de-
mand schedules.
The secondary market in deep and liquid Treasury bond lines essentially
acts like an outside option for potential bidders in Treasury auctions. Bidders can
satisfy their demand in the Treasury auction, or they can purchase the same Treasury
bond in the secondary market. The presence of the secondary market should put a
ceiling on the maximum a bidder is willing to bid in the auction.
In Chapter 5, I extend the existing empirical literature to include secondary
Treasury bond markets. I hypothesised that estimations of bidders’ valuations could
be overstated if the secondary market is ignored. If that is the case, then revenue
comparisons between alternative auction mechanisms could be inaccurate.
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The results in Chapter 5 confirmed my hypothesis. Secondary markets do
matter to bidders. And so they should matter to auctioneers of Treasury bonds.
Bidders’ under-bid, relative to their valuation, was an average of more than 70bps
when secondary markets were included. Bidders’ average under-bid was only 25bps
when secondary markets were not considered.
Because the extent of under-bidding is misestimated when secondary mar-
kets are ignored, there is a risk that revenue comparisons from Chapter 4 overesti-
mate the revenue that could be raised in the counterfactual upper bound Vickrey
auction mechanism. My results in Chapter 5 indicate this is indeed the case. The
revenue in the discriminatory-price auction used by TCorp is higher than the alter-
native when secondary markets are included in the estimation.
Revenue in the actual discriminatory auction exceeds the revenue in the
counterfactual mechanism by an average value of $0.3m, or 0.31%. The values
are not large in an economic sense. My finding for the relatively small differential
between auction mechanisms is in line with findings in preceding empirical studies.
That finding suggests that the choice of mechanism may not be the most
important decision for Treasury auctioneers. Instead, Treasury auctioneers might
want to focus on transparency, liquidity of their Treasury bond lines, credit ratings,
and establishing a strong dealer panel to encourage participating in primary market
auctions.
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A OLS Regression Results for Price Equations
Table 24: Hedonic Price Equation Models
Hedonic Model Auction Sales Private Treaty Sales
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat
Constant 3.220** 10.77 3.331** 7.34 2.900** 9.40
Property Characteristics (X)
PT -0.233** -4.26 -0.058** -3.89 -0.010** -3.56
T -0.003 -38.08 -0.001** -11.14 -0.003** -36.02
HS 0.000 -0.78 -0.001 -4.75 0.000 -0.58
B 0.088** 60.82 0.150** 17.79 0.082** 55.65
BR 0.241** 94.54 0.221** 16.34 0.236** 90.91
CP 0.002** 20.27 0.005** 3.52 0.038** 26.89
S 0.020** 20.86 0.080** 4.00 0.078** 20.33
DR 0.080** 9.64 0.095** 4.40 0.036** 8.57
FR 0.040** -1.81 -0.162* -2.29 -0.014 -1.35
SR -0.019 9.04 0.121** 3.46 0.030** 8.31
RR 0.065** 0.36 -0.141** -4.91 0.007 1.35
F 0.002 23.07 0.305** 10.80 0.126** 20.63
WR 0.014** 0.01 0.002 0.06 0.000 -0.01
CY 0.000 12.30 0.059* 2.44 0.059** 12.72
H 0.056** -21.17 -0.053 -1.90 -0.100** -21.88
AC 0.1004** 11.88 0.075** 4.27 0.033** 11.65
BC -0.034** 20.88 -0.001 -0.09 -0.069** -22.25
BB 0.065 0.47 -0.052 -1.36 0.004 0.67
TF 0.003 19.61 0.128** 5.80 0.084** 19.03
E 0.086** 9.30 0.127** 5.77 0.030** 7.88
G -0.035** 10.39 -0.036 1.95 0.029** 9.24
PO 0.032** 15.87 0.091** 3.98 0.064** 15.16
AL 0.067** 26.09 0.126** 5.13 0.122** 25.08
Market Conditions (M)
MT -0.011** -4.08 -0.003 -0.61 -0.002** -3.73
AR 0.123** 8.61 1.380** 6.53 0.120** 6.83
CR 0.148** -2.69 0.002 1.02 -0.010* -2.67
Seller Attributes (Z)
LMI 1.110** 2.69 1.429** 2.77 1.247** 2.59
Sales Mechanism
MC 1.333** 10.00 — — — —
Adj. R Squared 0.584 — 0.555 — 0.585 —
No. of Obs 89442 — 3571 — 85871 —
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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B Two-Step Regression Results
Table 25: Auction Sales by Property Type - Two Step Regression
Flat Auctions House Auctions
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat
Constant 3.331** 3.63 3.258** 6.36
Property Characteristics (X)
T -0.001** -4.76 -0.001** -10.15
HS -0.001** -4.13 -0.001** -4.56
B 0.011** 6.62 0.160** 16.11
BR -0.020** 7.19 0.224** 14.32
CP 0.080** 5.05 0.005** 3.04
S 0.121** 3.02 0.063** 2.74
DR 0.073 1.62 0.096** 3.91
FR -0.153 -0.98 -0.172* -2.17
SR 0.084 1.23 0.136** 3.31
RR -0.129* -2.31 -0.141** -4.20
F 0.348** 6.05 0.288** 8.86
WR -0.049 -0.67 0.022 0.55
CY 0.003 0.47 0.082** 2.92
H 0.007 -1.30 -0.048 -1.42
AC -0.056 -1.59 -0.080** -3.95
BC -0.029 -0.838 0.013 0.68
BB -0.053 -0.70 -0.049 -1.09
TF 0.134** 3.24 0.127** 4.90
E -0.108 2.45 -0.131** -5.16
G 0.045 1.21 0.021 0.97
PO 0.071 1.51 0.095** 3.65
AL 0.077 1.58 0.138** 4.84
Market Conditions (M)
MT -0.001 -0.10 -0.004 -0.64
AR 1.409** 3.18 1.338** 5.59
CR 0.041 1.03 -0.013 -0.55
Inverse Mills Ratio
IMR 5.167 1.38 4.593* 1.65
Adj. R Squared 0.545 — 0.563 —
No. of observations 957 — 2614 —
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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Table 26: Private Treaty Sales by Property Type - Two Step Regression
Flat Sales House Sales
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat
Constant 2.68** 7.38 3.591** 6.14
Property Characteristics (X)
T -0.001** -29.98 -0.001** -2.02
HS 0.000 -0.37 -0.001 -0.08
B 0.079** 46.66 0.009** 30.06
BR 0.240** 79.40 -0.023** 40.40
CP 0.039** 23.54 0.036** 12.90
S 0.080** 17.60 0.075** 10.08
DR 0.040** 8.16 0.025** 3.03
FR -0.004 -0.32 -0.040* -2.09
SR 0.064** 7.43 0.053** 3.79
RR 0.010 1.76 -0.003 -0.34
F 0.122** 17.13 0.134** 11.50
WR -0.001 -0.21 0.004 0.36
CY 0.053** 9.77 0.008** 8.48
H -0.100** -18.46 -0.010** -11.75
AC -0.030** -8.99 -0.042** -7.66
BC 0.068** 18.80 0.074** 12.01
BB -0.001 -0.08 0.167 1.44
TF 0.084** 16.06 0.086** 10.20
E -0.029** -6.41 -0.034** -4.62
G 0.028** 7.58 0.033** 5.41
PO 0.061** 12.31 0.076** 9.04
AL 0.119** 21.25 0.133** 14.80
Market Conditions (M)
MT -0.003** -3.34 -0.002 -1.61
AR 0.114** 5.52 0.137** 4.16
CR -0.011** -2.63 -0.005 -0.74
Inverse Mills Ratio
IMR 0.970 1.96 1.224 1.70
Adj. R Squared 0.587 — 0.583 —
No. of observations 22527 — 63344 —
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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C Two-stage Heckman Procedure
Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step procedure to account for sample se-
lection bias. The procedure ensures that coefficient estimates are consistent.
An OLS estimation is written as:
E (Yi|Xi) = Xiβ
The regression equation conditional on the selection rule changes if the sample is not
random. If Ii is a vector of variables that impact the choice of a sales mechanism,
then the regression equation becomes:
E (Yi|Xi, Ii) = Xiβ + E (i|Ii)
And in this situation, the mean of the error term E (i|Ii) is not equal to zero and
the estimated coefficients are biased.
Heckman (1979) proposes a correction term that is called the inverse Mill’s
ratio to correct for bias. The first step of the two-step procedure estimates a selec-
tion equation using a probit model. The inverse Mill’s ratio is calculated from the
probit equation error term. In the second step, the inverse Mill’s ratio becomes an
explanatory variable in the hedonic price OLS regression. If the coefficient for the
inverse Mill’s ratio is significantly different from zero then there is selectivity bias
present.
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D Property Differences and Price Differentials by Mean
Income Quantiles
Table 27: Property Differences and Price Differentials by Mean Income Quantiles
Variable Full Sample Lower Middle Upper
Quantile Quantile Quantile
Constant 0.285** 0.183 0.249** 0.278**
(2.26) (3.21) (4.23) (5.17)
PD 0.050** 0.031** 0.054** 0.062**
(2.96) (3.00) (3.40) (2.50)
PT 0.016 0.010 0.017* 0.016
(1.60) (1.72) (1.97) (1.90)
Adj. R sqd 0.032 0.021 0.018 0.029
F Stat 15.63 18.20 14.89 19.16
No. of obs 89442 26831 35779 26832
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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E NSW TCorp Dealer Panel Members
Table 28: NSW TCorp Dealer Panel Members
Panel Member Location
Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd Sydney
Barclays Bank plc, Australia Branch Sydney
BNP Paribas, Sydney Branch Sydney
Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd Sydney
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Sydney
Deutsche Bank AG, Sydney Branch Sydney
J.P. Morgan Australia Ltd Sydney
Merrill Lynch International (Australia) Ltd Sydney
National Australia Bank Ltd Sydney
Nomura International Sydney
The Royal Bank of Scotland Sydney
Royal Bank of Canada Sydney
The Toronto-Dominion Bank, London Branch Singapore
UBS AG, Australia Branch Sydney
Westpac Banking Corporation Sydney
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F Summary Statistics: TCorp Auctions Bidding Data
Table 29: Treasury Auction Summary Statistics
Mean Values
Number of bidders per auction 7.01
(2.08)
Number of bids per bidder 4.41
(5.52)
Maximum number of bids per bidder 13.15
(3.53)
Bid-cover ratio 3.93
(1.29)
MCP* 3.29
(0.32)
Number of winning bids 16.11
(5.09)
Value ($m) 225
(252.18)
Total number of bids 527
*Market clearing price, in yield
Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis
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G Treasury Auctions: First-order Conditions in the
Continuous Case
The subsequent discussion follows Wilson (1979).
G.1 Discriminatory Auction
A bidder in a continuous discriminatory auction faces the following max-
imisation problem.
max
q
∫ ∞
0
(∫ q(p)
0
[x(q, ti)dq − p(q)] dq
)
dH(p, q(p))
The middle integral is the bidder’s surplus from winning the quantity q(p). I denote
it as pi(q(p)). And
∂pi
∂p =
∂pi
∂q · ∂q∂p =
(
x(q(p), ti)− q−1(q(p))
]
q′(p)
Integrating by parts obtains
∫ ∞
0
pi(q(p))dH(p, q(p)) = pi(q(p))H(p, q(p))|∞0 −
∫ ∞
0
H(p, q(p))dpi(q(p))
When p = 0 then H(0) = 0 and when p = ∞ then pi(q(∞)) = 0. Then the profit
maximisation problem becomes
max
q
∫ ∞
0
H(p, q(p)) (x(q(p), ti)− p) q′(p)dp
The integrand becomes a function of p, q and q′. And the Euler equation that is a
necessary condition for optimality becomes Fq =
∂Fq′
∂p . So the first order condition
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in the continuous case for a discriminatory auction is given by
x(q(p), ti) = p+
H (p, q(p))
Hp (p, q(p))
G.2 Uniform-Price Auction
A bidder in a continuous uniform-price auction faces the following maximi-
sation problem.
max
q
∫ ∞
0
(∫ q(p)
0
x(q, ti)dq − pq(p)
)
dG(p, q(p))
Once again, the middle integral is the bidder’s surplus from winning the quantity
q(p). I denote it pi(q(p)). And
∂pi
∂p
= (x(q(p), ti)− p) q′(p)− q(p)
Integrating by parts and assuming the same boundary conditions, that when p = 0
then H(0) = 0 and when p = ∞ then pi(q(∞)) = 0, then the profit maximisation
problem becomes
max
q
∫ ∞
0
G(p, q(p)) [(x(q(p), ti)− p) q′(p)− q(p)] dp
And solving the equation delivers the Euler condition for the uniform-price auction
given by
x (q(p), ti) = p− Gq(p, q(p))q(p)
Gp(p, q(p))
(20)
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H Treasury Auctions: First-order Conditions in the
Discrete Case
H.1 Discriminatory Auction
The derivation follows Nautz (1995) and Hortacsu (2002).
Consider a risk neutral bidder that submits a bid vector ~qi : {qi0 ≥ qi1 ≥ · · · ≥ qiK+1}
along a set of prices p0 < pq < · · · < pK+1 that maximises his expected profit that
is:
∑K+1
k=1 [Prob (Market clearing price = pk : ~q)× (payoff on bids ≥ pk)]
=
∑K+1
k=1 [H(pk, ~q)−H(pk−1, ~q)]×
∑K+1
j=k
(∫ qj
qj+1
x(y, ti)dy − pj(qj − qj+1)
)
Nautz and Hortacsu make three assumptions about the price grid. First, the lowest
point on the price grid is below the support of the market-clearing price distribution:
H(pk, q(p)) = 0∀p ≤ p0. Second, the bidder submits no bid-point at p0, and that
q0 = q1. Finally, the bidder has zero demand at and above pK+1, the highest price
on the price grid: qK+1 = 0∀p ≥ pK+1.
Because most of the products with H(pk) and all of the H(pk−1) products
cancel, and because the partial sum for K + 1 is equal to zero from the third
assumption, the Lagrangian is written as
L =
K∑
k=1
H(pk, ~q)
[∫ qk
qk+
x(y, ti)dy − pk (qk − qk+1)
]
+ λk (qk − qk+1)
The first-order condition for each pk on the price grid is
H(pk) (x(qk, ti)− pk) + ∂H(pk)∂qk
(∫ qk
qk+1
x(y, ti)dy − pk (qk − qk+1)
)
+ λk
−H(pk−1) (x(qk, ti)− pk−1) + ∂H(pk−1)∂qk
(∫ qk−1
qk
x(y, ti)dy − pk−1 (qk−1 − qk)
)
− λk−1 = 0
Now,
∂H(pk−1)
∂qk
= 0. This is the case because the market-clearing price is
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the lowest price on the price grid where bidder i ’s residual supply is greater than
his bid-quantity - alternatively, pk is the lowest price that has excess supply. So
increasing the bid-quantity qk will not affect whether the price is pk−1 or lower.
Rearranging obtains the first-order condition that can be used to estimate
the marginal valuation step function:
x(qk, ti) = pk +
H(pk−1) (pk − pk−1)
H(pk)−H(pk−1)
−
∂H(pk)
∂qk
(∫ qk
qk+1
x(y, ti)dy − pk (qk − qk+1)
)
H(pk)−H(pk−1)
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I Revenue Comparison Significance Tests
Following Kang and Puller (2008), I test if the differences between the
actual revenues and the benchmark revenues with and without a secondary market
are statistically significant. The test uses bootstrapped standard errors from 10,000
resamples of the pair of actual bids and estimated marginal valuations for each
auction. Each resample has N randomly drawn bid vectors and marginal valuation
vectors, that are used to obtain a market clearing price and revenue for each pair
in the resampling set, giving 10,000 differences between the actual discriminatory
auction revenue I and the alternatives. In Table 30, the comparison is between
the actual discriminatory auction performed by NSW TCorp and the hypothetical
Vickrey auction. In Table 31, two comparisons are conducted; the auction with no
secondary market revenue (II ) and the auction with a secondary market, revenue
(III ). From these resamples, I obtain the expected ex-ante revenue difference and
the 95% confidence interval,calculated as percentages of the actual revenue obtained.
The significance tests show that for the majority of the auctions, I cannot
reject that actual discriminatory revenue is less than the counterfactual uniform-
price auction revenues.
The significance tests show that when the secondary market price is included
in the marginal valuation calculations and the secondary market is assumed to be
available to bidders in the hypothetical auction, , then for most of the auctions, I can
reject that actual discriminatory revenue is less than the counterfactual auctions.
But I cannot reject the test for most of the auctions when the secondary market is
assumed to not be available to bidders in the hypothetical auction calculations.
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Table 30: Statistical Significance Tests for Auctions
Maturity Auction Date 95% Confidence Interval Test Result
(I) - (II)
1 Apr 2019 18 Sep 2009 [-0.533, 0.659] Reject
20 Nov 2020 20 Nov 2009 [-1.358, 0.148] Not reject
18 Nov 2010 [-0.851, -0.515] Not reject
17 Feb 2011 [0.197, 0.159] Not reject
24 Mar 2011 [-0.5143, 1.136] Reject
20 Nov 2025 20 Aug 2008 [0.268, 0.389] Not reject
20 Feb 2009 [1.057, 1.454] Not reject
20 May 2009 [-0.318, 0.794] Reject
21 Jan 2010 [-0.596, 0.637] Reject
18 Feb 2010 [0.198, -0.567] Not reject
20 May 2010 [-0.333, 0.155] Reject
20 Aug 2010 [-0.099, 1.389] Not reject
18 Nov 2010 [-1.035, 0.100] Not reject
19 May 2011 [-0.178, 0.122] Not reject
18 Aug 2011 [0.559, 0.125] Not reject
20 Nov 2035 19 May 2011 [-1.343, -0.0.192] Reject
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Table 31: Statistical Significance Tests for Auctions with Fixed-Price Alternatives
Maturity Auction Date 95% Confidence Interval Test Result
(I) - (II)
1 Apr 2019 18 Sep 2009 [-1.059, -0.236] Not reject
20 Nov 2020 20 Nov 2009 [0.010, 0.293] Reject
18 Nov 2010 [-1.764, -0.572] Not reject
17 Feb 2011 [-1.854, -0.368] Not reject
24 Mar 2011 [-0.549, 0.160] Not reject
20 Nov 2025 20 Aug 2008 [-0.429, -0.303] Not reject
20 Feb 2009 [0.410, 1.239] Not reject
20 May 2009 [-1.127, -0.094] Not reject
21 Jan 2010 [-1.436, -0.197] Not reject
18 Feb 2010 [-1.144, -0.153] Not reject
20 May 2010 [-0.557, -0.133] Not reject
20 Aug 2010 [-0.523, -0.108] Not reject
18 Nov 2010 [-1.058, 0.016] Not reject
19 May 2011 [-1.019, -0.435] Not reject
18 Aug 2011 [-0.011, 0.202] Reject
20 Nov 2035 19 May 2011 [-1.722, -0.556] Not reject
Maturity Auction Date 95% Confidence Interval Test Result
(I) - (III)
1 Apr 2019 18 Sep 2009 [0.184, 1.153] Reject
20 Nov 2020 20 Nov 2009 [0.310, 0.689] Reject
18 Nov 2010 [0.325, 0.896] Reject
17 Feb 2011 [0.416, 0.788] Reject
24 Mar 2011 [0.023, 0.369] Reject
20 Nov 2025 20 Aug 2008 [1.253, 1.891] Reject
20 Feb 2009 [0.956, 1.246] Reject
20 May 2009 [0.018, 0.199] Reject
21 Jan 2010 [0.126, 0.753] Reject
18 Feb 2010 [0.223, 0.566] Reject
20 May 2010 [0.118, 1.050] Reject
20 Aug 2010 [-0.203, 0.845] Not reject
18 Nov 2010 [1.022, 1.685] Reject
19 May 2011 [0.421, 0.799] Reject
18 Aug 2011 [0.302, 0.756] Reject
20 Nov 2035 19 May 2011 [0.655, 1.102] Reject
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